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This project is about the distinction between universals and particulars.
The fundamental claim I defend is this: The distinction between universals
and particulars can be vindicated via the fact that universals are identical if indis-
cernible while particulars are not identical if indiscernible. This way of “making”
the universal-particular distinction is “extensionally” adequate—it (by and large)
gets the pre-theoretical extensions of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ right. The entities
that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the
entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars.
Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is “intensionally” adequate—it sit-
uates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently
vi
of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars
must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals
are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. No more can reasonably
be asked of a proposed universal-particular distinction.
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Chapter 1
The Introduction
There is another way of distinguishing between universals and par-
ticulars.
—John Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter
This project is about the distinction between universals and particulars.
The fundamental claim I defend is this: The distinction between universals
and particulars can be vindicated via the fact that universals are identical if indis-
cernible while particulars are not identical if indiscernible. This way of “making”
the universal-particular distinction is “extensionally” adequate—it (by and large)
gets the pre-theoretical extensions of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ right. The entities
that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the
entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars.
Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is “intensionally” adequate—it sit-
uates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently
of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars
must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals
are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. No more can reasonably
be asked of a proposed universal-particular distinction.
1
1.1 The Major Assumptions
Because this project takes up an issue that is “downstream” of some fundamental
debates in ontology, I must take certain contentious positions for granted while
stipulating them to be outside the scope of my work here. Further, a defense of
any one of the views in question would be a dissertation unto itself, so taking
them for granted is necessary to appropriately circumscribe the topics with which I
will deal and to establish a manageable dialectical situation. I will, however, have
cause to temporarily suspend certain assumed positions when I interact with the
views of others. At any rate, in the remainder of this section, I describe the major
assumptions of this project.
1.1.1 Pluralist Realism about Particulars
You and I, my dog Elsie, the giant pecan tree on my mother’s property, Lyle’s
putter, the Earth and the Moon all exist. They are paradigmatic particulars. I
am a pluralist about particulars in that I believe that particulars are distinct from
one another and that they are not modes or accidents of some unified, ultimate
“Reality”. So I disavow the monistic views of, e.g., Spinoza and F. H. Bradley
(1893). I am a realist about particulars in that I believe that particulars are mind-
independent; particulars need not be perceived in order to exist. So I disavow the
idealist views of, e.g., Bishop Berkeley and John Foster (1982).
There is another use of ‘particular’ in the literature on the universal-particular
distinction.1 This use identifies particulars with “substrata” or “bare” particulars.
Particulars are theoretical posits required for a particular theoretical role, namely
that of giving an account of the “individuation” or “individuality” of particulars.2
I do not intend to argue that there are particulars in this sense, nor do I intend to
distinguish particulars in this sense from universals.3 I mention this issue primarily
to avoid a potential confusion.
However, the two senses of ‘particular’ dovetail somewhat vis-a`-vis the cur-
1Russell (1911) (esp. the 1955 note) and Hawthorne and Sider (2002) are examplars of this
usage; there are others.
2For more on this issue, see Lowe (2003).
3I do, however, subscribe to the bare particular theory of individuation, though this fact is
irrelevant to what I am about here; cf. Moreland and Pickavance (2003) and Pickavance (2004),
(2009). See Moreland (1998), (2000) and Sider (2006) for more.
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rent strategy for the making the universal-particular distinction. Those who affirm
that particulars are identical if indiscernible—most famously, these are the “bundle
theorists”—are forced to deny as well the existence of particulars in the second,
theoretical sense. While there are other ways of being a primitivist about particu-
lars than by positing substrata, and so while there are other ways of embracing the
view that particulars are not identical if indiscernible, all those who accept primi-
tive particulars, whether in a substrata form or not, and so all those who deny that
particulars are identical if indiscernible, must reject the bundle theory.
1.1.2 Realism about Properties and Universals
The “problem of universals” is one of the oldest problems in philosophy and is
of fundamental importance. Discussion of the Problem of Universals goes back at
least to Plato and Aristotle, looms large in the medieval period, persists through the
moderns, and, via Husserl, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine among
others, continues to the contemporary scene in Armstrong, Lewis, Chisholm, and
many more.
Surprisingly, it is difficult to say exactly how the problem of universals is a
problem, and more often it is treated as a call for an account of attribute agreement
among different things. In this way, it is more like a calculus problem than a
problem whose only solution is the sacrifice of some deeply intuitive, strongly held
belief. That is, the problem of universals is not a puzzle. Rather, it is a phenomenon
that cries out for an account.
At any rate, we can make our way to the problem by considering the following
list: THE, THE.4 Question: how many words are on this list? Two answers seem
appropriate: There is one word on the list, and There are two words on the list. The
question, and its appropriate answers, can be clarified by drawing on a distinction
made by C. S. Peirce between types and tokens. The list, then, contains two tokens
of the same type. One can make similar distinctions in numerous situations: a
room full of thirty dogs contains one type of animal but thirty token animals; an
apartment complex has one type of home and (say) 400 token homes. Clearly, this
list can be extended: the type-token distinction has wide application.
The problem of universals is that of giving an adequate account of sameness
4My discussion here will follow Armstrong (1989) (pp. 1ff.) somewhat closely.
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of type. The two ‘THE’s in the list are of the same type. The dogs in the room are
all of the same type. The homes in the apartment complex are of the same type.
How should we understand this sameness? Does sameness, in these sorts of case,
amount to identity in some way? Further, some things are alike with respect to
certain types but not alike with respect to others. For example, some of the dogs
in the room may be alike in being dachshunds, while others are alike in being labs.
Some of the dachshunds may be like some of the labs in being black, while others
may be alike in being tan. Each dog, we can say, has a number of properties, and
where there is sameness of type there is having a property in common. Where there
is difference in type there is a difference in properties.
There are a number of candidate solutions to the problem of universals,
some of which deserve the title ‘realism.’ The others will here be called ‘nominal-
ism.’ The various versions of realism include reified types, in that realists claim
that types are fundamental elements of an adequate ontology. Realists believe in
universals and cash sameness of type in terms of identity. The various versions of
nominalism exclude reified types, in that nominalists claim that types either do not
exist (“extreme” nominalists) or else are just collections of particulars rather than
fundamental elements (“moderate” nominalists). Nominalists do not believe in uni-
versals; the world consists solely of particulars. Here is a classic characterization of
the contranst between realism and nominalism from David Armstrong:
The Realist about universals will take...properties seriously (or will at
least take certain selected properties seriously). The Realist will say that
these properties are really there in the world, as constituents of things,
and will take their sameness, where two different things have the same
property, to be a matter of strict identity. Two different things have the
same constituent: horseness or whatever.
The Nominalist will allow talk about properties. Such talk is impossible
to avoid in practice. The Nominalist may even allow that there really
are such entities as properties. But if he does admit properties, he will
insist that they are not universals, that they cannot be strictly identical
across tokens. They are particulars, as particular as the things that have
them. Alternatively, he may try to explain away talk of properties in
terms of some form of unity possessed by the tokens of a certain type.
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In either case the identity across tokens will be no more than a loose and
popular sort of identity. ((1989) p. 7)
While there are minutiae that we might dispute with respect to these characteriza-
tions (must realists claim that universals are “constituents” of things?), Armstrong’s
take on the distinction is certainly useful for fixing ideas. Realists claim that same-
ness of type or property is to be understood in terms of “sharing” one and the same
fundamental thing, whereas nominalists claim that sameness of type or property
can be understood without such sharing. At any rate, I assume that the realists are
correct: universals exist.
‘Property’ and ‘universal’ (and their cognates) have often been used inter-
changeably. Sometimes I will use the two interchangeably; context will make clear
when this is so. However, properties have been given a number of theoretical roles,
not all of which are played by the entities I mean to pick out with ‘property’ and
‘universal’. These roles fall broadly into three categories.5 First, properties may
play the role of attribute or “ground” of similarity and resemblance. This is the
way I have set up the problem of universals in what has come before, and I will not
pause here to repeat that discussion. Second, properties may play the role of relata
of causal relations or causal laws. The basic idea here is simple: things enter into
the causal relations that do and have the causal powers that they do at least in part
because of the properties that they have. A red ball looks red (in normal circum-
stances) because it is red, not because it is round. And bowling balls break toes
because they are heavy and hard, not because they are black or whatever. Third,
properties may play the role of semantic values for meaningful predicates. Predicates
contribute systematically to the meanings of sentences in which they occur, so they
have a semantic value. Some have used ‘property’ to label those semantic values.
For example, in the tradition of “California semantics”, properties in this sense are
set-theoretic entities; in particular, they are functions from worlds to extensions.
I am ignoring the third role, and believe that the first two dovetail. I ignore
the third role because it is often assumed that the sort of entity that is apt to
serve as the semantic value of a meaningful predicate is not likely to be the sort of
entity that is also apt to serve as an attribute or the relatum of a causal relation
or causal law. Or anyway, if it did turn out to be so apt, it wouldn’t be anything
5For a more thorough discussion of these roles, and for some others, see Oliver (1996).
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like the intensional entities that philosophers usually mean to pick out when they
use ‘property’ to label semantic values. I don’t need to challenge these sorts of
assumptions here. On the other hand, the roles of attribute and relata of causal
relations or causal laws dovetail. One way that entities resemble is by having the
same or similar causal powers, or by obeying the same natural laws. There is a
close connection, one I will explore in Chapter (5), between properties as attribute
and the causal powers of things. I do not, however, assume that the only causal
powers that a thing has must be causal powers that other things could have as
well. The importance of this caveat will emerge in Chapter (3). Hereafter, then,
when I use ‘property’ or ‘universal’, I mean to pick out those entities that make
for resemblance and causal powers. I will have more to say about property roles in
Chapter (2) below.
Largely due to the influence of Lewis (1983), metaphysicians often distin-
guish between properties and universals. For Lewis, properties are classes of pos-
sible individuals, namely those individuals which exemplify the relevant property,
while universals are those things, if such there be, that generally satisfy Armstrong’s
(1978) account. Properties have members, are not wholly located anywhere, and
are not repeatable. (Those that reject the Lewisian pluriverse can maintain this
Lewisian terminology by substituting intensions, that is, functions from worlds to
extensions, for classes in the characterization of properties.) Universals are numer-
ically the same in their instances, are wholly located wherever an instance of them
is, and are repeatable. Lewis adopts this terminology because he believes properties
and universals are fit for different theoretical work. In particular, properties are
fit to be the semantic values of predicates, while universals are fit to account for
resemblances and causal powers. Again, I will sometimes adopt this Lewisian usage
(and context will make clear where this is so), though I don’t challenge the claim
that these roles require different role-players.
Further, there are many different English words are roughly synonymous with
‘universal’ and ‘property’: ‘quality,’ ‘feature,’ ‘attribute,’ ‘kind,’ etc. I will use these
words more-or-less interchangeably with ‘property’, with the caveats about context
in place here as well. Lastly, there are two primary ways to construct singular
terms from predicates in English: nominalizations (‘gentleness’) and property-of
constructions (‘the property of being gentle’). Friederike Moltmann (2003), (2004a),
(2004b) has argued that these two types of constructions have different types of
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denotations. I assume in the dissertation that this is false: both nominalizations and
‘property-of’ constructions refer to universals. See Appendix A for the beginnings
of a defense of this assumption via a criticism of Moltmann’s case.
1.1.3 Sparse Universals
I assume that universals are sparse. Minimally, this means that it is not the case that
every (or, at any rate, almost every) predicate corresponds to a universal. Abundant
theorists of universals maintain that the class of universals are closed under negation,
disjunction, and conjunction. I assume that the class of universals are not closed
under negation or disjunction. Tentatively, I assume that the class of universals are
not closed under conjunction either. It will be worthwhile to motivate—though, I
want to be clear, not defend—this assumption; it will loom large in the sequel.
The picture that often drives a sparse theorist is the following: There is
bound to be a theory of everything, a theory that gets all the facts right and that
can be stated in natural language. Maybe this theory is just a completed physics,
maybe it will include more. (It doesn’t much matter for my purposes.) While
we don’t know what this theory is, we know it will include universals. In fact, it
will include a unique universal for every predicate in the minimal language needed
to state the theory completely. However, it won’t include a universal for every
natural language predicate. For instance, it won’t include the property of being
grue. It is unlikely, moreover, to include universals like the property of being green
or red. One reason the theory of everything won’t include universals for every
natural language predicate is that, prima facie, truths asserted using some natural
language predicates can be asserted without those predicates by “decomposing” the
predicates in question. The obvious and ultimately inadequate starting points are
principles like:
• o is grue iff o is green and was examined before time t or o is blue and was not
examined before t
• o is F or G iff o is F or o is G
• o is not F iff it is not the case that o is F
The idea is that the final theory will not need to deploy these predicates in asserting
all the facts; the predicates are, in that sense, disposable. As such, the theory
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need not include any universals corresponding to the disposable predicates. Again,
the theory only needs to include a universal corresponding to the predicates in the
minimal language needed to state the theory. By doing without such universals,
one simplifies the theory of everything. Another reason the theory of everything
won’t include universals for every natural language predicate is that the existence
of some universals would get a theory in trouble. For example, the property of being
a property that does not exemplify itself cannot be smoothly accommodated by a
consistent theory; but ‘x is a property that does not exemplify itself’ is a well-formed,
meaningful English predicate. Yet another reason not to include a universal for every
predicate is that some predicates appear to tell us nothing at all about the world.
For example, ‘x is round or not round’ is satisfied by every object. Knowing that
this dissertation is round or not round is utterly uninformative, however. Likewise,
knowing that a particular leaf is yellow is informative in a way that knowing that
that leaf is not green, not pink, and not clear is not. Universals corresponding to
these uniformative predicates, therefore, would be idle additions to one’s theory.
Again, this is just the picture.
The lesson the sparse theorist takes from this picture is that there is a ques-
tion about every predicate: must we include in our theory a universal to go with
it? I presume an affirmative answer to this question in every case. Reason must
be given for excluding a universal to go with a given predicate. Consistency and
simplicity are two reasons to exclude a putative universal. There may be others.
The assumption that universals are sparse invites the following question-
cum-objection: shouldn’t a proposed universal-particular distinction be available to
every realist? My answer is, of course, no, at least not obviously so. For example
and relevant to the present assumption, sparse and abundant theories differ dramat-
ically in their motivations and, often, in their conceptions of universals and the way
they relate to ordinary particulars. (Consider the constituent v. non-constituent
ontology debate; the constituent ontologists tend to be sparse theorists of universals,
while the non-constituent ontologists tend to be abundant theorists.6,7) It should
6Very roughly, the constituent ontologist maintains that universals are “parts” (in some extended
sense; cf. Paul (2002)) or “constituents” of ordinary particulars. The non-constituent ontologist
maintains that universals are not parts (in that sense) of ordinary particulars; that is, universals
are transcendent and just related to ordinary particulars. This dispute will not concern me here,
so I will not pause to make the issue more precise.
7For the constituent and sparse camp, cf. Armstrong (1978), (1997), Bergmann (1967), Lewis
(1983), and Moreland (2001). For the non-constituent and abundant camp, cf. Plantinga (1974)
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not be entirely surprising that various conceptions of universals will support various
distinctions between universals and particulars, so long as the conceptions of uni-
versals diverge widely enough. It may be, however, that the distinction defended
here can be redeployed in an abundant theory, though different arguments will be
needed insofar as I rely on the assumption that universals are sparse.
1.1.4 De Re Modality and “Robust” Essentialism
I assume a distinction between de dicto and de re modality and that de re modal
claims are meaningful and sometimes true. (This assumption is not as controver-
sial as it was thirty years or so ago.) Roughly, de dicto modality concerns what is
possible, impossible, necessary, and contingent as regards the truth-values of propo-
sitions (or declarative sentences) while de re modality concerns what is possible,
impossible, necessary, and contingent as regards the exemplification of properties
by objects. In order to make true claims about what properties are essential and
accidental to some object, de re modal claims must sometimes be true.
I assume that particulars have “thick” essences; so I assume “robust” essen-
tialism. No sane philosopher would deny that the following predicates are necessarily
true of every possible object: ‘x is round or not round,’ ‘x is self-identical,’ ‘x is not
red and blue all over.’ Such a list can be extended; call such predicates ‘transcen-
dental predicates.’ If any predicate on such a list express a property (I assume that
at least one does in the remainder of this section), then every possible object has
at least one essential property. Call any such property a ‘transcendental property.’
Transcendental properties constitute “thin” essences. “Minimal” essentialism is a
commitment to thin essences. On the other hand, I assume that some particulars
have thick essences, that is, essential properties that are not transcendental proper-
ties. For instance, I claim that I have the property of being human essentially.8
1.1.5 Neither Descriptive nor Revisionary Metaphysics
Lastly, I want to say a bit about how I conceive of the metaphysician’s projects.
Strawson (1959) makes a distinction between “descriptive” and “revisionary” meta-
(who is explicit about neither but known to be so committed), van Inwagen (2004), and Wolterstorff
(1970).
8Incidentally, if one denies that any transcendental predicate expresses a property, then one can
embrace robust essentialism without embracing minimal essentialism.
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physics. “Descriptive metaphysics,” according to Strawson, “is content to describe
the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is
concerned to produce a better structure.”9 I see myself as doing neither of these,
though if revision of our conceptual scheme occurred as a byproduct, I would not
have any principled objection.
Closer to my own conception is Nicholas Wolterstorff’s:
I understand ontology as descriptive, not explanatory; and descriptive of
the most general structure of what there is, not descriptive of the most
general structure of that conceptual scheme of ours which we apply to
what there is. ((1970) p. xii)
Wolterstorff cites Gustav Bergmann (cf. (1967)) as a proponent of explanatory
metaphysics, that view of metaphysics according to which one constructs a system
that as it were “saves the appearances” by purporting to explain what is presented
to us. The trouble is that explanatory metaphysics, so conceived, is near enough im-
possible. Consider the following. We are sometimes presented with spherical things.
Have we explained what is presented by claiming that there is something presented
to us which exemplifies sphericity? Doubtful. So metaphysics is descriptive, not
explanatory. But it is descriptive of the world, not our conceptual scheme. We can
know about the things to which our conceptual scheme applies, and it is with the
nature of that that metaphysics as it is practiced here is concerned. Metaphysics
is not, therefore, descriptive in the sense Strawson cites. As Wolterstorff points
out, it does not follow from this that there is something wrong with describing the
structure of our conceptual scheme. Like Wolterstorff, that is just not what I am
concerned to do here.10
Some may worry that metaphysics so conceived is impossible, or at least mis-
guided. I agree with Ted Sider (2001) that this worry is misplaced. Such objections
generally presume a sharp divide between metaphysics and science. However, such
divisions are enormously difficult to substantiate, and even if one could, the empiri-
cist theories of knowledge that would be required to repudiate the metaphysics side
of the divide are unstable. These very brief remarks will not satisfy the skeptic, but
nothing I say here will do so. I simply note my belief that metaphysics, as carried
9(1959) p. 9.
10Sider (2001) has a conception similar to Wolterstorff’s and mine.
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out here, is possible.
1.2 The Setup
Here are some harmless observations about the world. There are lots of people. Rob
and Mark and I are tall. Jamie’s hair is the same color as Aarin’s. Fire engines tend
to be red. Electrons have unit negative charge. Wisdom is a virtue. My computer
is heavier than Julie’s. Elsie is a dachshund. Triangles have three sides. Yellow is
lighter than violet. Franklin Roosevelt had many of the qualities of a great leader.
These observations naturally lead the realist to an ontology with (at least)
two putative categories: Universal and Particular. The particulars are Rob, Mark,
me, Jamie’s and Aarin’s hair, fire engines, electrons, my and Julie’s computers, Elsie,
triangles, and Franklin Roosevelt. The universals are the properties and relations
of being tall, being the same color as, being red, having unit negative charge, being
wise, being virtuous, being heavier than, being a dachshund, having three sides, being
yellow, being lighter than, being violet, and all those “qualities of a great leader,”
whatever they may be. So the realist postulates the two categories—Universal and
Particular—and populates them with the items mentioned on these lists, among
others. What more need be done?
Alex Oliver, in his excellent article on the state of the art in the metaphysics
of properties, observes:
Given an ontological category, there are four general questions to ask:
(1) What distinguishes the category from the others?
(2) Are there any entities in the category?
(3) Which entities are in the category?
(4) What are the entities in the category like?
The first and last questions are not always distinct. ((1996), p. 10)
Universal and Particular are two ontological categories that call for answers to
Oliver’s four questions. We have seen that the realist answers (2) affirmatively
for both categories and supplies the lists of the preceding paragraph as the begin-
nings of an answer to (3) in each case. Questions (1) and (4) are so far without
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answers. Answering them for the categories Universal and Particular is what need
be done.
A number of proposals, falling into two broad categories, have been offered
by way of answer to question (1) for Universal vis-a´-vis Particular (and vice versa).
The first category of proposal endeavors to answer (1) by appealing to an asymmetry
in the way universals and particulars relate to space and time.11 The second, more
popular, category of proposal endeavors to answer (1) by appealing to an asymmetry
in the way universals and particulars relate to each other in atomic facts.12 I do
not intend to take up these views in detail, for what I have to say is not opposed
to them. They will, however, receive a certain amount of development, though not
much by way of critical attention, in Chapter 2.
Regardless, an interesting feature of these proposals is that they attempt to
answer question (1) without answering or presupposing an answer to question (4).
This should be clear from the fact that both categories of answer to (1) appeal to
the relations in which universals and particulars respectively stand to each other
or to some other thing. No attempt at saying what universals and particulars
are respectively like need be presupposed by such accounts.13 Oliver, for his part,
thinks that one needn’t answer (4) in order to answer (1) in the case of Universal
and Particular.14
My approach rejects the view—implicitly assumed by many interlocutors
in the debate about the universal-particular distinction—that (1) can be answered
without considering (4) by endeavoring to answer (1) precisely by exploring (4). In
particular, I will take up and try to give a partial answer to the question: what
are the identity conditions of universals and particulars, respectively? The par-
tial answer I give will be enough to establish an answer to (1). I try to supply a
universal-particular distinction by considering the nature of universals and particu-
lars themselves. In this way, the universal-particular distinction I offer is motivated
11Russell (1911) develops a variant of this view, and MacBride (1998) criticizes it.
12For developments and criticisms, cf. Frege (1892), Hochberg (1980), (2004), Lowe (1989),
(2004), MacBride (2004b), (2004a), (2005b), (2005c), (2005a), (2006), Oliver (1996), Ramsey
(1925), Russell (1911), (1919), Simons (1992).
13There is one exception to this, namely an account of the distinction that appeals to the “com-
pleteness” of particulars and the “incompleteness” of unviersals. Cf. Frege (1892), Russell (1919).
The chief trouble for this view lies in explaining precisely what it is about particulars that makes
them complete and what it is about universals that makes them incomplete. It is exceedingly
difficult to move this view beyond mere metaphor.
14Or, at least, “Property” and Particular. Cf. (1996) p. 15.
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largely by constraints imposed by a broader theory of universals and particulars. So
if I am successful, I will have vindicated the universal-particular distinction.
A desirable feature of the present strategy is that it does not require one to
take a stand on the alternative approaches mentioned above. Indeed, it is prima
facie compatible with them all. I see no reason to anticipate an incompatibility be-
tween the present strategy and its alternatives, though I have no argument for their
compatibility. If the universal-particular distinction can be defended in one of those
ways as well, then we will simply have multiple lines of argument which converge
on the same view. This is dialectically advantageous for me. Those with a horse in
an alternative strategy’s race needn’t give up on it to embrace my arguments; they
are able to double their chances of winning on the cheap!
Another desirable feature of the present strategy, a concomitant of the fea-
ture highlighted above, is that it bypasses altogether the gauntlet thrown down
by Frank Ramsey (1925). The core of Ramsey’s challenge is that one cannot base
the universal-particular distinction on the linguistic distinction between subject and
predicate. But it’s implications are more far-reaching. Ramsey argues for a kind
of skepticism about the universal-particular distinction. At the root of that skep-
ticism lies a Wittgensteinian skepticism about the “forms” of atomic propositions
and, therefore, a skepticism that one can discover classes of thing that play dif-
ferent roles in atomic facts, as universals and particulars are meant to do. Any
suggestion to the contrary either leads to trouble or is based solely on the interest
of the philosopher or logician, according to Ramsey. I would like to avoid Ramsey’s
challenge if possible, and the strategy I undertake here does so.15
The present strategy does take its cue from John Wisdom (1934), who re-
sponded to Ramsey with precisely the view defended here. Wisdom (1934) was
not about defending the universal-particular distinction, however, so the current
strategy is merely noted by him as a possible way to characterize the distinction.16
For example, Wisdom spends very little time illuminating the notion of “qualitative
similarity,” a notion whose limits are vital to chart if one is to make the distinction
in this way. Regardless, Ramsey’s (1925) arguments do not touch the claim that
universals are identical if idiscernible while particulars are not, so we needn’t get
bogged down in a discussion of Ramsey’s (1925) arguments, nor in the large body
15This is not to say that I am convinced that Ramsey cannot be answered.
16See (1934) p. 208f.
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of literature that has emerged recently regarding them.17
1.3 The Plan
A quick rundown of the structure of the dissertation:
In Chapter 2, I examine what one must do to “make” the universal-particular
distinction and argue that an extensionally adequate characterization of a primitive
distinction is enough, so long as the proposal situates smoothly in the theory of
universals motivated independently of the need to vindicate the universal-particular
distinction.
In Chapter 3, I consider how to explicitly formulate the Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles (“The Principle”). I start by considering anew the question
whether properties of identity (the property of being Jamie or being identical to
Jamie) ought to be immediately excluded from the domain of properties relevant
to The Principle. The interim conclusion is that they should not be, and that there
are no good extant arguments for doing so. The path to this conclusion suggests an
alternative formulation of The Principle with the domain of properties populated
by the “natural” properties.
In Chapter 4, I argue that particulars have primitive individuation condi-
tions. That is, I argue that distinct particulars can share all their natural properties
in common. This requires, it should be clear, the eventual ruling out of properties
of identity as natural; thus I come to reject the interim conclusion of the previous
chapter.
In Chapter 5, I defend modest causal structuralism about universals. This
occurs in two steps. First, I argue that properties have causal essences. This re-
sult rests on two modal principles that ought to be accepted by all sides. Sec-
ond, I argue that those essences are unique. This claim rests on more contentious
considerations—which I find plausible nonetheless—having to do with the theo-
retical role of universals. I conclude this chapter by considering and rejecting an
argument against causal structuralism.
In Chapter 6, I use the results of Chapters 3-5, together with some addi-
17Cf. Hochberg (2004); Lowe (2004); MacBride (2004b), (2004a), (2005b), (2005c), (2005a),
(2006); Simons (1992); as well as the lengthy implicit discussions in Strawson (1959) and Wolter-
stroff (1970).
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tional work, to show that universals are identical if indiscernible (in the relevant
sense) while particulars are not. With the result of Chapter 2, then, I conclude
that an adequate universal-particular distinction can rest on this extensionally ad-
equate characterization in terms of indiscernibility. Thus I will have vindicated the
universal-particular distinction.
Following the conclusion of the main thread of argument, I include an ap-
pendix that supports my assumption regarding the semantics of singular terms
formed from predicates by considering a series of papers by Friederike Moltamnn.
She argues that an adequate semantics for nominalizations and so-called “nominal-
izing quantifiers” requires a more elaborate ontology than has been countenanced
by standard versions of realism. Her arguments are found wanting. This discussion
further cuts off an objection to Chapters 5 and 6 that I have not considered all the
objects which play the universal role.
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Chapter 2
What Must One Do When One
Makes the Universal-Particular
Distinction?
First we have the difference between a percept and a concept... [T]his
is unlikely to be a distinction of any fundamental importance... Next
we have various distinctions between objects based on their relations
to space and time... [I]n spite of the importance of the subject, I do
not think we can have reached the essence of the matter. ... And so
it is with logical distinctions that our inquiry must mainly deal.
—Frank Ramsey, “Universals”
2.1 Introduction
In the early stages of “Universals”, Frank Ramsey asks, “What then, I propose
to ask, is the difference between a particular and a universal? What can we say
about one which will not also be true of the other?”1 I assume that to answer
Ramsey’s first question requires that one make the universal-particular distinction
in a satisfactory way. The second question is just what Ramsey’s says it is, whether
one can say something true about universals that one cannot say about particulars.
1(1925), p. 57.
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The question to which this chapter is devoted is: Are Ramsey’s two questions the
same? In other words, the concern of this chapter is whether making the universal-
particular distinction is a different task than that of saying something true about
universals that is not also true of particulars (or vice versa).
It may seem obvious that the two questions are the same. If one is able
to find a systematic difference in feature between two classes of objects, one has
done enough. The distinction between the two classes consists in that difference
in feature. At least, the distinction between the two classes can be substantiated
(motivated) on the basis of that difference.
However, this is too fast. Suppose that, by some cosmic accident, every man
was five foot ten or taller and every woman was five foot nine or shorter. It would
nonetheless be false that the distinction between men and women consisted in this
difference in height. This is so because it is not the case that a human’s being five
foot ten or taller makes, grounds, etc. that human’s being male. There is not the
right kind of relationship between height and sex to make the distinction between
the sexes on the basis of a difference in height. Therefore, even though we have
found something to say truly about men that cannot be said truly about women, we
have not thereby distinguished men from women. I claim not that this is conclusive,
only that it should give us pause.
Suppose we found a feature X possessed by universals but not particulars.
We have found an answer to Ramsey’s second question. But we can go on to ask, for
example, Why should universals’ being X and particulars’ not being X make them,
respectively, universals and particulars. What about being X does that work? It
may be that we must be able to answer these questions if we are to make the
universal-particular distinction. Or, maybe we at least ought to be able to answer
the weaker question, What about being a universal requires the having of X, and
what about being a particular requires the lacking of X?
I believe it is this last question—What about being a universal requires the
having of X, and what about being a particular requires the lacking of X?—is all
we should expect from a proposed universal-particular distinction. The stronger
question—Why does having or lacking X make something a universal/particular—
is not a question that needs to be answered by an adequate universal-particular
distinction. In this chapter, I defend these claims. I first examine some explicit
and implicit proposals regarding what constitutes an adequate universal-particular
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distinction. I then consider the sense in which universals are theoretical posits,
and argue that it follows from an appropriate understanding of that sense that the
weaker question is all one can hope to answer.
2.2 Extensional and Intensional Adequacy
Fraser MacBride (1998) seems to believe Ramsey’s two questions are different.2 He
briefly describes two criteria for an adequate distinction. They are these:
E-Adequacy. An adequate universal-particular distinction will, by and large,
classify universals and particulars according to our pretheoretical intuitions.
That is, the distinction will divide the universals and particulars and will not
substantially alter the pretheoretical extensions of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’.
I-Adequacy. An adequate universal-particular distinction will incorporate the
appropriate intensional notions relevant to the distinction, for example, that
universals and particulars instantiate each other.
Let us add that a proposed distinction is “Adequate” if it is both E-Adequate and
I-Adequate. MacBride appears to recognize that E-Adequacy is more lucid than
I-Adequacy. The question of the E-Adequacy of a putative distinction is easier to
settle, and the failure of a putative distinction to be E-Adequate constitutes changing
the subject and, therefore, failure to make the universal-particular distinction. Set-
tling questions about the I-Adequacy of a distinction, on the other hand, is difficult.
In fact, the only criterion of I-Adequacy supplied by MacBride is that universals
and particulars instantiate each other. Furthermore, there may be more than one
I-Adequate distinction.3
These two criteria create room to distinguish Ramsey’s two questions. Sup-
pose one could articulate an E-Adequate distinction. One would thereby have pro-
vided an answer to Ramsey’s second question. It is possible, however, that such
a distinction would fail to be I-Adequate. It could, for instance, fail to legislate
whether universals and particulars instantiate each other.4 Therefore, it is possible
2Cf., especially, p. 206.
3MacBride calls this situation a case in which there is a “tie for definitional success.” (p. 206)
4I assume, for now, that MacBride is right to count this as a constraint on I-Adequacy. I will
reject this assumption in the sequel.
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that an E-Adequate distinction fail to be Adequate. An E-Adequate distinction, then,
may fail as an answer to Ramsey’s first question while succeeding as an answer to
Ramsey’s second question. Because the notion of I-Adequacy is not as yet lucid, I
cannot say confidently whether it is possible to articulate an I-Adequate distinction
that fails to be E-Adequate. No matter, though, for it would be misguided to claim
that in articulating such a distinction one would thereby have answered Ramsey’s
first question without answering his second. Such a possibility does not, therefore,
create space to distinguish Ramsey’s two questions.
Unfortunately, MacBride does very little to illuminate I-Adequacy. Further-
more, the one thing he does say—that universals and particulars instantiate each
other—is contentious. One traditional way to make the distinction, which can be
traced back at least to Aristotle (De Interpretatione 17a37), appeals to an asym-
metry with respect to instantiation, viz. that particulars are not instantiated but
universals are. Surely this definition does not fail because it violates the most obvi-
ous intensional constraint on the distinction. We’ll need to look elsewhere in order
to substantiate the notion of I-Adequacy and, therefore, to impose it as a constraint
on an Adequate distinction.
2.3 Ramsey and Russell
Ramsey (1925) seems to believe that his two questions are different, and that the
second question is of little interest in the context of a discussion about the universal-
particular distinction.5 Just after asking those questions, Ramsey continues:
If we follow Mr. Russell we shall have to investigate three kinds of dis-
tinction, psychological, physical, and logical. First we have the difference
between a percept and a concept, the objects of two different kinds of
mental acts; but this is unlikely to be a distinction of any fundamental
importance, since a difference in two mental acts may not correspond
to any difference whatever in their objects. Next we have various dis-
tinctions between objects based on their relations to space and time; for
instance, some objects can only be in one place at a time, others, like
5This may be surprising given that the questions are Ramsey’s. I suspect what Ramsey had in
mind with respect to the second question was this: What can we say fundamentally or logically (or
some such) about one which will not also be true of the other?
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the colour red, can be in many. Here again, in spite of the importance
of the subject, I do not think we can have reached the essence of the
matter. For when, for instance, Dr. Whitehead says that a table is an
adjective, and Mr. Johnson that it is a substantive, they are not arguing
about how many places the table can be in at once, but about its logi-
cal nature. And so it is with logical distinctions that our inquiry must
mainly deal. ((1925), pp. 57-8)
Here Ramsey, prior even to considering the question whether something true can be
said about universals that cannot be said about particulars with respect to “their
relations to space and time”, dismisses any such attempt to make the universal-
particular distinction on such a basis. The reason is that one cannot have “reached
the essence of the matter” in such a way. The issue is not, as with the percept-
concept distinction, that Ramsey sees some principled reason for doubting whether
a difference with respect to relations to space and time can provide an E-Adequate
distinction. Rather, the issue is that the distinction at stake concerns the “logical
natures” of universals and particulars. To make a universal-particular distinction,
Ramsey seems to suggest, one must distinguish the logical nature of universals from
that of particulars. This requires more than merely finding something to say truly
of universals that is not also true of particulars. Ramsey, then, finds room to
distinguish his two questions.
Ramsey’s focus on the “logical natures” provides us clues as to what will
count as an I-Adequate distinction on his view. Indeed, in the remainder of his
(1925), Ramsey suggests he would only accept a distinction which displays a dif-
ference in function of universals and particulars in atomic facts: universals must
be predicated, particulars predicated of. He is, however, skeptical that any such
distinction can be motivated. Certainly he thinks it cannot be motivated on the
basis of a linguistic subject-predicate distinction. At any rate, the requirement that
an adequate distinction entails that universals and particulars function differently
in atomic facts is a constraint on I-Adequacy. It may be that this is what Ramsey
means when he claims that we must make the distinction on the basis of the logical
natures of universals and particulars. That is, we must find an asymmetry with
respect to the functioning of universals and particulars in atomic facts.
On the other hand, in his note on his (1925), written in 1926, Ramsey seems
to suggest a different but related characterization of what it is for a distinction
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to concern the logical natures of universals and particulars. In that note, Ramsey
considers Russell’s claim that universals and particulars play different roles in the
logical system of the Principia. Universals, according to Russell, always occur as
propositional functions and determine two ranges of propositions, a narrower range
represented by, for example, ‘x is wise’ and a broader range represented more gen-
erally by ‘φ(wise)’. Particulars, on the other hand, determine only one range of
propositions, the broad range represented by, for example, ‘φ(Socrates)’. Ramsey
had already criticized this view in his (1925), but here in the note he says,
Now this is the only difference between the way individuals and univer-
sals function in [Russell’s] system, and [so]...it is probable that we have
here the essence of the matter. ((1990) p. 32)
The suggestion Ramsey seems to be making is that one must find an asymmetry
with respect to the way universals and particulars function in one’s logical system.
It is not clear to me which of these suggestions Ramsey actually intends to
endorse, but regardless, I do not think they are acceptable. With respect to the
first suggestion, there are realist ontologies that deny primacy of place to facts, so
it is best not to require that an Adequate universal-particular distinction appeal
to an asymmetry with respect to the functioning of universals and particulars in
atomic facts, at least if we can get away with it. I will argue below that we can get
away with it by offering a different constraint on I-Adequacy. Suppose, on the other
hand, that one thought that every adequate ontology includes facts, and that we
can allow theorizing about the universal-particular distinction to constrain answers
to more basic ontological questions in this way. Still, one might think that one could
make the universal-particular distinction even if one denied that the two functioned
differently in atomic facts. A broadly Tractarian view of atomic facts, according to
which universals and particulars hang together in atomic facts “like links in a chain”,
does not seem to immediately rule out an Adequate universal-particular distinction.
For example, you might think the distinction could manifest itself in the possible
combinations of things that are allowable, or in the sorts of necessary entailments
that obtain between things. It is not clear why a distinction which appeals to these
sorts of asymmetries would fail to be I-Adequate, nor does Ramsey give us any
reason to think so. More importantly, it is not at all obvious, even if universals and
particulars function differently in atomic facts, how that difference in function is
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relevant to the universal-particular distinction. It is an answer to this question that
a notion of I-Adequacy formulated along these lines would need to supply. Ramsey
does not go far enough here.
With respect to the second suggestion, Ramsey does little to clear up what
sort of “roles” or “functions” in a logical system are appropriate to appeal to. I
confess that I do not even understand what a function in a logical system is meant
to be insofar as it is meant to relate to the distinction between universals and
particulars. The reason is quite simple: universals and particulars are what they
are independent of any logical system we construct. To suggest otherwise—for
example, that universals and particulars are what they are because of their role in
a logical system—is to get the cart before the horse. Maybe Ramsey only intends
to suggest that our logical system should reflect the universal-particular distinction
by including an asymmetry of function in the logical system for entities in the two
categories, and that unless we construct a logical system that does so we have not
adequately made the universal-particular distinction. (I suspect this is closer to his
intent.) But why should that be? Why is a difference with respect to what is true
about universals and particulars, reflected of course in what one’s logical system
validates, not enough? Ramsey does not give us any clues as to how he would
answer that question. As such, I conclude that either there is no definite proposal
here, or that Ramsey has not given us reason enough to accept it.
I do not want to deny that Ramsey is on to something here. Indeed, I
believe that he is. I believe he is close to advocating the style of argument for his
conclusion mandated by my preferred proposal regarding I-Adequacy. Below, I will
show that we can reconstruct something like Ramsey’s argument if we adopt my
characterization of I-Adequacy.
Russell, like Ramsey, does not explicitly address our present issue. However,
we can get some idea of Russell’s thinking on the matter by considering his various
proposals for making the universal-particular distinction. There are at least three
discernible strands in Russell’s thinking about the distinction. I want to consider
these three in turn and see whether we can cull from his discussions any insight
into his thinking about the conditions of I-Adequacy for the universal-particular
distinction.
22
First, Russell (1911) took the view that universals could be in more than one
place at a time while particulars cannot.6 After defending this view, Russell goes on
to compare it to psychological, temporal, and logical distinctions between universals
and particulars. It is the third, logical distinction that is of interest here. About
the possibility of a logical distinction made on the basis of a relation of predication,
Russell says:
And if predication is an ultimate relation, the best best definition of par-
ticulars is that they are entities which can only be subjects of predicates
or terms of relations, i.e., that they are (in the logical sense) substances.
This definition is preferable to the one introducing space or time, because
space and time are accidental characteristics of the world with which we
happen to be acquainted, and therefore are destitute of the necessary
universality belonging to purely logical categories. ((1911) p. 123)
Russell does not go on to consider in depth the question whether such a logical
distinction is available (though he suggests that it is, merely asserting the crucial
premise that predication is an “ultimate relation”, and one can see the later develop-
ments of his views on this score as implicit attempts to do so), but that is no matter
in the present context. What is interesting is that Russell seems to be rejecting with
one hand what he had just defended with the other. He seems to doubt whether a
universal-particular distinction predicated on an asymmetry regarding relations to
space is adequate. Why? Russell’s concern is a lack of “universality.” Space is an
“accidental characteristic” of our world.
So it seems that Russell would propose “universality” or “necessity” as a
constraint on an I-Adequate distinction. What Russell apparently means is that
an I-Adequate distinction must hold necessarily. There can be no world where
a proposed distinction fails. If one makes the universal-particular distinction on
the basis of an asymmetry with respect to time and space, in non-spatiotemporal
worlds, the distinction would not hold. So the distinction formulated in that way is
not I-Adequate. However, this proposal seems to not push us any further than does
E-Adequacy. It seems right to think that a distinction is E-Adequate only if it gets
6More exactly, Russell claims that particulars cannot be in or “belong to” more than one place
at a time, whereas universals can. The notion of “belonging to” is meant to cover, primarily, the
case of thoughts. Cf. (1911) p. 121f.
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the extensions of the categories right in both actual and counterfactual scenarios.
Russell does not go far enough here.
Second, Russell (1919; 1924) took the view that particulars are “complete”
whereas universals are “incomplete.” It is difficult to find Russell committing ex-
plicitly to this claim, though Ramsey (1925) certainly believed he was so committed,
and Russell apparently never objected to Ramsey’s characterization. Further, Rus-
sell does say things that suggest the view. For example, he says, “Attributes and
relations, though they may be not susceptible of analysis, differ from substances
[particulars?] by the fact that they suggest a structure, and that there can be no
significant symbol which symbolizes them in isolation.”7 Russell had earlier (in the
(1919) lectures, and even in the (1911) paper) compared particulars to substances.
He claimed as well, “Particulars have this peculiarity...that each of them stands
entirely alone and is completely self-subsistent.”8 Russell goes on:
To understand a name [by definition, a word for a particular] you must be
acquainted with the particular of which it is a name, and you must know
that it is the name of that particular. You do not, that is to say, have
any suggestion of the form of a proposition, whereas in understanding a
predicate [a word for a relation?] you do. ... You have to bring in the
form of a proposition. ((1919) p. 205)
Strictly speaking, Russell is committing only to a kind the completeness and incom-
pleteness of names and predicates, respectively, but it is difficult not to see here an
analogous claim with respect to the particulars and universals. Unfortunately, it is
just not clear to what the complete-incomplete proposal amounts. Indeed, Ramsey
(1925) criticizes it on just this score.
Regardless, here we find overlap between Ramsey and Russell on I-Adequacy,
since if Russell is right that universals are incomplete whereas particulars are com-
plete, we would have found the desired asymmetry with respect to function in atomic
facts. Russell may be taken as suggesting that an I-Adequate universal-particular
distinction will appeal to an asymmetry with respect to the function of universals
and particulars in atomic facts. If this is right, then the same problem besets Rus-
sell’s proposal for I-Adequacy as besets the first construal of Ramsey’s. To repeat,
7(1924) p. 337.
8(1919) p. 201.
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such a proposal ignores the intuitive possibility that one can construct an Adequate
universal-particular distinction without appealing to an asymmetry of function in
atomic facts. Russell gives no argument as to why a universal-particular distinction
must proceed in this way. Again, I believe we can do better.
Third, Russell (1962) took the view that universals are “unigrade” whereas
particulars are “mulitgrade.” Something is unigrade if and only if it is only capable
of being an element of atomic facts with a definite, fixed number of elements. In
other words, if something is only capable of being an element of facts with exactly
two elements, but not with three or four, etc., then it is unigrade. Or if it is only
capable of being an element of facts with exactly five elements, but not with two or
three, etc., then it is unigrade. Something is multigrade if and only if it is capable
of being an element of facts with various numbers of elements. In other words, if
something is capable of being an element of atomic facts with two or three elements,
or with seven or twelve elements, or with any number of elements at all, then it is
multigrade. It is easy to feel tempted by the view that universals are unigrade
whereas particulars are multigrade. Consider, for example, the property of being
green. It is prima facie plausible to think that this property can only be an element
of atomic facts with exactly two elements. An atomic fact involving that property
would only have, in addition to the property itself, a particular. Indeed, this is just
what it is to be a monadic relation. Dyadic relations, like the relation of being three
meters from, apparently can only be an element of atomic facts containing exactly
three elements. More generally, it is plausible to think that every n-adic property
can only be an element of atomic facts containing n   1 elements. On the other
hand, particulars seem to be such that they can be an element of atomic facts with
any number of elements. Particular o might exemplify the property of being green
while also standing in the relation of being three feet from to some other particular.
If so, then o is an element of an atomic fact with two elements and of an atomic fact
with three elements.
The major hurdle for this view is that it is unclear whether all universals
have a fixed “adicity”. Fraser MacBride (2005b) cites relations like that of forming
a circle and of forming a stable molecule.9 A circle might be formed by any number
of things (over a certain threshold). You might form a circle with twelve toddlers,
9(2005b) p. 573. MacBride has other concerns as well, but this seems to me to be the most
serious.
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or with seven rocks, or with a great number of boulders. But then the relation of
forming a circle does not have a fixed adicity. It can be an element of facts with (at
least) thirteen, eight, and a-great-number-plus-one elements. I think MacBride is
probably right about this, and that this view of Russell’s is inadequate.10 We needn’t
worry about that here, however, for what we are concerned about is whether Russell
gives any insight into his thinking about intensional constraints on an Adequate
universal-particular distinction when he articulates and develops this view.
Unfortunately, Russell’s development of this view does not provide any in-
sight into his thinking about constraints on I-Adequacy that were not already present
in his (1911), his (1919), or his (1924). Certainly, this proposal is robustly “logical”
in nature and has the requisite “universality” guaranteed by its being logical. But
Russell (1962) does not discuss the universal-particular distinction in depth, nor
does he discuss what constraints an I-Adequate distinction must satisfy.
I think what we ought to conclude is that neither Russell nor Ramsey had
any explicitly formulated thoughts about what it takes for a universal-particular
distinction to be I-Adequate. What one finds in their work are vague requirements
of “logicality” or whathaveyou. They each give reasons to think that certain de-
velopments of the distinction are not I-Adequate, but there seem to be no positive
proposals on offer. Therefore, I want to turn to some considerations about theo-
rizing about universals and particulars that suggest an intensional contraint on an
Adequate distinction. I believe it is the only such constraint available.
2.4 Universals as Theoretical Posits
Universals are theoretical posits.11 This should be uncontroversial in a certain sense.
Universals play a certain theoretical role, and other kinds of thing (tropes and classes
of tropes; classes of particulars; etc.) have been posited to play the same role. On
the other hand, the realist identifies universals with colors and shapes and kinds. As
such, one might be strained by the claim that universals are theoretical posits. It is
not a matter of theory that there are colors, shapes, kinds, etc.. That the apple is
red is not a matter of theory; likewise that my computer is (roughly) a rectangular
prism, that Elsie is a dog, etc. If there are Moorean facts, surely these are among
10But cf. Hochberg’s (2004) attempted repair.
11The following discussion was greatly aided by a conversation with Herb Hochberg.
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them. But if universals just are things like redness, rectangular prismhood, and
doghood, then universals are not theoretical posits.
What is going on? What is theoretical is not that universals exist, but that
they have the nature that realists claim they have.12 That is, what is theoretical
is that universals are universals rather than classes of tropes, classes of particulars,
or what have you. There are, then, two general constraints on a realist theory. The
entities postulated by the theory—namely, the universals—must (i) be given identity
conditions that distinguish them from the entities postulated by the various forms of
nominalism and (ii) be up to the work they are given in that theory—that is, must
have identity conditions that allow them to do their work within the theory. The
nature of universals is, therefore, constrained by what distinguishes a realist view
from various forms of nominalism and by the work to which universals are put. If a
realist theory fails to distinguish universals from the entities postulated by a form
of nominalism to do the same work, then that theory is inadequate. Similarly, if a
realist theory gives identity conditions to universals which keeps them from doing
their work, then that theory is inadequate. The discussion of this dissertation will
be driven by the second of these constraints, so it will be useful to pause again over
the nature of the work to which universals are put.
Universals have been given many jobs.13 Most prominently, their jobs are
these three. First, universals are posited to play the role of attribute, to account
for resemblance, to solve the so-called “One Over Many” problem, etc. This is the
fundamental role that universals have, since at least Plato, been given. I take it as
a datum that there are numerous examples of objects which are of the same type,
have an identical or similar attribute, or resemble each other to a greater or lesser
degree. According to the realist about universals who puts universals to work on this
phenomenon, where there is sameness of type, likeness of attribute, or resemblence,
there is sharing of a universal. Second, universals are posited to play the role of
relata of relations of causation, nomic necessitation, etc. Again, I take it as a datum
that objects have the causal powers that they do because of the properties that they
have. Red visual experiences are normally caused by red things. Medicines have
12This is not to say that there aren’t any philosophers that deny that there are colors, shapes,
kinds, etc. Cf. Devitt (1980).
13Cf. Oliver (1996). I am using ‘property’ and ‘universal’ interchangeably here. The last job
I discuss is not often given to entities labeled ‘universal’, but since properties just are universals
according to present usage, the name substitution is appropriate here.
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their healing effects because of their chemical properties, not because they come as
a liquid or in pill form, etc. According to the realist about universals who puts uni-
versals to work on this phenomenon, where there is a systematic causal relationship
between objects, there is some sort of relationship among universals that explains or
constitutes that causal relationship. Third, universals are posited to play the role of
semantic values for meaningful predicates. Predicates contribute systematically to
the meanings of sentences in which they occur. Predicates, therefore, have a definite
semantic value. Universals can be put to work playing the role of these semantic
values.
Fundamentally, the nature of properties as universals is constrained by their
ability to do these jobs. Universals as attributes must not have a nature that
precludes their doing the work of accounting for sameness of type, similarity of
attribute, and resemblance. Universals as relata of causal relations or relations of
nomic necessitation must not have a nature that precludes their doing the work of
accounting for systematic causal relationships. And universals as semantic values for
meaningful predicates must not have a nature that precludes their doing the work
of being such semantic values. Indeed, one often finds philosophers who think that
the work places conflicting constraints on universals and that, therefore, different
entities are required to do different jobs.14 The import of this fact—that the nature
of universals is constrained by their ability to do their work—will become evident
shortly.
Here I am interested primarily in the first two of those jobs, and believe that
the two come more or less to the same. The reason I believe these two roles come
more or less to the same is simple: one way that entities resemble is by having the
same or similar causal powers, or by obeying the same natural laws. There is a
close connection between properties as attributes and the causal powers of things.
I ignore the third because I don’t want to challenge the common assumption that
the sorts of entities fit to be attributes and to play in causal relationships are also
apt to be semantic values for meaningful predicates. At least, I don’t want to be
committed here to the claim the the role-players could be the same.15
It matters that universals are theoretical posits in this sense, and that they
14Alex Oliver (1996) and Friederike Moltmann (2003; 2004a; 2004b) are examples of this tendency.
15I will become apparent that if universals as attributes and causal relata are also semantic values
of predicates, then I will have just made my task here all the more difficult. So my ignoring this
third role is not a cheat.
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are given the work that they are. Here we have a very clear test for whether a
proposed account of universals is theoretically adequate. Again: if a full-blown
realist theory supplies identity conditions to universals that prevents them from
doing their work in the theory, then that understanding of the nature of universals
is flawed. This, I believe, suggests a defensible constraint on the I-Adequacy of a
universal-particular distinction. I turn now to developing that constraint.
2.5 The One Intensional Constraint
I believe there is only one intensional constraint on an Adequate universal-particular
distinction: the distinction ought to be motivated by the broader theory of universals
and particulars. In essence, the distinction should be entailed, or at least suggested,
by other constraints placed on universals and particulars in virtue of their theoretical
roles or our intuitions about them. In the remainder of this chapter, I elucidate
this constraint. To do so, I want to point out two places where philosophers have
implicitly recognized its importance. But first, I will make the notion more precise.
What, more specifically, do I mean when I say that an Adequate universal-
particular distinction ought to be “motivated by the broader theory of universals
and particulars”? We can now put to good use the discussion about the sense in
which universals are a theoretical posit. Theoretical posits are posited to play a
role in a theory, and theories require that certain things play certain roles. The
nature of those role-players is constrained only by the work they do in the theory.
Constraints on the nature of the role-players that emerge from outside the scope
of the theory are unmotivated. We simply can have no reason to believe that such
constraints hold. If we want, then, to distinguish the role-players from other sorts
of entities posited by the theory or from entities from another theory or with which
we are acquainted, we must only appeal to features of the role-players guaranteed
by the theory itself. The way to do this, it seems to me, is to argue that something
can’t play that role unless it has those features. So in particular with respect to
unviersals, when I say that an Adequate universal-particular distinction ought to be
“motivated by the broader theory of universals and particulars,” I mean that the
distinction ought to be motivated by the work to which universals are put, that is,
by arguments that they could not do their work if they had such and such features.
With respect to particulars, the situation is somewhat different because particulars
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are not theoretical posits in the sense that universals are. We are acquainted with
particulars; we causally interact with them; etc. As such, we have more information
about their natures than what is required by the role they play in a theory. We can
observe things about particulars, and our intuitions about what is possible and not
possible for particulars are justified. Therefore, if one can argue that particulars
must have a feature X on the basis of ontological considerations about the nature of
particulars that arise from observation or intuition, and if one then goes on to argue
that universals must lack X if they are to do their work, then one can construct
an I-Adequate universal-particular distinction on the basis of the asymmetry with
respect to feature X. The work in question, as I discussed above, is making for
resemblance and causal powers. We must find a feature that particulars have that
universals can’t have if they are to do their work in the theory.
Furthermore, questions like, “What about having/lacking X makes some-
thing a universal/particular?” do not require an answer in order to justifiably con-
clude that a proposed distinction is Adequate. For one thing, I am mildly dubious
of this sort of “making” language. There is a sense in which universals are univer-
sals and particulars are particulars because they play their respective roles in one’s
overall ontological theory. If that is an adequate answer to this “making” question,
however, the question itself is trivial. Presumably, then, the question is meant to be
“deeper”, to be asking for a universal-particular distinction that appeals to features
of universals and particulars that in some other way explain why universals are
universals and particulars are particulars. This kind of question is mysterious, but
whether or not I understand it, I think it is inappropriate. What we are looking for
when we seek an Adequate universal-particular distinction is a vindication. There
is no question that, once one settles on a realist theory of universals (that is, of
resemblance and causal powers), one is committed to two fundamentally distinct
categories, Universal and Particular. One needn’t argue that there is a universal-
particular distinction. Rather, the issue is whether one can show that the distinction
holds up on inspection, that one does not wind up with a theory according to which
entities in the two categories have identical identity conditions. In other words, the
dialectical situation is such that the burden lies on the opponent of the universal-
particular distinction to show that the theory of universals cannot substantiate it;
the proponent of the distinction, therefore, must show that the theory can sub-
stantiate it. In order to do this, all one must do is find a feature or features that
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entities in one category must have that entities in the other category cannot have,
given the respective theoretical roles of universals and particulars and facts known
on the basis of observation and modal intuition about particulars. Because we are
after a vindication, there is just no need to answer questions about what “makes”
something a universal or a particular.
This construal of I-Adequacy is not trivial. At this stage of the investigation,
it is not obvious whether there will be some feature on the basis of which we can make
an I-Adequate universal-particular distinction. It may turn out to be impossible to
isolate such a feature. If so, then the universal-particular distinction cannot be
vindicated and the realist should be led to reconsider either (i) her realist theory
generally or (ii) the work to which she has put universals.
Before moving on to places where this characterization of I-Adequacy has
been implicitly recognized in the literature, I want to note that I offer my condition
of I-Adequacy as a sufficient condition. Whether it is also a necessary condition on
I-Adequacy is another matter, and one that I do not intend to take up. There may
be wholly other sufficient conditions on I-Adequacy. If so, I leave open the question
whether my proposal satisfies those as well. There may also be sufficient conditions
on I-Adequacy that are along the same lines as but that are weaker than the one
I have offered. If so, all the better for my proposal, which satisfies the stronger
constraint. Or so I will argue.
At least two philosophers have implicitly recognized this intensional con-
straint. First, Alex Oliver (1996) suggests with many others that particulars are
things that have properties, but that are not themselves properties. This is simply
a stipulation for him. Presumably, however, he means for the stipulation to match
our inchoate notion of a particular. He goes on to say,
Thus I endorse the old idea that properties have a dual function: as
that which is predicated of a particular and as the subject of further
predications. The linguistic mark of this ontological distinction is the
use of abstract singular terms in two types of sentence illustrated by
“N.N. has humility” and “Humility is a virtue”. Of course, we can turn
the first sentence around to form “Humility is a characteristic of N.N.”,
but this transformation merely reinforces the fact that properties are of
particulars, are had by particulars, and not vice versa. So I take it that
a role for a type of entity cannot be properly called a “property role”,
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unless the entities which fill the role are understood to be the sorts of
things which can be had by particulars. ((1996) p. 15)
Now we can agree with Oliver about all this insofar as we have given him his stipula-
tion regarding the word ‘particular’ mentioned above. But one question is whether
the corresponding theoretical role for particulars, as those things that have proper-
ties but are not themselves properties, is played by the sorts of things we ordinarily
call ‘particulars.’ That is, one question is whether Oliver’s stipulated notion of par-
ticulars is coextensive with the inchoate notion. The answer to this is not obvious,
and I don’t intend to take it up here.16 The important point, the one relevant to the
present discussion, is that Oliver is suggesting a property-particular distinction that
is motivated entirely by the broader theory of properties and particulars. Something
is apt to play the “property role” only if it can be had by particulars, and something
is apt to play the “particular role” (we may assume) only if it cannot be had by
other particulars or by properties. Given that the theory constrains the respective
roles in this way, a property-particular distinction simply falls out of the theory.
Oliver seems to believe that this is enough. So long as all that is right, there are no
other intensional constraints to be satisfied. Thus Oliver can be seen to implicitly
agree that an Adequate universal-particular distinction need only (a) get the exten-
sions of “universal” and “particular” right (the constraint on E-Adequacy) and (b)
be motivated by the broader theory of universals and particulars (the constraint on
I-Adequacy).
The other philosopher that has recognized our intensional constraint is Her-
bert Hochberg. In his (1980), Hochberg attempts to repair Russell’s (1911) classic
argument for the existence of universals. In order to see the sense in which Hochberg
recognizes our intensional constraint, I must briefly recount the structure of his ar-
gument. Suppose that a resembles b and that c resembles d and, for convenience,
write these as ‘S1pa, bq’ and ‘S2pc, dq’, respectively. Suppose further, for reductio,
that S1 and S2 are particulars. There is, then, a further fact that S1 resembles S2,
that S3pS1,S2q. And further, S4pS1,S3q, S5pS2,S3q, etc. This is Russell’s famous
resemblance regress. As Russell recognized, it can be stopped if we suppose that
16Oliver thinks that it is obvious, and that the answer is “yes.” He actually says that “there
are some entities which have properties, but which are not properties,” and stipulates the label
‘particulars’ for these. Unfortunately, everything else that he says is compatible with there being
no particulars in that sense, only properties.
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S1  S2. Russell, at this point, takes himself to have proven that universals exist,
since S1 ( S2) can be a constituent of more than one fact. As Hochberg recognizes,
however, this is not enough. a, for example, can be a constituent of more than one
fact as well. There is more to being a universal than the ability to be a constituent
of more than one fact: a universal must also be playing the role of a relation or
predicable in the facts in question.
But Hochberg believes Russell has shown this last as well, and here we move
closer to Hochberg’s recognition of our intensional constraint. The gap is filled
by an argument that there are particulars as well as universals, and that S1 can
be a constituent of multiple facts that have as constituents, other than S1, only
particulars. Since particulars are not predicable, and since every fact needs an
entity playing the role of a relation, the gap in Russell’s argument can be filled if
this much can be established. Hochberg reminds us that Russell argues in more
than one place that there are particulars. He says:
[The argument for particulars] purports to show that there are two sorts
of entities, particulars and universals, and an asymmetrical connection
presupposed by a viable account of the true ascription of predicates to
objects. ((1980) p. 201, emphasis mine)
Whether Russell has succeeded is, for our purposes, beside the point. What matters
is the style of argument highlighted by the italicized material in the above quote.
Hochberg (given that he endorses Russell’s reconstructed argument) puts universals
to work in providing an account of predication. He then argues, in effect, that unless
we assume an asymmetry of exemplification, universals will not be capable of doing
their work. The idea is that unless universals and particulars are asymmetrically
related in this way, universals will be unable to do the work of providing a viable
account of predication. This is precisely the style of argument required by the notion
of I-Adequacy defended here. Given that Hochberg apparently endorses this style of
argument, reconstructed by him on behalf of Russell, I believe Hochberg can rightly
been seen as implicitly endorsing my constraint on I-Adequacy.
While Oliver (1996) and Hochberg (1980) do not explicitly endorse my pro-
posal regarding I-Adequacy, I have pointed to arguments from each that appear to
follow the pattern required by my constraint. This is enough, I believe, to conclude
that Oliver and Hochberg implicitly recognize my proposal regarding I-Adequacy.
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Earlier, I claimed that we can reconstruct Ramsey’s argument regarding
against the universal-particular distinction given my preferred intensional constraint.
Ramsey assumed, recall, that the universal-particular distinction will involve an ap-
peal to an asymmetry of function in atomic facts, or that an asymmetry should
manifest in one’s logical system. Behind both of these views, whether they are
different or not, it is tempting to see an implicit role for universals, viz. the role
of providing an account of predication, exemplification, or the “binding” of ele-
ments into facts. (This is especially tempting given Russell’s affinity for the Fregean
complete-incomplete dichotomy and Ramsey’s explicit engagement with Russell’s
thoughts there.) If one further assumed that an adequate account of predication,
etc. required some apparent asymmetry of function in atomic facts or an asymmetry
in one’s logical system, then one could see Ramsey as arguing in the following way:
The role of universals is to provide an account of predication, etc.; If universals
can provide an account of predication, etc., then there must be some asymmetry of
function between universals and particulars in atomic facts, or an asymmetry in the
logical system; There are no such asymmetries (for the reasons he gives); Therefore,
nothing plays the universal role, so there is no robust universal-particular distinc-
tion.17 This kind of argument against the universal-particular distinction begins
with a theoretical role and tries to show that the role does not provide resources
enough to distinguish its players from particulars. Once again, this is the style of
argument mandated by my proposal for I-Adequacy. Admittedly, this is speculative
and reconstructive. But it is not, I think, out of the question that such a thought
process was at play. I think this is sufficient to conclude that Ramsey’s insights
regarding I-Adequacy, or least what is good about his insights, are captured by my
proposal.
In this chapter, I have argued that there are two substantive constraints on
an Adequate universal-particular distinction. A distinction is E-Adequate just in
case it gets the extensions of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ (more or less) right. A
distinction is I-Adequate if it motivated by the broader theory of universals and
particulars. I have given reasons to think that this constraint on I-Adequacy has
been recognized, if only implicitly, in the literature. And I have argued that it follows
from a proper understanding of the sense in which universals are theoretical posits.
Beginning in the next chapter, I get to work developing an Adequate universal-
17Ramsey might say that universals and particulars “differ by no more than type”.
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parituclar distinction in this sense.
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Chapter 3
Properties of (the) Identity (of
Indiscernibles)
A. The principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles seems to me
obviously true...
B. It seems to me obviously false. ...
A. ... a has at least one property, which b does not have, that is to
say the property of being identical to a.
B. This a roundabout way of saying nothing...
—Max Black, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”
3.1 Two Difficult Questions
Consider these two questions: Are particulars—you and me, my computer, your
favorite copy of your favorite book—identical if indiscernible? and: Are there prop-
erties of identity—being identical to Jamie, being identical to Frege? Clearing up
what, exactly, these questions are asking will be one burden of what follows. A few
observations to get us started. First, ‘indiscernible’ is not an easy notion to illumi-
nate, despite that the inchoate notion is more or less shared and uncontroversial.
Second, it is not obvious what properties of identity would even be if they existed,
and answers to the second question often differ in virtue of differing conceptions
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of properties of identity.1 Finally, it is standard practice to begin the hunt for the
properties relevant to whether two particulars are indiscernible by ruling out prop-
erties of identity.2 This, I suspect, is due to the pervasive view that if there are
any properties of identity, they couldn’t possibly explain the identity facts and so
to invoke them in discussions about the truth of the identity of indiscernibles would
be to beg the question. Regardless, because of this practice, our two questions are
often viewed as by and large independent. Whether or not there are properties of
identity, the thought goes, they aren’t relevant to the question whether indiscernible
objects must be identical.
In this chapter, I want to work toward a fresh look at these questions. Let
me lay bare my cards. I believe the practice of ruling out properties of identity
as relevant to indiscernibility has caused interlocutors in this area to overlook an
option that some may find plausible, namely a construal of properties of identity
as (perfectly) natural. Further, unveiling this option will allow the debates over
the truth of identity of indiscernibles and the existence and nature of properties
of identity to be refocused in a productive way, thereby overcoming the stagnation
one finds in debates about the individuation of particulars.3 In what follows, I will
defend these claims, and hope to show that our two questions are not so easy to
prise apart in the traditional way.
I will start with a discussion of two treatments of some core issues with our
two questions, one classic and one very recent. These two will serve as paradigm
cases of the “standard practice” mentioned above, and will therefore be an instruc-
tive launching pad.
3.2 Rodriguez-Pereyra on Trivializing Properties
Our first exemplar of the standard practice is Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006).
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) is about finding the weakest non-trivial of the Principle of
the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter, ‘The Principle’) by providing an intensional
(rather than extensional) characterization of the class of trivializing properties. He
1Cf. Moreland (2000) as individuators and Plantinga (1974) as, roughly, an abstract on identity
statements.
2Cf. Adams (1979), Bergmann (1953), Black (1952), Katz (1983), Moreland (1998), Rodriguez-
Pereyra (2006), Swinburne (1995), et al.
3Cf. Zimmerman (1997) and Hawthorne (1995) on Max Black worlds.
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is not, then, about finding an answer to either of our two questions. However, what
Rodriguez-Pereyra is about is important for answering our first question.
Here’s how. There’s an important problem one faces immediately upon ask-
ing whether particulars are identical if indiscernible, that is, whether particulars sat-
isfy The Principle. With Rodriguez-Pereyra, we can say that “The Principle...says
that no two things differ solo numero. That means that when two things differ
numerically there is also a further difference between them. This further difference
I shall call a qualitative difference.”4 But what properties make for “qualitative
difference”? Consider the canonical second-order formulation of The Principle:
P. @x@yp@FpFxØ Fyq Ñ x  yq
Suppose we are using the standard semantics for (full) second-order logic. There
is, then, a predicate corresponding to each subset of the domain. Suppose further
that o and o1 are distinct elements of the domain of our model. Trivially, o and o1
will satisfy different sets of predicates because tou and to1u are distinct subsets of
the domain. If we think that there is a property for each predicate, then o and o1
trivially have different properties. Contraposing, if (constants) a and b are assigned
to objects that have all the same properties, then a and b must be assigned to the
same object, since the unit set of each object in the domain is an “F” over which
‘@F’ quantifies. Construing the situation in this way makes The Principle trivially
true, which it certainly is not. The crucial question is how to restrict the domain
of the property quantifier to get a non-trivial version of The Principle. Different
restrictions have been proposed, and Rodriguez-Pereyra is offering what he believes
is the weakest restriction that returns a non-trivial version of The Principle. It is
only after one has specified such a restriction, though, that one can ask whether
particulars are identical if indiscernible (on that restriction), for only then will one
have a clear understanding of what properties make for qualitative difference.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, as I mentioned above, begins with the claim that prop-
erties of identity are trivializing properties. He invites the reader to consider this
argument:
1. a and b share all their properties [Assumption for Conditional Proof]
2. a has the property being identical to a [Assumption]
4(2006), p. 205.
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3. b has the property being identical to a [(1,2)]
4. a  b [(3)]
5. If a and b share all their properties, then a  b [Conditionalization, (1,4)]5
If we view ‘a’ and ‘b’ as schematic letters, then the argument is perfectly general
and establishes The Principle. But the version of The Principle thereby established
is trivial, for the reasons outlined above. The upshot is this: “Properties of identity
are trivializing properties, since they do not make a qualitative difference.”6
How these pieces are supposed to work together to generate this conclu-
sion is far from clear. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to look more carefully at
how Rodriguez-Pereyra gets (2) and (4). He says that (2) is got from the law of
self-identity—@xpx  xq—and the assumption that there are properties of identity.
There is an instructive footnote:
It is important to be clear what properties of identity are. Having re-
course to the property abstraction λ-operator makes that clear. The
λ-operator binds a variable from a first-order open sentence to designate
the property expressed by that open sentence. Thus properties of iden-
tity are those that in their λ-expression the open sentence from which the
λ-operator binds a variable consists only of an identity sign flanked by an
individual variable and an individual constant. So properties like being
identical to a and being identical to b are properties of identity because
their λ-expressions are, respectively, ‘pλxqpx  aq’ and ‘pλxqpx  bq’.
But the properties of being identical to something or being self-identical
are not properties of identity. Their λ-expressions, ‘pλxqpx  yq’ and
‘pλxqpx  xq’, do not satisfy our characterization. ((2006), p. 220)
The idea, I suppose, is this. From the law of self-identity, we get that a  a.
Substituting a variable for the first ‘a’, we generate the open sentence ‘x  a’.
Binding with the λ-operator, we get ‘pλxqpx  aq’. The set of objects in the domain
corresponding to that λ-expression will, of course, be the unit set of the object to
which a is assigned. Presumably, this is why the version of The Principle thereby
established is trivial. A point of interest is that nowhere in that line of reasoning did
5(2006), p. 207.
6(2006), p. 207.
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the assumption that there are properties of identity play. This, I believe, is telling.
I’ll return to it in a bit.
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s footnote is a bit puzzling. It is not clear what Rodriguez-
Pereyra means by “properties like being identical to a...are properties of identity
because their λ-expressions are...‘pλxqpx  aq’.” This could mean a couple things.
It might mean that ‘being identical to a’ is a first-order open sentence to which one
might affix a λ-operator to generate a λ-expression which “designates” that property.
This, of course, is just confused. ‘Being identical to a’ is neither written in a first-
order language, nor, if one did so, would one write it as an open sentence. Being
identical to a, construed as a property, would be some term, a predicate letter of
some sort. Rodriguez-Pereyra must mean that ‘pλxqpx  aq’ designates the property
of being identical to a. So ‘x  a’ expresses a property, viz. the property of being
identical to a, and ‘pλxqpx  aq’ designates that property. Given this understanding,
we can rewrite (1-5) as:
6. a and b satisfy the same λ-expressions
7. a satisfies pλxqpx  aq
8. b satisfies pλxqpx  aq
9. a  b [λ-application, (8)]
10. If a and b satisfy the same λ-expressions, then a  b
However, if one is thinking of properties of identity as one thinks of other
sorts of fundamental properties, say the property of being green, this way of repre-
senting the argument may come as a surprise. The open sentence, ‘x is green’ would
be written in a first-order language as ‘Gx’. Binding to get a λ-expression, we get
‘pλxqpGxq’. Why the striking difference between the λ-expression which designates
being identical to a and that which designates being green? In particular, how do
we get a bit of logical vocabulary (‘’) into the predicate that expresses any funda-
mental property?7 Rodriguez-Pereyra has provided no argument that properties of
identity are not fundamental. So consider these two open sentences:
a. x is identical to a
7I don’t mean to deny that predicates that contain logical vocabulary can express a property,
just that no such predicate will express a logically simple property. More on this below.
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b. x has (the property of) being identical to a
How ought we represent these two sentences? (a) can be read in two ways. First,
(a) may say that something stands in the relation of identity to a.8 In that case,
(a) ought to be represented as ‘x  a’. On another reading, however, (a) predicates
the property of being identical to a to something. Rodriguez-Pereyra seems to think
this construal ought to be represented in the same way. But, if one thinks there
are properties of identity and that they are just like the property of being green in
that they are fundamental properties, it seems the right way to represent (a) on
the second reading is something like ‘Iax’, where ‘Ia’ is the predicate letter assigned
to the property of being identical to a. A similar pair of readings occurs with (b).
The first reading treats (b) just like the second reading of (a). The second treats
(b) as claiming that something and the property of being identical to a stand in the
relation of having or exemplification.
What does all this matter to Rodriguez-Pereyra’s categorization of prop-
erties of identity as trivializing properties? If one is thinking of properties “in
extension”—that is, as sets of objects—then there is no difference between the prop-
erties expressed by (a) on both readings and (b) on the first reading. In each case,
the property is simply a set of objects, namely those that are identical to a. Likewise
if one is thinking of properties “in intension”—that is, as functions from objects to
truth-values or from worlds to extensions. But if one is thinking of properties as
something like Platonic universals, as something to which objects stand in some
sort of relation (whether that relation is reified or not), then it is not obvious that
the properties expressed by (a) and (b) are the same. It may be that use of the
λ-calculus, suggesting as it does the treatment of properties as sets of objects or
functions from objects to truth-values, rather than helping make clear what prop-
erties of identity are, simply confused the issue.
For instance, consider ‘pλxqpFx ^ pGb Ñ Hbqq’. Many realists would deny
that there is any property of being F and such that (if b is G then b is H).9 If
there is no such property, then that λ-expression cannot designate it, nor would
the predicate from which the λ-expression is formed express it. In general, the
8If we wanted to be careful, we would say that the object to which ‘x’ is assigned is identical to
the object to which ‘a’ is assigned. I hope this mild infelicity will not cause confusion.
9Some examples: Armstrong (1978), (1997), Moreland (2001), Moreland and Pickavance (2003),
Russell (1919).
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predicates that sparse theorists of universals deny correspond to any property do not,
according to those theorists, express any property. How could they? Nonetheless,
those predicates certainly pick out a set of objects or a function from objects to truth
values or worlds to extensions. The issue here, then, is deeper than just whether
properties of identity correspond to a set with only one member.
The upshot is that there is a way of thinking about properties of identity
on which Rodriguez-Pereyra’s representation in the λ-calculus is inadequate. That
way of thinking takes them to be simple properties, not relational ones. Those who
take properties of identity to do metaphysical work—e.g. providing a solution to
the so-called “problem of individuation”10—presumably would balk at the idea that
properties of identity are nothing over and above a thing’s standing in a relation
to itself. Rather, they would think of properties of identity as logically analogous
to properties like being green and so would represent them in the λ-calculus as e.g.
pλxqpIaxq. This suggests the following formulation of the argument:
11. @FpFaØ Fbq
12. Iaa
13. Iab [Universal Instantiation (11) & Bi-conditional Elimination (11,12)]
14. a  b [?]
15. p@FpFaØ Fbq Ñ a  bq
We will return to this argument in a bit. For now, suffice it to note that, leaving
aside whether it is valid, this argument does not appear trivial, and so would not
establish something trivial.
Moving on, then, to Rodriguez-Pereyra’s derivation of (4) from (3), we will
see how his representation of properties of identity contributed to his categorization
of them as trivializing. Initially, the move from (3) to (4) seems uncontroversial,
and Rodriguez-Pereyra believes that it is. Again in a footnote, he says, “That b is
identical to a follows only on the assumption that if a thing has property F then it is
F. This is unexceptionable, and should not be confused with the more controversial
10For some discussions of this problem, see e.g. Lowe (2003), Moreland (1998) and (2000),
Moreland and Pickavance (2003).
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principle that if a thing is F then it has property F.”11 Call this “unexceptionable”
assumption ‘The Transition’.
Now we can put all the fussing over the λ-calculus to good use. Rodriguez-
Pereyra thinks that the argument establishes a trivial version of The Principle. If
this is right, then there must be something trivial in the move from (3) to (4) (though
Rodriguez-Pereyra never says). The initial statement of the argument (1-5) needs
The Transition, and needs it to be trivial. (3) says that b has the property of being
identical to a. Using The Transition, infer that b is identical to a. Then rewrite as
b  a. This all seems fine, but it’s not clear that there is any triviality involved.
While unexceptionable, The Transition doesn’t quite seem trivial. Maybe the use of
the λ-calculus is supposed to help support the triviality complaint. Consider, then,
the rewritten argument (6-10). Here we may have triviality in the move from (8) to
(9) if we take λ-application to be merely syntactic transformation. We can rewrite
(8) in the following ways:
81. pλxqpx  aqrbs
82. b  a
Then (9) is simply a commutation about ‘’ of (82), which is trivial. But there’s
trouble here. If (8) can be rewritten in these ways, then we can rewrite (7) as:
71. a  a
However, we now cannot get from (6) and (7) (construed as in (71)) to (8) (that is,
(82)) because (7) no longer says anything about λ-expressions, so (6) cannot play
its putative role in the argument. So the use of the λ-calculus upsets the validity of
the argument.
Rodriguez-Pereyra has an out here. Recall that, in my initial presentation of
how the λ-calculus helped us make sense of the argument, I found no need for the as-
sumption that there are properties of identity. This potential invalidity reintroduces
the need for them. Consider an expanded version of (11-15):
11. @FpFaØ Fbq
11a. a  a [Law of Identity]
11(2006), p. 220.
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11b. There are properties of identity; that is: @x@ypx  yÑ Iyxq
12. Iaa [(11a,b)]
13. Iab [(11,12)]
13a. @x@ypIyxÑ x  yq [The Transition]
14. a  b [(13,13a)]
15. p@FpFaØ Fbq Ñ a  bq
(11b) makes explicit how to combine the Law of Identity with the assumption that
there are properties of identity to get (12). This seems to be what Rodriguez-
Pereyra wants, as noted above. Unfortunately, this combination is far from trivial.
The combination is just an instance of the move from the claim that a is F to the
claim that a has the property of being F.12 Rodriguez-Pereyra admits that this
general principle is objectionable. If the general principle is objectionable, then it is
hard to see how any instance of it can be trivial.
One might think that I have stated (11b) in a way that makes it an instance
of the objectionable principle, when Rodriguez-Pereyra has used the λ-calculus to
avoid that. Maybe, that is, Rodriguez-Pereyra would want to write not (11b) but:
11b1. @x@ypx  yÑ pλzqpx  zqrysq
I do not see how this is any less a version of the objectionable principle in virtue
of being written in the λ-calculus. An unrestricted comprehension principle is ob-
jectionable because it leads to paradox, and if we take seriously the ontology that
goes along with Rodriguez-Pereyra’s use of the λ-calculus—λ-expressions designate
properties expressed by open sentences—then it’s no less objectionable for being
written in λ-notation. One can write a λ-expression that designates the property of
12This may not be obvious to some, given the construal of properties as second-order objects.
Rodriguez-Pereyra thinks the issue about whether to formulate The Principle as a first- or second-
order principle is irrelevant to for his purposes. (Cf. (2006) fn. 3, p. 220.) In a first-order
formulation, (11b) would read: @x@ypx  y Ñ Hpx, Iyqq, where Hpx, yq means that x has y in the
way that objects have properties. Understood this way, the points in the text go through.
Maybe this is a good place to note that I think the first-order formulation is the right one,
and that, pace Rodriguez-Pereyra, it does matter for what he’s about. Well, at least the use of
the second-order formulation is apt to cause confusion. Whether Rodriguez-Pereyra was confused
himself, I don’t know.
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being a property that is not self-exemplifying.13 On the other hand, we saw above
that λ-application can be understood merely as syntactic transformation. (This
repairs the worries about unrestricted comprehension.) So (11b1) is just a different
way of writing:
11b2. @x@ypx  yÑ x  yq
(11b2) is true, of course, but it hardly allows one to generate the sub-conclusion (14)
that a  b from the Law of Self-Identity, since in combination with (11b2) one is not
licensed to infer that a exemplifies the relevant property of identity. To repair this
flaw, one might reify the λ-calculus satisfaction relation, but then The Transition
ceases to be trivial. One would be back, essentially, to (11b) (cf. fn. 12).
The point is that Rodriguez-Pereyra faces a dilemma. His use of the λ-
calculus suggests a version of his argument that is not valid. But if we make room
for properties of identity and move away from the λ-calculus or reify the λ-calculus
abstraction and satisfaction relations, then the argument is not trivial. What he
needed was a valid, trivial argument to make his case. To complete the case against
Rodriguez-Pereyra, we will need to consider the question whether properties of
identity can plausibly be construed as fundamental properties. Rodriguez-Pereyra,
however, does not consider that question, so I will postpone a discussion of it for a
bit.
3.3 Adams on Primitive Thisness
Adams, as well, rules out properties of identity—he calls them ‘thisnesses’—as rele-
vant to indiscernibility. Adams contrasts thisness with “suchness”: basically, a such-
ness is a property that makes for qualitative difference. It will be useful to dwell on
Adams’s development of these notions. He says, “A thisness is the property of being
identical with a certain particular individual”.14 And later, “All the properties that
are, in certain senses, general (capable of being possessed by different individuals)
and nonrelational are suchnesses.”15 One might wonder whether the parenthetical
remark is doing all the work here. At this point, it is an open question—one Adams
13One can write it like this: pλFqpPpFq^ FpFqq, where ‘P’ abbreviates the predicate ‘is a property’.
14(1979) p. 6.
15(1979) p. 7, emphasis mine.
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recognizes as open—whether thisnesses are qualitative, that is, whether thisnesses
are also suchnesses. It is therefore puzzling to find him suggesting that suchnesses
must be “capable of being possessed by different individuals.” To his credit, Adams
goes on:
[L]et us say that a basic suchness is a property that satisfies the follow-
ing three conditions. (1) It is not a thisness and is not equivalent to
one. (2) It is not a property of being related in one way or another to
one or more particular individuals (or to their thisnesses). ... (3) [It] is
not a property of being identical with or related in one way or another
to an extensionally defined set that has an individual among its mem-
bers, or among its members’ members, or among its members’ members’
members, etc. ((1979) pp. 7-8)
A suchness, for Adams, is either a basic suchness or a property constructed out
of basic suchnesses via certain operations. The operations may be logical. If F is
a suchness, then  F is a suchness; likewise for disjunction and existential general-
ization. The operations may also be epistemic. If p is a proposition constructed
from allowed operations, then pbelieves that pq and pwishes that pq etc. are also
suchnesses.16
I take issue with clause (1) of Adams’s characterization of basic suchness.
He simply stipulates that thisnesses are not basic qualitative properties. Adams
goes on to defend the claim that thisnesses aren’t qualitative at all (that is, that
thisnesses aren’t non-basic suchnesses). But why has he overlooked the possibility
that thisnesses—properties like being identical to Jamie Pickavance—might be basic,
qualitative properties? The answer to this question is not plain. It may be that
Adams, like Rodriguez-Pereyra, had a blind spot here. But consider this passage
where Adams briefly discusses his use of ‘property’:
It may be controversial to speak of a “property” of being identical with
16Adams is willing to dig in his heels if one finds this characterization unsatisfactory. He says,
“I am prepared to accept the notion of a suchness, and related notions of qualitativeness of facts,
similarities, differences, etc., as primitive if they cannot be satisfactorily defined” (1979, p. 9).
Given this, I propose to grant Adams his characterization of suchness, though clearly he ought not
use the fallback primitivist position to defend the claim that thisnesses cannot be suchnesses, even
basic ones. He takes care to do this in with respect to the Leibnizian position, though Leibniz did
not hold that thisnesses were basic suchnesses. However, his definitions rule out the possibility that
thisnesses are basic suchnesses, and that is the possibility I am concerned to chart out here.
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me. I want the word ‘property’ to carry as light a metaphysical load
here as possible. ... I am not committed to regarding properties as
components of individuals. To deny that thisnesses are purely qualita-
tive is not necessarily to postulate “bare particulars,” substrata without
qualities of their own, which would be what was left of the individual
when all its qualitative properties were subtracted. Conversely, to hold
that thisnesses are purely qualitative is not to imply that individuals are
nothing but bundles of qualities, for qualities may not be components of
individuals at all. ((1979) pp. 6-7)
Adams is expressing neutrality regarding whether properties are “constituents” of
objects. This professed neutrality may be telling. Suppose one is a bundle theorist,
i.e., that one maintains that objects just are bundles of properties (together with
some bundling relation, which we can ignore here). There are two ways of thinking
about primitive thisness on this view. First, one might think that each thisness is
primitively different from the others. On this view, a thisness is a member of the
bundle, and the primitiveness of thisness consists in the fact that each thisness is
primitively different from the others. Second, one might think that each object is
primitively different from others. On this view, there is no thisness in the bundle,
and the primitiveness of thisness consists in the fact that each object is primitively
different from the others. Bundle theorists cannot be light with ‘property’ like
Adams wants to be. As a result, these two options stand in high relief for them.
One might wonder what, exactly, the primitiveness of primitive thisness con-
sists in, according to Adams. The two options above commend themselves as live
options. Either the primitiveness concerns numerical difference among thisnesses,
or the primitiveness concerns numerical difference among objects. Adams is not
clear which he has in mind here. But if one is thinking along the lines of the second
option, it would be easier to overlook the possibility that thisness is both primitive
and qualitative. This is because no qualitative difference among objects is plausibly
primitive in the second sense.17 However, if one is thinking along the lines of the
first option, then it is not obvious that thisnesses aren’t qualitative (that is, aren’t
also basic suchnesses).
17Unless one is an extreme nominalist, a´ la´ Devitt (1980). But we are here assuming a realism
about properties, so I will not concern myself with this possibility.
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Whether these speculations apply in the situation with Adams (1979) or not,
Adams does not consider the possibility that thisness is primitive and qualitative.
This possibility is, for all Adams says, still on the table. Admittedly, this possibility
is initially a bit puzzling, so I turn now to motivating the claim that thisness may
be qualitative.
3.4 Two Types of Externalism
I want to distinguish two ways of thinking about externalism as a thesis about the
content of mental states because one of the ways will make room for thinking of
properties of identity as qualitative.18 Roughly, externalism is the claim that it is
possible for instrinsic (often: “microphysical”) duplicates to differ with respect to
the contents of their respective mental states, or that factors “outside the head”
contribute to the determination of the content of mental states.19 The fundamen-
tal evidence for such views consists in varieties of so-called “Twin Earth” thought
experiments. These arguments are well-known, so I will not rehearse any of them
here. Many externalists seem content with the metaphysical possibility claim as a
definition of externalism, and this may in large part be due to the fact that the
metaphysical possibility claim is all that the Twin Earth thought experiments can
deliver. But some—and here I include myself—would like to know more, if we can,
about the sense in which the world outside our minds “determines” the content of
our thoughts according to externalism. It is with two ways of thinking about this
determination relation that I am concerned here. One of the ways, I hope to show,
supports thinking of properties of identity as qualitative.
The two types of externalism differ with respect to the sense in which the
objects about which thinkers think determine the content of the thinkers’ respective
thoughts. Here it will be useful to introduce a bit of machinery. Let ‘Bpt, cq’ mean
that t stands in the belief relation to c.20 We’ll be primarily concerned with what
kinds of things the externalist might put in place of c in some particular cases.
18There are, I believe, other ways of thinking about externalism that are incompatible with both
of the ways I will discuss presently.
19Cf. Burge (1979), (1986), (1988); McGinn (1989); McLaughlin and Tye (1998); et al. Putnam
(1975) began the discussion by defending a similar view for linguistic content, though many take
his arguments to establish the claim about mental content as well.
20I’ll use belief as a paradigm mental attitude. I don’t call them “propositional” attitudes because
I don’t want to prejudice any issues about what the attitudes are attitudes toward.
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Here’s such a case, as it happens, a Twin Earth one. Let Tim and Jim be intrinsic
duplicates in different worlds, and let Jenny and Winnie be intrinsic duplicates and
worldmates of Tim and Jim, respectively.21 Tim believes that Jenny is cute, and
Jim believes that Winnie is cute. Our question for the externalist is this: how do
Jenny and Winnie relate to Tim’s and Jim’s beliefs?
Answer one. Jenny is a constituent of the content of Tim’s belief, and Winnie
of Jim’s.22 One way to represent this view is to have contents be ordered n-tuples
of individuals (whether objects or facts or whatnot), properties, and relations.23 In
this case, we could use ordered pairs of Jenny and cuteness for Tim, and Winnie and
cuteness for Jim.24 So, B(Tim, Jenny,cuteness¡) and B(Jim, Winnie,cuteness¡).
Here there is no question about the truth of externalism. If the objects in the world
are different, so are the things to which thinkers stand in the belief relation. So it is
natural—if not inevitable—to say that Tim and Jim believe different things, have
different beliefs.
Answer two. The belief relation relates believers and propositions, and Jenny
and Winnie aren’t the right kinds of things to be constituents of propositions.25 So
Jenny and Winnie aren’t constituents of the items to which thinkers stand in the be-
lief relation. They are, rather, the intentional objects of propositions. Letting ‘ppq’
be a name for the proposition expressed by ‘p’, ‘p’ a sentence, then B(Tim,pJenny
is cuteq) and B(Jim,pWinnie is cuteq). One might wonder, given that Jenny and
Winnie are intrinsic duplicates and that propositions are necessary existents, how
it is that Tim got to stand in the belief relation to a proposition with Jenny as an
intentional object, whereas Jim got to stand in the belief relation to a proposition
with Winnie as an intentional object, rather than vice versa. Further, since Jenny
and Winnie aren’t constituents of Tim’s and Jim’s respective beliefs, one might
21Friends of Tim and Jim and Jenny and Winnie will, of course, call the pairs by the same names.
Names are changed here to protect their identities.
22McGinn (1989) defends such a view explicitly.
23More precisely, we would need to state this recursively; the infelicity of the simpler formulation
is not relevant to my purposes here.
24Any kind of Russellian-type construct will do. Even Russell’s multiple-relation theory will do
the trick. The point is not that this kind of externalist must pick one of the Russellian views;
rather, the point is that this kind of externalist needs to make some of the things to which we stand
in the belief relation the objects in the world that vary in Twin Earth thought experiments.
25I have in mind here the kinds of propositions one finds in, e.g., Bealer (1984), Plantinga (1974)
and (1978), and van Inwagen (1986). Again, what these kinds of propositions are, what constituents
they have (if any), is not relevant. All that matters is that Jenny and Winnie aren’t constituents.
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wonder about how it is that the world is contributing to the difference in Tim’s
and Jim’s beliefs. In response, the externalist can tell the following causal story.
Tim is causally related to Jenny, and there is something about Jenny that causes
people to come to have concepts, beliefs, etc. with Jenny as intentional object,
rather than some other person (or thing). Likewise for Jim and Winnie. You might
have thought that, in virtue of being duplicates, Jenny and Winnie would have the
same causal powers (and liabilities). It turns out, however, that this way of thinking
about externalism teaches that this is not so.26
There is also a causal story to tell given the first answer. It only need be
told to those who puzzle at why Jenny ended up as the constituent of Tim’s belief.
The story is rather simple. Jenny initiated the causal chain that culminated in
Tim’s belief that Jenny is cute. Likewise, Winnie initiated the causal chain that
culminated in Jim’s belief. This causal story, however, need not appeal to any of
causal power had by Jenny but not by Winnie (or vice versa). It needn’t do so
because this view does not require that Tim be caused by Jenny to enter into a
relation to some third thing. It is the presence of the particular causal exchange
between Jenny and Tim that explains why Tim has Jenny as a constituent of his
belief.
It is the second answer that suggests room for thinking of properties of iden-
tity as qualitative. Jenny and Winnie must have different causal powers. Realists
often say that where there is a (set of) causal power(s), there one need postulate a
property: individuals have causal powers in virtue of the properties they instantiate.
Since Jenny is able to cause thoughts about Jenny, there must be a property that
she exemplifies that explains this ability. Since only Jenny is able to cause thoughts
about Jenny, this property must be such that only Jenny can exemplify it. Likewise
for Winnie. A candidate name for such property is ‘the property of being identical
to Jenny ’, or ‘the property of being Jenny ’. I suggest that this is a natural choice
to play the role.
To be clear, I mean only to chart out an externalist option, not that the
externalist ought or is forced to embrace it.27 That option requires that properties
of identity contribute to the causal profile of an object. As such, properties of
26Or that intrinsic duplicates are transworld identical. Nothing in my story rules out the claim
that Tim and Jim are the same person, and that Jenny and Winnie are as well. That would be an
even more surprising result, and needn’t distract us at this point.
27Indeed, I argue below that the externalist ought to reject it.
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identity ought to be understood as robustly qualititative on this view, on a par with
the property of being round and the property of being negatively charged. Further,
this is just one story according to which properties of identity play a causal role.
There may be others. Thus we need an argument that properties of identity don’t
make for qualitative difference.
3.4.1 Adams Again
Some may think that Adams (1981) gives an argument that properties of identity
don’t make for qualitative difference. Adams (1981) is concerned to defend the
claim that “non-qualitative” possibilities must be grounded in actual individuals.
To get at the idea of a “non-qualitative” possibility, consider a world containing only
two electrons, a and b, and suppose a and b differ only with respect to properties
of identity and relations that presuppose distinctness (e.g., being two spatial units
from a). a and b, we can suppose, have the same modal profile; what is possible for a
is possible for b and vice versa. To claim that there are non-qualitative possibilities
with respect to a and b would be to claim that there are at least two worlds that
differ only in that, in one world a exists but b does not, whereas in the other b exists
but a does not. Adams claims that there are two worlds like this only if a or b or
both exist in the actual world. A crucial lemma for Adams is the claim that the
only properties of identity that exist are those of actual individuals. So far, this is
compatible with the claim that properties of identity make for qualitative difference.
But suppose one thought (a) that all qualitative properties could exist even if the
objects that actually instantiate them don’t exist, and (b) that the only properties
of identity that exist in a world are those of the individuals that exist in that world.
(b) seems plausible, if not mandatory, if Adams is right about his lemma. (a) also
seems prima facie plausible. (NB: (a) is far weaker than the claim that qualitative
properties are necessary existents, and is compatible with the so-called “Principle of
Instantiation”, that properties exist only if they are instantiated.) (a) and (b) are
incompatible with the claim that properties of identity are qualitative. Consider the
set of worlds in which I do not exist. By (a), there is some world in that set where
my property of identity exists. But by (b), there is no world in the set where my
property of identity exists. Contradiction. I am inclined to accept (a), so if Adams is
right and if (b) should be accepted if Adams is right, then the rational course would
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be to deny the possibility that properties of identity make for qualitative difference
and reject the possibility of the kind of externalism that I used to motivate it.
I look to Adams (1981) at this point because Adams there makes an ar-
gument against the possibility of what he calls ‘haecceities’. Haecceities stand in
contrast to what he calls ‘thisnesses’, or what I have been calling ‘properties of
identity’. Haecceities are “non-qualitative essences, or perhaps more broadly... non-
qualitative entities...which could exist without the individuals whose [haecceities]
they are. ... I depend on my [haecceity] in a way that it does not depend on me; for
certainly I could not have existed without it.”28 Later, he clarifies further: “On [the
theory of thisnesses] the individuals themselves provide the basis for non-qualitative
facts, by their identity and distinctness. In the theory of haecceities this basis is
provided instead by the haecceities... Specifically, the basis for non-qualitative facts
is provided by the incommunicability of haecceities—that is, by their inability to
bear a certain relation to more than one individual in the same or in different pos-
sible worlds.”29 Adams goes on to argue that haecceities are too mysterious to
be countenanced. I bring this issue to light because Adams is here as close as he
gets to making room for the possibility of qualitative properties of identity, and
his arguments against haecceities are substantially independent of the claim that
haecceities are non-qualitative. So, if he is right that haecceities don’t exist, and if
his arguments do not depend on the claim that haecceities are non-qualitative, then
he has equally made arguments against qualitative properties of identity.
Here is the first, and fundamental, criticism Adams lodges against haecceities:
It is not easy to say what haecceities would be. That is indeed the
chief objection to them. Suppose H* is my haecceity. What would H*
have been if I had never existed? It would be misleading at best for an
actualist to claim that H* would have been my haecceity in that case, for
he thinks there would have been no me for it to be related to. But one
might hold that H* would have been something that could have been
a haecceity of an individual, and that could not have been a haecceity
of different individuals in different possible worlds. That would fit it
to represent me in worlds in which I myself would not exist. Likewise
it might be claimed that there are infinitely many such entities in the
28Adams (1981), p. 12.
29Adams (1981), p. 13.
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actual world, deputizing here for individuals that would exist in other
possible worlds. But what would these entities be? ((1981), pp. 12-3)
It is hard to know what to say about this, for it is hard to know exactly what the
problem is supposed to be. Here is a tempting parody of the first half of the quote,
which I take to be the meat of Adams’s argument:
It is not easy to say what colors would be. That is indeed the chief
objection to them. Suppose G is the color of green things. What would
G have been if green things had never existed? It would be misleading
at best for an actualist to claim that G would have been the color of
green things in that case, for he thinks there would have been no green
things for it to be related to.
I take it no one would be convinced by this objection to the existence of colors. G
would have been G in a world with no green things. What else could it have been?
It is, of course, not the color of green things in such a world. There aren’t any green
things. The trouble is that we just can’t say what a property is—that is, we can’t
bring the property directly before a person’s mind—without being situated with
respect to something that exemplifies it. G is that color; H* is his haecceity. But
given that we know that H* is Adams’s haecceity, we can say what it would have
been were he not to exist: it would have been H*. Now, if we were in that world,
we would not be able to say anything at all about Adams or his haecceity. But
that is no objection to H* existing in that world.30 Further, we in this world where
Adams does exist, can say that, were Adams not to exist, H* would have been that
property such that, if something had it, then that thing would be Adams.
Adams may be objecting, however, that we cannot give any sort of intrinsic
characterization of haecceities (“what would these entities be?”). I suppose Adams
would agree that we can characterize haecceities in certain ways. Some examples.
Haecceities are properties, and they are not relational properties (properties like
being two miles from Wrigley Field and being identical to Derrek Lee are relational
properties; properties like being green and having 2kg mass are not relational).
Haecceities are intrinsic properties. And: If H is a haecceity and a and b are
30Plantinga (1974), (1978), in fact, insists that the essences of non-actual individuals are not
graspable by us, and are therefore not things about which we can talk. But see Plantinga (1985)
for some qualifications.
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individuals, a has H and b has H if and only if a  b. If he does agree to these
characterizations, then the objection would have to be that these characterizations
are not intrinsic. I confess that I don’t understand this objection. We are unable
to say much more than this about properties that are, on Adams’s view, perfectly
respectable. Take the property of being yellow. More to the point, take the property
of being identical to Adams.
Adams, in the quote above, points at the putative incommunicability of
haecceities, and he later develops a case that incommunicability is mysterious.31
Adams’s case takes the form of a series of questions, which boil down to these three:
(A) Why can each haecceity be exemplified only once in each world? (B) Why is
it that “different” objects in different worlds which exemplify the same haecceity
are (trans-world) identical? and (C) Why is each haecceity incompatible with many
properties (e.g. Adams’s haecceity with the property of being an event)? (A) and
(B) have straightforward answers, though I suspect Adams will not be satisfied. Take
(B) first: object o in world w and object o1 in world w1 are identical because they
both exemplify haecceity H. As for (A), the possibility of two non-identical objects
exemplifying the same haecceity simply entails a contradiction, for the “two” objects
would, in that case, have to be identical. Adams will insist that he was asking for a
characterization of haecceities that implied these answers, not for a reminder that
this is the role haecceities were posited to play. The analogy with color is helpful here
as well. It makes little sense to ask for a theory of the property of being green that
explains why two objects that exemplify it are the same color, or that explains why
there couldn’t be two objects with different colors that both exemplified the property
of being green. No instrinsic characterization of the property itself is available to
play such a role. The response to (C) is similar, but deserves more motivation.
First, the response: haecceities just are incompatible with certain properties; the
connections are primitive and necessary. To motivate this response, I will consider
Adams’s account of the incompatibility of thisnesses with certain properties. To be
clear: I don’t mean to respond to his question with an ad hominem, or with some
sort of tu quoque. Adams’s account simply serves as a useful example. The point of
what follows is that, on any account of thisness, the incompatibility to which Adams
31Adams also claims that the nature of haecceities is obscure. (Cf. the final paragraph of (1981)
p. 13, continued on p. 14.) But I fail to see how the points he raises there apply any less to his
preferred thisnesses. So I have chosen to ignore that criticism.
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points will be primitive, and so it is no objection to the theory of haecceities that
this is so. So here is Adams’s account of the incompatibility of his thisness and the
property of being a musical performance:
The explanation is that I am (in fact) a person, and there are necessary
conditions of trans-temporal and trans-world identity which follow (per-
haps analytically) from the concept of a person and which entail that no
musical performance could have been the same individual as one that
is in fact a person—from which it follows that no musical performance
could have had the property of being identical with me, which is my
thisness. ((1981), p. 18)
The real work being done is by the “concept of a person”, not by the account
of thisness. Adams moves from the concept of a person—his being a person—to
the impossibility of his being a musical performance (he puts this as a universally
generalized claim), and then to the incompatibility of his thisness with the property
of being a musical performance. That progression is available to the advocate of
haecceities as well. Adams does not directly defend, on the basis of a theory of
thisness, the incompatibility of his thisness and the property of being a musical
performance. Rather, he claims that it follows from the co-instantiation of his
thisness and the property of being a person that his thisness is incompatible with
the property of being a musical performance. This is no less “mysterious” than the
claims of the advocate of haecceities.
Maybe Adams thinks that the connection between Adams and his thisness
explains the incompatibility of his thisness and the property of being a musical
performance in a way that is unavailable with haecceities. For instance, if one
thought that Adams was a constituent of his thisness (a thought Adams would likely
resist), one might think that the incompatibility of that thisness and the property
of being a musical performance would simply follow immediately. However, any
such connection will not do the trick. For Adams will be related to properties
of distinctness (the property of being distinct from Adams) in whatever way he is
related to his thisness, save exemplification. Adams is a constituent of the property
of being distinct from Adams no less that he is a constituent of his thisness. And,
something Adams would likely accept, the property of being distinct from Adams
could not exist were Adams not to exist. But the property of being distinct from
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Adams is compatible with the property of being a musical performance. Indeed, all
musical performances exemplify that property essentially.
It may be worth mentioning at this point that the forgoing discussion is
unnecessary without the claim that all qualitative properties could exist even if
none of the objects that actually instantiate them do ((a) above). So, if you are
unsatisfied with the replies I have offered on behalf of haecceities, one could just
give up that claim.32
3.4.2 Rodriguez-Pereyra Redux
At the end of §3.2, I promised to consider the question whether properties of iden-
tity could plausibly be construed as fundamental properties (or, to use Adams’s lan-
guage, basic suchnesses). They must be so construed if my criticisms of Rodriguez-
Pereyra are to hold water. So far, I have not defended the claim that properties of
identity are fundamental properties, but I hope what I have done so far has shown
that an argument is needed either way. In §3.4, I articulated an externalist posi-
tion that would seem to require that properties of identity are qualitative properties
that cannot be analyzed or explained in terms of the possession of other qualitative
properties by an object, and this resistance to analysis is a, if not the hallmark of
fundamental properties. Further, in §3.4.1, I defended properties of identity (under
the name ‘haecceities’) against objections that can be construed as objections to the
view that such properties are fundamental. Therefore, the criticisms of Rodriguez-
Pereyra hold water.
3.5 A New Way Forward
The externalist option on which properties of identity contribute to the causal profile
of objects suggests an alternative way to frame disputes about indiscernibility and
properties of identity. It is possible to have what seem to be intrinsic duplicates
with distinct causal powers on one prima facie plausible construal of externalism,
which leads to the view that these objects are not indiscernible. The failure of
indiscernibility is a consequence of the variation in causal profile, which in turn was
a consequence of the differing identities of the objects in question. A variation in
32Fine (1985) takes up similar issues, but I believe they are sufficiently answered either in what
I say about Adams here or in Plantinga (1985).
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causal profile, however, always signals qualitative variation. An alternative approach
would be to find a class of properties that make for causal powers, and quantify over
them in the canonical formulation of The Principle.
A species of property that plays the role of accounting for causal powers
is extant in the literature: natural properties. Roughly, natural properties are,
according to Lewis (1983), those properties that make for resemblance and causal
powers. It is difficult to say much more (though I will be forced to say more shortly).
Regardless, one finds philosophers exploiting the notion of a natural property in
various contexts, often taking the notion as a primitive.33 I assume that this means
that we have a fairly robust idea of which properties are the natural ones, even
if there is some disagreement in particular cases (for example, over properties of
identity). Like Adams (1979) and his notion of ‘suchness,’ I am prepared to accept
the notion of ‘naturalness’ as a primitive, pausing only to adjudicate in particular
cases whether a property is natural or not and to illuminate the notion insofar as
such illumination is possible. In particular, again, I will pause over properties of
identity.
The primary advantage of this alternative is that it gives us new ground over
which to argue, namely whether a property is natural. In some sense, then, I have
merely pushed the dispute on to a different playing field. However, I believe this
is an advance. Using the notion of a natural property gives a grip on the notion
of qualitativeness that we lacked previously because there are tests for naturalness
extant in the literature. I will make use of these tests in the next chapter. And I
show there that the dispute really boils down to the question whether properties of
identity truly contribute to the causal profile of the objects that exemplify them.
For if properties of identity do not contribute to the causal profile of the objects
that exemplify them, then Adams et al. have already made good arguments against
the claim that particulars satisfy The Principle.
So I hereafter take The Principle to say this: necessarily, if o and o1 exemplify
the same natural properties, then o  o1. I will therefore defend the claim that it is
possible that particulars have duplicates with respect to natural properties, but that
it is not possible that universals have duplicates with respect to natural properties.
33E.g., Hawthorne (2001), Lewis (1983), (1986), Sider (1996), et al. Lewis (1986) expresses
willingness to take the notion as a primitive, but considers potential analyses. Sider (1995) argues
against one of those analyses, and Sider (1996) argues against another not considered by Lewis.
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Our chief question regarding particulars, to which I turn presently, is whether
properties of identity are natural properties. Later, in Chapter 5 and §6.2, I will take
up the question whether distinct universals can exemplify identical sets of natural
properties.
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Chapter 4
Primitive Particulars
[P]roponents of primitive thisness must attack...a certain doctrine of
the Identity of Indiscernibles.
—Robert Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”
I claim that particulars do not satisfy The Principle; they are not identical if
indiscernible, where indiscernibility is now understood as agreement on all natural
properties.1 The individuation of particulars is, therefore, primitive with respect
to the class of natural properties. In other words, every possible particular could
have had a duplicate with respect to natural properties. This claim is not new, and
this chapter will be mildly unoriginal. There is a sense in which I am mimicking
the arguments one finds in Adams (1979), Black (1952), Swinburne (1995), and
Zimmerman (1997). The chief contributions I hope to make are the argument against
the naturalness of properties of identity (§4.1) and the discussion of Hawthorne’s and
Sider’s (2002) articulation of the bundle theory and the notion of “linkage” (§4.3).
In between (§4.2), I argue that certain possibilities require primitive particulars.
1Where the class of natural properties include monadic and polyadic ones.
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4.1 An Argument Against the Naturalness of Proper-
ties of Identity
I argued in Chapter 3 that properties of identity are not obviously non-natural
because the standard extant reasons for thinking that they are not relevant to in-
discernibility are bad and because properties of identity might contribute to the
causal profile of particulars. In this section, I give an argument that properties of
identity of particulars aren’t natural.2 To make our way to that argument, I begin
by considering an unsuccessful one.
There is a tempting though ultimately unsatisfactory argument against the
naturalness of properties of identity that is suggested by Lewis’s (1983) characteri-
zation of natural properties. Lewis says these things:
I follow Armstrong’s terminology: ‘universals’ are repeatable entities,
wholly present wherever a particular instantiates them. ((1983) p. 8, fn.
2, emphasis mine)
By occurring repeatedly, universals defy intuitive principles. ((1983) p.
11, emphasis mine)
If we had properties and universals both, the universals could serve to
pick out the natural properties. ... [W]e could call a property perfectly
natural if its members are all and only those things that share some one
universal. ((1983) p. 13, emphasis in the original)3
The first two sentences emphasize the repeatability of universals. The third empha-
sizes the one-to-one correspondence between the class of natural properties and the
class of universals.4 The bad argument goes like this: Properties of identity are not
repeatable. They cannot, therefore, correspond to a universal. Thus they are not
natural.
I will highlight two reasons this is a bad argument. The first reason this
is a bad argument relates to the sense in which there are properties of identity in
2For the remainder of this section, I will drop the qualification ‘of particulars.’ Importantly,
the arguments contained here cannot establish more than that. In §6.2.1 I will consider whether
universals might have natural properties of identity.
3I have not made a fuss about the difference between natural and perfectly natural properties.
In my usage, the natural properties are those that Lewis calls ‘perfectly natural’.
4One such correspondence, the one with which I have been operating (cf. §1.1.3), is identity.
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Lewis’s comprehensive philosophical system.5 As such, I must rehearse in broad
strokes that system and some crucial distinctions made by Lewis that are relevant
for us here.
Lewis’s considered ontology contains two fundamental categories of thing:
individuals and the iterative hierarchy of classes.6 The fundamental individuals are
just fundamental possibilia, which are in turn all the possible space-time points.
Mereology is unrestricted, so for any set of space-time points, there is an individual
with those and no other space-time points as parts. Ordinary particulars, then,
are sums of space-time points. The classes include the pure classes, constructed
from the empty class, and the impure classes constructed from possibilia alone or
possibilia and pure classes together. First-level monadic properties are classes of
individuals, and first-level n-adic relations are classes of ordered n-tuples of individ-
uals; higher-level properties are then defined in the obvious ways. Exemplification
is class membership.7
Because of that fundamental ontology, Lewis cannot countenance enduring
objects or transworld identity. That is, no object that is wholly present at (space-
time) location l1 is (classically) identical to an object that is wholly present at
location l2 (where l1 , l2). Space-time points cannot change their locations, mereo-
logical sums cannot exchange their parts, and classes have their members essentially.
Objects can persist, however. That is, it is sometimes correct to say that the object
that exists at l1 is the same object as the object that exists at l2. Lewis believes
that persisting objects perdure: they have parts that exist at various space-time
locations. That is, it is possible for an object to have a part that is wholly present
at l1 and a distinct part that is wholly present at l2. Individuals o and o1 are
“trans-time genidentical” just in case o and o1 are temporal parts of the same ordi-
nary particular. Lewis can also embrace de re modality by embracing “trans-world
genidentity.” Two individuals o and o1 are trans-world genidentical just in case o
and o1 are counterparts.8 So there are two species of genidentity: trans-time and
5Similar comments apply, e.g., to Sider (2001).
6I play fast and loose with the distinction between sets and classes. The distinction needn’t
concern us here.
7In (1983) and (1986), Lewis considers adding universals to his ontology. Universals, in Lewis’s
usage, are not properties. They are, as noted above, those things if such there be that mostly
conform to Armstrong’s account. I won’t here concern myself with a Lewisian ontology including
universals. It is not relevant to the points I am about.
8For Lewis, counterpart relations are context sensitive. Because of my assumptions about de re
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trans-world.
I now return to the issue about properties of identity. For Lewis, properties
of identity are obviously not repeatable. However, properties of genidentity are re-
peatable, and are the properties relevant to the species of externalism that suggests
unique causal powers for intrinsic duplicates. This is not obvious. So consider first
trans-time genidentity. Jenny’s temporal part at t1 and Jenny’s temporal part at
t2 ought both cause thoughts about Jenny as a whole, not just about themselves.
Likewise for temporal parts of Jenny’s counterparts, which temporal parts are coun-
terparts of Jenny’s temporal parts. If we call Jenny’s temporal part at t1, ‘Jenny1,’
then the causally relevant property is the property of being genidentical to Jenny1.
But since genidentity is an identity relation, and since properties are just classes
of individuals, the property of being genidentical to Jenny1 is (classically) identical
to the property of being genidentical to Jenny2 is identical to the property of being
genidentical to j, where ‘ j’ is replaced by a name for any of Jenny’s temporal parts
or for any temporal part of any of Jenny’s counterparts. So we have identified a
property—the property of being genidentical to Jenny1—had by all and only the
possible causes of thoughts about Jenny. Furthermore, it should now be apparent
that properties of genidentity are repeatable. So we have one reason to reject the
bad argument from repeatability.
The second, more important reason this is a bad argument is present in
Lewis (1983): repeatability is not a fundamental constraint on something’s being a
universal. Here is Lewis:
The guiding idea [behind a theory of (sparse) universals], roughly, is that
the world’s universals should comprise a minimal basis for characterising
the world completely. ((1983) p. 12)
Repeatability can be sacrificed if it compromises the ability of the theory to charac-
terize the world completely. I have supplied reason that not including properties of
identity among the inventory of universals compromises the ability of the theory to
characterize the world completely (§3.4), so an argument from repeatability against
counting properties of identity as natural must fail.
The mistake made in this argument is instructive. We have seen only two
modality (cf. 1.1.4), I have altered this somewhat. The counterpart relation is reflexive, symmetric,
and transitive; that is, the counterpart relation is an identity relation.
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fundamental roles for natural properties, and we have seen that accounting for
resemblances cannot supply a basis for counting properties of identity as natural.
So if properties of identity do not make for differences in causal powers, then they
do not count as natural. This should not be a new thought: it was via a putative
possibility about variation in causal profile that I cast doubt on the assumption that
properties of identity are not natural. I will return to this point shortly.
But maybe properties of identity do make for resemblance, despite their lack
of repeatability.9 If properties of identity do make for resemblance, then they qualify
as natural and are relevant to The Principle. Why might one think that properties
of identity make for resemblance? It may be that repeatability is not a necessary
condition for making for resemblance. There is a sense in which objects resemble
themselves. Certainly every object is not unlike itself. If each object resembles
itself in a way that it cannot resemble other things, then a likely candidate for the
ground of this resemblance is, for arbitrary object o, the property of being identical
to o. Though interesting, I think whatever sense one can give to ‘resembles’ in
the antecedent of the preceding conditional, it is going to be a departure from the
sense ‘resembles’ has in our initial theorizing about attribute agreement. Recall
the standard realist picture of attributes. It is motivated by the feeling that one
needs resembling objects to literally share something—a universal—where there
exists attribute agreement. This underlying motivation is only available when the
resembling objects are two or more. If there is just one object resembling itself,
there is no need, given the realist motivation, to postulate some further thing to
explain the resemblance. There is no sharing, so no need for something more than
the object itself. Further, we can even grant that objects resemble themselves but
deny that objects resemble themselves in a way that they cannot resemble other
things. These two claims are easy to confuse. But the former claim is compatible
with the possibility of exactly resembling yet distinct objects. This possibility has
intuition on its side as well, so the burden is on those who would deny it.10 Given the
standard realist motivations, this burden is difficult to discharge. Lastly, opening
the door to the claim that properties of identity make for resemblance opens the
door to the claim that other properties make for resemblance as well, despite that
9Rob Koons pressed this point and helped me to see that it is worth addressing.
10Importantly, I don’t presume that the possibility of indiscernible objects has intuition on its
side, since there is more that goes into the our specific, technical notion of indiscernibility than
goes into the notion of exact resemblance.
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these other properties do not make for resemblance by any reasonable measure.
Take any property that at most one object can exemplify, e.g., the property of being
the third-born child of Lyle and Kathleen Morrow. My wife, if she resembles herself
simply by being identical to herself, would seem to resemble herself in virtue of
being the third-born child of Lyle and Kathleen Morrow. Whatever sense one gives
to ‘resembles’ in order to qualify properties of identity as making for resemblance,
that sense applies equally well to the property of being the third-born child of Lyle
and Kathleen Morrow. However, it is implausible to think that the property of being
the third-born child of Lyle and Kathleen Morrow makes for resemblance. If we allow
properties of identity to make for resemblance, then we allow too many properties
to make for resemblance; there is no principled way to close the door immediately
after we let in properties of identity. Best to keep the door closed to properties of
identity as well and to insist that repeatability is a necessary condition for making
for resemblance.
I do not have a deductive argument against the naturalness of properties of
identity, but I believe there are two converging lines of argument that make it much
more plausible to hold that properties are identity are not natural than that they
are. This is the sense in which I construct an argument against the naturalness of
properties of identity.
The first line begins with the following observation: Jenny has unique “pow-
ers” on top of her ability to cause Jenny-thoughts. Some examples. Only Jenny can
cast a Jenny-shadow. Only Jenny can leave a Jenny-footprint. Only Jenny can ap-
pear in a Jenny-video. Winnie’s shadow would be the same shape and size, as would
a Winnie-footprint; and a Winnie-video would be perceptually indistinguishable
from a Jenny-video. But Winnie cannot make a Jenny-shadow, or Jenny-footprint,
or Jenny-video.
Analogues of the two varieties of externalist story about the identity of sin-
gular mental contents are available regarding the identity of Jenny- and Winne-
footprints, shadows, and videos as well. Recall that on one externalist story the
identity of a particular singular content did not depend on the intentional object
of that content; rather, the view is externalist in the sense that one can only think
that content if one is suitably related to the relevant intentional object. On the
other externalist story, the intentional object of a singular content is somehow con-
stitutive of the content itself, such that the identity of the content is dependent on
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the object. Now consider a particular Jenny-footprint, Jenny f p. Like in the singular
content case, Jenny f p’s identity either constitutively depends on Jenny or it does
not. If it does not, then Jenny would have caused Jenny f p to come into existence not
only by causing a footprint of a certain shape and size, but also by causing it to have
some fundamental property that only Jenny can cause. Otherwise, Winnie could
cause Jenny f p to come into existence, which she cannot. Call that fundamental
property, ‘the property of being caused by Jenny.’ (Jenny-shadows and -videos have
this property as well.) Importantly, this is not meant to be an historical property
of some sort. It is, rather, a non-relational intrinsic property, despite its mislead-
ing name.11 If Jenny f p’s identity does constitutively depend on Jenny herself, on
the other hand, then no such special property is needed. Rather, it is Jenny f p’s
standing in some complex, presumably causal-cum-historical relation to Jenny that
goes to distinguish Jenny f p from a duplicate footprint left by Winnie. Winnie is not
suitably related to Jenny f p.
I claim that the first story about Jenny f p is implausible relative to the sec-
ond. To make our way there, consider the claim that God could bring Jenny f p into
existence without Jenny: there is no bar to his instantiating the fundamental, non-
relational, intrinsic property of being caused by Jenny without bringing Jenny and,
therefore, an instance of the property of being identical to Jenny, into existence. One
can argue for this claim by defending two premises. First, God can instantiate any
fundamental property independently of the instantiating of any property not neces-
sarily connected to that property. Second, instances of the property of being caused
by Jenny are not necessarily connected to instances of any of Jenny’s fundamental
essences. The first premise, about the instantiation of fundamental properties, has
a high degree of intuitive plausibility. And an instance of it, when combined with
the second premise, gives the independence of our two properties. However, the
second premise is more contentious. One might think that instances of the property
of being caused by Jenny are necessarily connected to instances of the property of
being identical to Jenny, which is clearly an essence of Jenny. I can think of three
11One is free to choose a different name. I have in mind something analogous to the way in which
the intentional properties of singular contents are not constituted by those contents’s standing in
a certain relation to their respective intentional objects. The intentional properties of a singular
content are intrinsic, fundamental properties of those contents, at least on the Bealer-Plantinga-
van-Inwagen-style picture I have in mind. Likewise the way properties of identity are not meant to
be relational.
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ways that property instances can be necessarily connected. First, there are superve-
nience relations. Second, there are categorial relations. Third, there are necessary
historical relations.
Supervenience relations certainly do not necessarily connect instances of the
property of being identical to Jenny and the property of being caused by Jenny.
Jenny could have existed without causing anything, so she need not have caused
anything that exemplifies the property of being caused by Jenny. On the other hand,
something could exemplify the property of being caused by Jenny without Jenny
existing, so without the property of being identical to Jenny being exemplified. (For
instance, Jenny might have tragically disintegrated just after leaving a footprint
in the “fine sands” of Portsmouth, England. The footprint exists and exemplifies
the property of being caused by Jenny while nothing exemplifies the property of
being identical to Jenny. Therefore, there is supervenience in neither direction;
supervenience relations do not necessarily connect instances of the property of being
identical to Jenny and the property of being caused by Jenny.
Categorial relations do not necessarily connect instances of the property of
being identical to Jenny and the property of being caused by Jenny in a way that
would prevent their independent instantiation. One type of categorial relation that
necessarily connects properties in the requisite way are determinate-determinable
relations. For instance, God could not instantiate the property of being blue without
instantiating the property of being colored, nor could he instantiate the property of
being triangular without instantiating the property of being shaped. Neither the
property of being identical to Jenny nor the property of being caused by Jenny is a
determinate (determinable) of the other. Another type of categorial relation that
necessarily connects property instatiations in the requisite way are logical relations.
Suspending for the moment worries that would arise for the sparse theorist, God
could not instantiate the property of being yellow without instantiating the property
of being not not yellow and the property of being yellow or grue and etc. Instances of
the property of being identical to Jenny and the property of being caused by Jenny
are not logically connected in this way. It seems to me that there are no other
categorial relations that would do the trick, so instances of the property of being
identical to Jenny and the property of eing caused by Jenny are not necessarily
connected by categorial relations.12
12There are categorial relations that are exclusionary. For example, the property of being blue
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We are left with the possibility of necessary historical relations between in-
stances of the property of being identical to Jenny and the property of being caused
by Jenny. First, recall that the property of being caused by Jenny is not meant to be
short-hand for some kind of historical relational property. Because of this, it is not
obviously plausible that instances of these two properties are necessarily connected
by historical relations. If they are not, then (by process of elimination) the prop-
erty of being identical to Jenny and the property of being caused by Jenny are not
necessarily connected. Thus, God could bring them into existence independently of
one another. This means that Jenny f p could exist without Jenny. That, so I say, is
radically counterintuitive. The story that entails it ought to be rejected.
But suppose that instances of the two are necessarily connected via histor-
ical relations. Then the property of being caused by Jenny would seem to be a
needless addition to the story. The alternative externalist story exploits the pres-
ence of historical relations to explain the dependence of Jenny f p on Jenny as well.
Furthermore, that story seems to have the resources to generate the dependence.
So, the proponent of the property of being caused by Jenny is faced with a simpler
story that she herself must tell that explains everything that needs explaining. This
is a paradigm case of a dispute where Occam’s Razor is justly invoked: the story
with the property of being caused by Jenny is implausible relative to its simpler
alternative.
One might argue that I have left out necessary causal relations as a way for
property instances to be necessarily connected. Suppose, for instance, that causal
structuralism about properties is true.13 All will agree, further, that properties
stand in law-like relations to one another. For example, since negatively charged
things are apt to attract positively charged things, the property of being negatively
charged is law-like related to the property of being positively charged. The causal
structuralist is committed to the claim that these law-like relations are necessary.
This sort of law-like relation, which we can assume to obtain in the case of the
property of being identical to Jenny and the property of being caused by Jenny, is
not enough to secure the sort of necessary connection needed here. What is needed
cannot be co-exemplified with the property of being yellow. Clearly, this type of connection is no
help in the present context.
13Cf. Ch. 5 below for more details. For my purposes in this context, it is enough to note that
the causal structuralist believes that the causal powers that each particular property confers on its
bearers must be conferred by that property.
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is a necessary connection between instances of properties, not between the prop-
erties themselves. Law-like relations do not secure necessary connections between
instances of properties. An instance of the property of being negatively charged may
never be causally related to an instance of the property of being positively charged :
there may be no positively charged things in the world with the negatively charged
thing. Putting the matter another way, God could instantiate the property of being
negatively charged without needing to instantiate the property of being positively
charged and vice versa despite their being necessarily connected causally. This kind
of relation, then, is not enough to secure the claim that God could not instantiate
the property of being caused by Jenny independently of his instantiating the prop-
erty of being identical to Jenny. Since there is no reason to think that there are
causal relations which necessarily connect instances of properties, save in this case,
this objection can only be successful if it begs the question.
The objector who attempts to exploit causal relations may be misled by the
name, ‘the property of being caused by Jenny ’. Certainly, there is something right
about the claim that the identity of Jenny f p depends on Jenny, and on being caused
by her. Both analogues of the two externalist stories agree to that much. Both
should agree, furthermore, that there are complex historical and causal relations
which relate Jenny and Jenny f p. This is not enough to generate the need for the
property of being caused by Jenny, however. That property, again, is meant to be a
non-relational, intrinsic property had by all and only those things suitably related
(via causal-cum-historical relations) to Jenny, but that does not reduce to or (depen-
dently) supervene upon that relationship.14 The presence of such a supervenience
relationship—which is ex hypothesi lacking—would justify the necessary connection
required to avoid my argument. But if the proponent of the property of being caused
by Jenny took that route, she would sacrifice the ability to distinguish herself from
the proponent of the alternative story. Again, both stories could agree to the pres-
ence of a property that supervenes on causal-cum-historical relations between Jenny
and Jenny f p that one might naturally call ‘the property of being caused by Jenny.’
That is simply not the sense we have stipulated for those words here.
We have digressed at length, so it will be useful to review where we have
come from. We began down this path through the possibility of necessary connec-
14In its original usage, “supervenience” did not imply one-way dependence; usage has changed
in this respect.
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tions because I had given an argument that God could bring Jenny f p into existence
without Jenny, an argument that relied on the premise that the property of being
caused by Jenny is not necessarily connected to the property of being identical to
Jenny. Given that we found no necessary connection between these two proper-
ties, that argument stands. I had claimed that a certain story about the identity
conditions of Jenny f p was implausible relative to another story. The story I claim
is implausible denies that Jenny f p’s identity constitutively depends on Jenny; the
better story accepts that dependence and uses causal-cum-historical relations to
substantiate the dependence.
Since we have now seen that God could, on the story that denies the depen-
dence, bring Jenny f p into existence without Jenny, I can make the case that the
implausible story is implausible. The case is rather simple: it is absurd to think
that God could bring Jenny f p into existence without Jenny: Jenny f p is a footprint
of Jenny’s! Certainly, Jenny f p must depend on Jenny is some important way, a way
that requires that Jenny f p could not exist were it not left by Jenny herself. Other-
wise, there are worlds where Winnie leaves Jenny f p, Jamie leaves Jenny f p, and so
on. And by analogy, I could cast a Jenny-shadow, or be in a Jenny-video, and on
and on. Better to tell a story using causal-cum-historical relations that displays the
needed dependence.
Thus far in this section, I have argued that one ought not to tell an externalist
story about the individuation conditions of Jenny f p that exploits the presence of a
irreducible property of being caused by Jenny. Rather, one should tell the story
using causal-cum-historical relations that situates Jenny f p with respect to Jenny
and maintains that Jenny f p’s identity constitutively depends on Jenny. Thus, the
property of being identical to Jenny does not confer the power to cause Jenny-
footprints, or -shadows, or -videos. I must now make the case that this result
carries over to the mental content case.
The required analogy is not far to seek, for I built the externalist stories
about Jenny-footprints, -shadows, and -videos on analogy with the externalist stories
about mental content. As in the footprint case, if one wants properties of identity to
contribute to Jenny’s causal profile, one must claim that what makes the difference
between thoughts that relate a believer to a proposition with Jenny as an intentional
object and those that relate a believer to a proposition with Winnie as an intentional
object is that the latter, but not the former, exemplify some irreducible property
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much like that of being caused by Jenny. The presence of such a property creates
room to insist that Jenny has a power that no one else has, which in turn makes
room for the claim that the property of being identical to Jenny contributes to
Jenny’s causal profile. Exploiting a property like that of being caused by Jenny,
the story continues, is the best way to explain how it came to be that Tim wound
up related to a proposition (content) with Jenny as an intentional object (rather
than Winnie). But the moral of the footprint case, carried over by analogy here, is
that one should not claim that token Jenny-thoughts have an irreducible property
of being caused by Jenny. The more plausible view situates token Jenny-thoughts
with respect to Jenny using a story that exploits causal-cum-historical relations.
In this way, one makes it plausible that the identity of each token Jenny-thought
constitutively depends on Jenny. It is thus natural to take part of the content of the
belief to be Jenny herself. If this is right, though, then the need for the property
of being caused by Jenny falls away, and thus the wedge one used to create space
in Jenny’s causal profile for the property of being identical to Jenny to fill, loses
its thrust. This latter view is more plausible because the former view must tell the
causal-cum-historical story anyway, unless one straps oneself with the implausible
claim that God could cause Jenny-thoughts in a Jenny-less world. (Importantly, I
do not take this result to show that the appropriate externalist story cannot support
a “mode of presentation” or some such, only that the mode of presentation should
either (a) not be uniquely correlated with Jenny or (b) not be counted as part of
the content of the belief.) Therefore, Jenny does not have an irreducible power to
cause Jenny-thoughts, and the property of being identical to Jenny does not confer
the power to cause token Jenny-thoughts.
Because I built the case for the naturalness of the property of being identical
to Jenny on the basis of the possibility of Jenny’s unique, irreducible power to
cause Jenny-thoughts, this line undermines the motivation I gave for thinking that
properties of identity are natural. Therefore, those who want to think of properties
of identity as natural owe an alternative motivation.
The second line of argument that converges on the implausibility of the
naturalness of properties of identity proceeds via process of elimination. While I have
presented the first line as undermining the externalist-based motivation for thinking
that properties of identity are natural, it can be viewed also as a global threat to
the claim that the property of being identical to Jenny contributes to Jenny’s causal
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profile. This is because we have seen only two ways to argue that a given property
is natural: one must either argue that the property makes for resemblance, or argue
that the property makes for causal powers. Clearly, properties of identity cannot
make for resemblance. Two objects simply cannot share a property of identity. So,
the only way to argue that properties of identity are natural is to argue that they
make for causal powers. But we now have reason to doubt that properties of identity
contribute to the causal powers of the objects that exemplify them. The powers I
have considered that might be thought to require the naturalness of properties of
identity are better understood, I have argued, in a way that does not require the
naturalness of properties of identity. Therefore, since properties of identity don’t
make for resemblance or causal powers, properties of identity are not natural.
There are two ways to resist this argument from elimination. First, one
could argue that I have not considered a power that objects have that can only be
explained by claiming that properties of identity are natural. Second, one could
argue that there are natural properties which make for neither resemblance nor
causal powers, that natural properties can make for something else. The first of
these strategies I will simply dismiss. I can think of no powers of objects that are
unique but not subject to the kind of analysis given above.
The second strategy, however, may have teeth. Jonathan Schaffer (2004) dis-
tinguishes three—not two—qualifications for being a sparse property: resemblance
(his “similarity”), causal powers (“causality”), and “primacy.” Sparse properties,
in virtue of playing the primacy role, says Schaffer, “serve as the ontological base
for linguistic truths.”15 Primacy is a way of “characterizing the notion of the on-
tological base,” and “the primacy qualification...requires that the base is capable of
participating in the truth-making relation.”16 The idea, again, is that the sparse
properties provide adequate resources to characterize the world completely. In other
words, once God settles on a distribution of properties that play the primacy role,
any further addition would not alter the truths that hold at that world.17 We have
15(2004) p. 100.
16(2004) p. 100. Schaffer defends primacy against a competing qualification, that of “fundamen-
tality,” which is more commonly discussed. (Cf. Lewis (1983), Armstrong (1978), et al.) I find
Schaffer’s criticisms of fundamentality and defense of primacy compelling. I point the reader to
(2004) for more.
17This way of characterizing the primacy role, and that of the ontological base, does not require
that there be truthmakers. At this point, I do not want to assume that in order to embrace the
primacy role one must embrace truthmakers. I will return to this issue shortly, where it will become
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already seen that sparse properties (universals) and natural properties are of a piece.
So, if Schaffer has offered a third qualification for being a sparse property, he has
ipso facto offered a third qualification for being a natural property. I am prepared
to accept Schaffer’s qualification. What is needed to resist the argument from elim-
ination, then, is a class of linguistic truths that require properties of identity to be
in the ontological base.
Presumably, the class of truths in question will involve proper names. Why
think that these are the relevant truths? Linguistic truths involving neither proper
names nor demonstratives (nor anaphora of the same) clearly do not require prop-
erties of identity to make them true. Truths involving proper names, on the other
hand, might be best understood using properties of identity. So one might first
think it will at least include the class containing completions of the following sen-
tence schema: ‘This is (NAME).’ For example, ‘This is Kathleen’ and ‘This is Lyle’
will be included in the class. One might take the view to be about sentences like
this: ‘This is named “Kathleen”.’ This is clearly the wrong way to defend the view
that properties of identity are needed. What is relevant here is how the thing in
question came to be called ‘Kathleen,’ and there is no reason to think that this will
have anything to do with the thing’s exemplifying the property of being identical to
Kathleen. Better to take the view to about sentences like this: ‘This is this (Kath-
leen).’ For example, ‘This is this (Kathleen)’ might be made true by the fact that
the referent of ‘This’ (in the context) exemplifies the property of being identical to
Kathleen.
Importantly, this is a view about what makes the sentences like ‘This is
Kathleen’ true, not a view about the identity facts. This view about these truths
does not supply the resources to argue that Kathleen (“this person”) is identical to
Kathleen because she exemplifies the property of being identical to Kathleen. But
proponents might assert that we already know that the fact that this is Kathleen
obtains because the referent of ‘this’ in the context exemplifies the property of being
identical to Kathleen. On this take, the view about truths presupposes that view
about the identity facts and deploys it when confronted with the need to supply a
truth-maker for sentences like ‘This is Kathleen’. It is this progression of thoughts
that I must argue against. Here, one might think that the property of being identical
to Kathleen is relevant for the reasons outlined above.
more important.
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But I don’t think this view about the identity facts is right. I share Lewis’s
attitude about identity:
[W]e should not suppose that we have...any problem about identity.
We never have. Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything
is identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything else except
itself. There is never any problem about what makes something identical
to itself; nothing can ever fail to be. And there is never any problem
about what makes two things identical; two things never can be identical.
There might be a problem about how to define identity to someone
sufficiently lacking in conceptual resources—we note that it won’t suffice
to teach him certain rules of inference—but since such unfortunates are
rare, even among philosophers, we needn’t worry much if their condition
is incurable. ((1986) pp. 192-3)
I think this is the right attitude to have. And if it is, then there is just no question
about whether properties of identity are needed to ground the truth of identity
statements: they are not. Similar remarks apply to the trans-world identity case.
Here is Kripke:
Why can’t it be part of of the description of a possible world that it
contains Nixon and that in that world Nixon didn’t win the election?
It might be a question, of course, whether such a world is possible. ...
But, once we see that such a situation is possible, then we are given
that the man who might have lost the election or did lose the election in
this possible world is Nixon, because that’s part of the description of the
world. Possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered by powerful tele-
scopes. There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about
what would have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situa-
tion, we are talking about what would have happened to him. ((1980)
p. 44, emphasis in the original)
I make these points about identity to emphasize that identity facts are utterly
unproblematic and, therefore, do not need to involve any properties of identity. All
the Nixon identity facts need is Nixon himself. All the Elsie identity facts need is
Elsie herself. Appealing to properties of identity seems a needless addition insofar as
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one shares with me the Lewis-Kripke attitude about identity. True identity claims,
if their truth is grounded in anything, are grounded in identity facts. So properties
of identity are not needed to ground the truth of identity claims. To add properties
of identity to the story introduces needless complications that ought to be rejected
via considerations of simplicity of theory.
I do not deny that there might be epistemological problems to do with de-
ciding, in a particular case, whether some thing one has encountered at one time is
the same as a thing one had encountered at some other time. Indeed, there may be
very difficult problems of this sort. But such problems are irrelevant to the truth
of the identity claims because they are irrelevant to the identity facts. The identity
facts ground the truth of the identity claims. Appealing to truthmakers for identity
claims that involve properties of identity isn’t going to help with these epistemo-
logical troubles either. One can no more discover whether something with which
one is presented exemplifies the property of being identical to Jamie than one can
discover, using one’s powerful telescope, whether it is Nixon in that other possible
world.
Perhaps things will be clearer if we consider a different case without the
demonstrative(s). Consider ‘Kathleen is a teacher.’ One might give these truth-
conditions: the (unique) thing that exemplifies the property of being identical to
Kathleen also exemplifies the property of being a teacher.18 I see no reason to tell
this co-exemplification story. Better just to say that ‘Kathleen’ is a teacher is true
iff Kathleen exemplifies the property of being a teacher. The property of identity
is just idle machinery. Additionally, I don’t think this is enough to underwrite the
truth of the sentence ‘Kathleen is a teacher.’ We must also be able to connect these
properties to the linguistic utterances that are meant to latch onto them. In par-
ticular, we must connect ‘Kathleen’ to the property of being identical to Kathleen.
In order to that, we must (presumably) tell a causal-cum-historical story about
a particular object (Kathleen) and a particular name (‘Kathleen’). It will be the
qualities that some speaker associates with Kathleen and ‘Kathleen’ (the internal-
ists) or causal-cum-historical relations that obtain between a use of ‘Kathleen’ and
Kathleen (the externalists) that will in part play the primacy role in such a story.
Even descriptivists about names ought to be unhappy with the claim that ‘Kath-
leen’ is synonymous with ‘the thing that exemplifies the property of being identical
18Cf. Plantinga (1978).
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to Kathleen, but that is the only view on which properties of identity will play the
relevant role. Once one has told one’s favored story about how to hook ‘Kathleen’
to Kathleen, we will have gotten ourselves into a situation similar to that regarding
mental contents, footprints, etc. above: the property of being identical to Kathleen
will be redundant and, therefore, dispensable. Simplicity will demand that we dis-
pense it. Similar remarks apply to positive existential claims like ‘Kathleen exists’.
Once one connects the name ‘Kathleen’ to Kathleen, there is no work left for the
property of being identical to Kathleen. There is just no issue regarding whether or
how she is herself. (Here it may be useful to recall Lewis’s remarks about identity
noted above.)
A note of clarification. I am not saying that the method of connection be-
tween ‘Kathleen’ and Kathleen is part of the semantic theory, or part of the truth-
conditions of sentences involving ‘Kathleen,’ or some such. Rather, I am saying that
the story about that connection must be part of the overall theory of what makes
‘Kathleen is a teacher’ true, and that the way we connect words to their meanings
can influence the propriety of taking on otherwise idle ontology when constructing
a semantics proper, or giving the truth-conditions of sentences, or what have you.
In this case, properties of identity would be an idle addition because the stories
available regarding how we connect proper names to their referents makes available
a more natural, ontologically parsimonious alternative to truth-conditions involving
properties of identity.
Maybe, however, I have been looking to the wrong truths involving proper
names; maybe it is negative existential statements—statements like ‘Kathleen does
not exist’—that will reveal the need for properties of identity to play the primacy
role.19 The idea is that the best truthmaker of negative existentials like ‘Kathleen
does not exist’ are facts like the property of being identical to Kathleen’s having
no instances, or like the property of being identical to Kathleen’s exemplifying the
property of having no instances. Whether or not the primacy role must be clarified
using the notion of truthmaking, this particular attempt to qualify properties of
identity as natural seems to be committed to understanding the primacy role using
the notion of truthmaking. The alternative clarification of the primacy role appeals
to property distributions, and the truth of negative existentials does not seem to
turn on a distribution of properties of identity. (Maybe it depends on a distribution
19Rob Koons pressed this point. Cf. Plantinga (1978).
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of the property of having no instances, but that won’t qualify properties of identity
as natural.) So I will consider this strategy for qualifying properties of identity as
natural as one that deploys truthmakers essentially. If one thinks that this is an
inappropriate way to clarify the notion of the ontological base, so much the worse
for this strategy for qualifying properties of identity as natural.
Before considering the merits of this strategy, I should make a dialectical
point. Given that properties of identity are not needed to play a role in accounting
for resemblance and causal powers, and that they are not needed to play a role in
grounding positive existentials and identity claims, the burden is on those who think
that properties of identity a part of the ontological base because the ground the truth
of negative existentials. This attitude is warranted because it would be surprising if
properties of identity were natural only because of this minimal role. Further, those
committed to a sparse theory of universals would be forced, if properties of identity
are natural for this reason, to take on a whole class of properties, many of which are
irrelevant to her characterization of the actual world. For instance, the property of
being identical to Jamie and the property of being identical to Julie do not play a
role in grounding the truth of a negative existential, since Jamie and Julie actually
exist. But, if properties of identity generally are natural, then the sparse theorist
must take these properties on as well. The upshot of this dialectical point is that
I only need to argue that there is a plausible way to ground negative existentials
without properties of identity; the proponent of natural properties of identity, on
the other hand, must argue that her view is the only plausible alternative.
Truthmaker theories, like theories of universals, come in varying degrees of
abundance. In its most abundant form, truthmaker theory claims that every truth
has a unique truthmaker. This view is sometimes called ‘truthmaker maximalism’.
In its sparsest form, truthmaker theory claims that all truths supervene on being,
but tries to get away with as little “being” as possible to make it all work out. There
are also partial theories of truthmakers, theories that claim that only some truths
have truthmakers. For instance, one might assert that all non-modal truths have
truthmakers but that modal truths (maybe including tensed truths) do not.20
20Those committed to a sparse theory of universals ought to commit to a correspondingly sparse
theory of truthmaking. To see why, consider the a sparse theorist who denies that there are
disjunctive properties, and consider the claim that Elsie is a dachshund or a badger. Such a sparse
theorist certainly would not say that ‘Elsie is a dachshund or a badger’ has as a truthmaker Elsie’s
exemplifying the property of being a dachshund or a badger. The sparse theorist in question doesn’t
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We do not need to settle or explore in detail all of these issues here. The
question that concerns us is just this: What are the truthmakers for negative ex-
istential statements? In particular, we want to know, for each negative existential
statement, whether there is a fact or set of facts (i) that do not involve properties
of identity but (ii) that necessitate the truth of that negative existential statement.
If we can find such a fact or set of facts for each negative existential, or state in
general what fact or set of facts would be needed in each case such that it is clear
that it or they obtain when the corresponding negative existential is true, then we
will have reason to deny that properties of identity play a primacy role with respect
to negative existentials. (Here, the dialectical point made a few paragraphs back
looms large.)
We can specify in a general way the fact or set of facts satisfying (i) and
(ii). The set of facts will be these: all the positive existential facts together with the
“totality” fact. The totality fact is a “that’s all” fact. Consider the great conjunction
of all the atomic facts that there are, where atomic facts are, roughly, truthmakers
for completions of one of the following two schemas: something’s exemplifying some
property or some n things standing in some n-adic relation. The totality fact for
the actual world is the fact that the facts in the great conjunction are all the atomic
facts. Truthmaker theorists are led to embrace totality facts because of problems
with the truth of certain general truths. For instance, consider the claim that all
crows are black. The conjunction of crow1’s being black, crow2’s being black, crow3’s
being black, and so on, is not enough to guarantee the truth of the claim that all
crows are black. In order to get the truth of this universally quantified claim, we
need to stipulate that crow1, crow2, crow3, and so on, are all the crows that there
are. Similarly for other universally quantified claims. Further, consider the claim
that there aren’t any unicorns. Even granting that there are no unicorns in our
universe, the arrangement of matter and the distribution of qualities of our universe
is consistent with the truth of the claim that there is a unicorn. For our universe
could have been embedded within a bigger universe which does contain a unicorn,
believe there is any such property! Rather, she is likely to claim that ‘Elsie is a dachshund or a
badger’ has as a truthmaker Elsie’s exemplifying the property of being a dachshund. Once that fact
obtains, there just is no question about the truth of ‘Elsie is a dachshund or a badger’. But one
sacrifices uniqueness if one goes this way, for the same fact will make true an infinity of claims,
e.g., ‘Elsie is a dachshund or a beagle’, ‘Elsie is a dachshund or a person’, ‘Elsie is a dachshund
or snubnosed’, and so on. The sparse theorist, then, at least ought to retreat from truthmaker
maximalism.
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or could have been running in tandem with a spatiotemporally isolated universe
that contains a unicorn. So the conjunction of all the atomic facts pertaining to
our universe is not sufficient to guarantee the truth of the claim that there are no
unicorns. Totality facts solve these problems. Together with the totality fact, the
list of black crows is sufficient to guarantee the truth of the claim that all crows are
black, and the the conjunction of all the atomic facts pertaining to our universe is
sufficient to guarantee the truth of the claim that there are no unicorns.21
Again, I claim that the set containing all the positive existential facts and
the totality facts satisfy clauses (i) and (ii) above. First, consider clause (i), that
this set does not include facts that involve properties of identity. We have already
seen that positive existential facts do not involve properties of identity. No totality
fact involves properties of identity either. Each totality fact, again, is just the fact
that all the relevant atomic facts are all the facts that there are. They are not to be
construed as a great conjunction of negative existentials of all the facts that there
are not. They are irreducibly general facts that include the relevant atomic facts
and contribute in addition a “that’s all” clause. Further, I see no need to construe
the inclusion relation among facts as involving properties of identity for facts. To
my knowledge, no one has even proposed such an understanding of inclusion.22 So
totality facts do not involve properties of identity for the facts they include either.
Totality facts simply don’t involve properties of identity at all. Second, consider
clause (ii), that this set necessitates the truth of all the true negative existentials.
It is easy to see that this is true. Suppose there was a true negative existential
claim whose truth was not necessitated by our set of facts. Then there is a world
where all our positive existential facts obtain and in which the same totality fact
obtains, but in which the negative existential claim whose truth is not necessitated
is false. In this world, then, another positive existential claim is true, which requires
21On the need for totality facts, cf. Armstrong (1997) pp. 196-201, especially p. 197 and
Russell (1919) lecture V. My discussion owes much to Parsons (2006). Note that if Cheyne’s and
Pigden’s (2006) view can be salvaged from the criticisms of Parsons (2006), the totality fact need
not be included in the set of facts satisfying (i) and (ii); all that would be needed are the positive
existentials. I doubt such a salvage job is possible, however.
Parsons actually rejects that there are totality facts, and correspondingly rejects that there are
truthmakers for general truths, among which are negative existentials. This, of course, is no help to
those who think that negative existentials require that properties of identity be in the ontological
base, so I am ignoring it here.
22This includes Plantinga, whose use properties of identity and other “essences” is perhaps more
promiscuous than any other.
78
an additional positive existential fact. But this contradicts the assumption that our
original set of positive existential facts are all the positive existential facts. Such
a situation is, therefore, impossible. Clause (ii) is satisfied. Thus there is no need
for properties of identity to make true negative existentials. The work can be done
without properties of identity.
One might balk at the preceding suggestion because it introduces a negative
fact disguised as a positive one. The totality fact is just as much the fact that there
are no other facts as it is the fact that all the atomic facts are are all the facts that
there are. The hesitation over negative existential facts can be seen as a case of
a more general hesitation over negative facts, but we have been led to the latter
anyway. Why not, then, just accept a bunch of others? In particular, why not
accept negative existential facts?
Leaving aside worries about whether the totality fact is rightly construed as
either positive or negative23, the fundamental reason I opt for a totality fact rather
than for loads of negative facts to do with the existence of objects is that I find the
former tack more elegant and theoretically satisfying. We have already seen that
properties of identity are not required to characterize the positive aspects of the
world: they are not needed to account for the resemblance facts, the causal powers
of things, or for the truth of positive existentials and other claims about particu-
lars. The question is, then, whether we ought to countenance one general fact—the
totality fact—or loads of negative facts—one for each true negative existential. But
even if we go in for a negative fact for each negative existential, we will still need the
totality fact. For we need to ground the truth of claims like ‘Elsie is not a badger’,
‘Jamie is not six foot, four’, ‘This computer is not a PC’, and ‘All crows are black’
as well. We can certainly populate the world with more negative and general facts
to individually ground all these truths, but it seems to me better to opt for just
the one totality fact. It is the existing crows that go to make ‘all crows are black’
true, not a primitive fact that the property of being a crow is always coexemplified
with the property of being black. Likewise, it is Jamie’s actual height that grounds
the truth of ‘Jamie is not six foot, four’, not her not exemplifying the property of
being six foot, four. Deploying totality facts is the way to maintain these sorts of
23Cf. Russell’s (1919) remarks that, “In regard to general propositions, the distinction of affir-
mative and negative is arbitrary. Whether you are going to regard the propositions about ‘all’ as
the affirmative ones and the propositions about ‘some’ as the negative ones, or vice versa, is purely
a matter of taste” (pp. 228-9).
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thoughts, and to keep one’s theory as simple as possible in the process. And once
one deploys totality facts to ground the truth of these negative claims, one gets
negative existentials for free.
I do not claim, then, that the view that properties of identity are natural
because they play a role in grounding negative existentials, is incoherent. Rather, my
claim is that it is better to opt for an alternative that secures the truth of negative
existentials and many other truths by deploying totality facts. Given the dialectical
situation when we came to negative existentials, furthermore, I conclude that the
proponent of the claim that properties of identity are are part of the ontological
base cannot meet her burden.
Returning to the main line of argument, we see more generally that the roles
of primacy, resemblance, and causal powers dovetail.24 We have seen this dovetail
in the case of resemblance and causal powers. The one way it seems one could drive
a wedge between the two—by using properties of identity—has been seen to fail.
Any causal role they might be thought to play requires unsightly redundancy. It
would seem that trying to wedge in properties of identity using primacy is similarly
destined to failure. And for the same reason: any primacy role that properties of
identity might be thought to play would be redundant, so we ought to conclude that
they play no primacy role at all.
There may be other lines of argument that converge on the non-naturalness of
properties of identity, but I believe the two considered above are sufficient to warrant
the desired conclusion: properties of identity for particulars are not natural. They
are not relevant to The Principle.
4.2 The Possibility of Indiscernible Particulars
Now that we have concluded that properties of identity are not natural, it is time to
turn to the question whether particulars satisfy The Principle. I claim that they do
not. Indiscernible particulars are possible; the identity conditions of particulars are
primitive. This claim is certainly not new; it has been defended at various times and
various ways by Adams (1979), Black (1952), Moreland (1998), Swinburne (1995),
and Zimmerman (1997), among others. As such, in the remainder of this section
24This is something Schaffer (2004) recognizes; indeed, it is part of the reason he trades (what
he calls) “fundamentality” for primacy.
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I do not mean to offer anything substantially novel. I will, rather, rehearse and
defend the arguments of these previous authors, using the typical strategy that
has come to rely on so-called “Max Black worlds.” The basic idea is that one
can construct a possible world that is symmetrical about an axis defined by any
set of natural properties. If this is right, and given some plausible combinatorial
assumptions about modal space, then for any particular, there will be a possible
world containing that particular and a distinct particular that is a duplicate of the
former with respect to natural properties. In this way, The Principle can be shown
to be false vis-a´-vis particulars.
To start, let us consider a world which Max Black (1952) describes, and the
conclusion he seeks to draw from it:
Isn’t it logically possible that the universe should have contained nothing
but two exactly similar spheres? We might suppose that each was made
of chemically pure iron, had a diameter of one mile, that they had the
same temperature, colour, and so on, and that nothing else existed.
Then every quality and relational characteristic of the one would also
be a property of the other. Now if what I am describing is logically
possible, it is not impossible for two things to have all their properties
in common. This seems to me to refute the Principle. (p. 156, emphasis
in the original)
I think Black is right about this. I can conceive of such worlds which are symmetrical
in the requisite way—call them ‘Black Worlds’—and I have an intuition about some
Black Worlds that they are possible.
It is not difficult to see why the use of natural properties in formulating The
Principle makes the possibility of Black Worlds very plausible, if not inevitable.
When describing a possible world, it is very difficult to see how the resources of
one’s language vis-a`-vis properties would need to extend beyond names for prop-
erties that play the roles of accounting for resemblance, causal powers, and, most
importantly, the ontological base. Names for any other properties are dispensable,
at best. Once one has the resources to describe completely the ontological base,
there is really nothing more to do.25 As such, the exclusion of properties of identity
from among the ranks of the natural properties is a crucial lemma to establishing the
25All this assumes, of course, a sparse theory of universals.
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possibility of Black Worlds. If there are no other putatively natural properties that
are not symmetrically exemplifiable, then it is possible to find, for any set of natural
properties N possibly co-exemplified by an object o, a world containing nothing but
two objects exemplifying all the monadic properties in N and which stand to one
another in exactly the same relations in N.26 That is to say, if there are no other
putatively natural properties that are not symmetrically exemplifiable, then Black
Worlds are possible.
There is another sort of property, however, that one may take to upset the
possibility of Black Worlds, namely, monadic relational properties whose canonical
description involves the name of a particular. I have in mind here properties like
that of being two miles from A, where ‘A’ is the name of some particular. (The
monadic relational properties I have in mind in this section go hand in hand with
external relations. This will become important both here and, especially, in Chapter
6.) Such properties are not symmetrically exemplifiable. If they are natural, then
Black Worlds pose no threat to The Principle. (Terminological note: Hereafter
I use the label ‘monadic relational property’ as shorthand for ‘monadic relational
property whose canonical description involves the name of a particular.’ There are
other monadic relational properties, like that of being two miles from an iron sphere
one mile in diameter, that clearly are inadequate to save The Principle in this
setting.) For let the names ‘Castor’ and ‘Pollux’ refer to the two spheres in Black’s
(1952) world. Then, supposing that the respective centers of Castor and Pollux are
separated by d units of space, Castor would exemplify the property of being d units
of space from Pollux and would not exemplify the property of being d units of space
from Castor, while Pollux would exemplify the property of being d units of space
from Castor and would not exemplify the property of being d units of space from
Pollux. The Principle is, therefore, satisfied in such a world if monadic relational
properties are natural.27
26All necessary existents will exist in such a world as well, of course. These existents should not
upset the symmetry of the world, however, so I will ignore them in the discussion to follow.
27I am here assuming that we aren’t looking for some particular subclass of monadic relational
properties that at least one of which every particular must exemplify so long as it exists in a world
with at least one particular distinct from itself. That is, I am assuming that it is the fact that such
properties are monadic relational properties that will make the difference as to whether they are
natural. So: show that some monadic relational property is natural or not, on the basis of features
that property has in virtue of being monadic relational, and one will thereby have shown that the
whole class of monadic relational properties is natural or not. If one is unhappy with my choice of
monadic relational distance properties, the forthcoming line of argumentation should carry over to
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Black (1952) is skeptical. Black’s paper is written in dialogue form, and
here is his character B (who speaks for Black himself) responding to character A’s
attempt to deploy the line given in the previous paragraph:
What can this mean? ... [T]he spheres have no names—neither ‘Castor’,
nor ‘Pollux’, nor ‘a’, nor ‘b’, nor any others. Yet you still still want to
say they have certain properties which cannot be referred to without
using names for the spheres. You want to say “the property of being at
a distance from Castor” though it is logically impossible for you to talk
in this way. You can’t speak, but you won’t be silent. (p. 159)
Evidently, Black is concerned about our ability to say certain things, in particular,
to say that Castor has the property of being d units of space from Pollux. But, he
contends, we can say no such thing. We cannot name the spheres; we cannot use
names for the spheres at all. This is certainly true, and it follows that we cannot
deploy the names of the properties A is trying to deploy to convince B that The
Principle is true in this Black World. But I do not see how it follows from this fact
about our ability to say certain things that the spheres would not have the properties
in the class in question were this Black World actual. That is, we certainly can use
names for properties that are in the right class. For example, the class includes
the property of being two miles from Jamie and the property of being one thousand
miles from Lyle. If these properties and their ilk are natural, then we can say that
the two spheres would have different natural properties, though we of course cannot
say which two properties it is that make the difference in the given case. In other
words, Black is confusing the epistemological question of whether we can specify
the conditions that make it true that his Black World is one in which The Principle
is satisfied with the metaphysical question of whether The Principle is satisfied in
that world.
The question again, then, is whether monadic relational properties like that of
being two miles from Jamie are natural, and I believe the discussion from Chapter 3
and §4.1 contains materials that justify the claim that monadic relational properties
are not natural. I will make this case in two steps. First, I will argue that monadic
relational properties (whose canonical description involves the name of a particular)
“involve” properties of identity, if they are to be any help in this setting. On this
one’s favored choice.
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basis, I will argue secondly that if monadic relational properties are natural, then
properties of identity must be natural as well. Since properties of identity have been
seen to be non-natural, I conclude that monadic relational properties are non-natural
as well.
There are three ways to think about properties whose canonical description
involves the name of a particular. The first I call the ‘Fine-Adams Proposal’, which
takes its cue from Fine (1985) and Adams (1979) and (1981).28 According to the
Fine-Adams Proposal, the logical form of propositions denoted by sentences like
‘A has the property of being R-related to B’ is this: Exmp(A,Prop(R,xBy)). Here,
Exmp(x,y) is true just in case x exemplifies y. Prop is a function with two argument
places, the first of which takes n-place relations and the second of which takes ordered
n-tuples of objects, and whose values are monadic relational properties. So, for
example, the value of Prop for arguments R and xBy, respectively, is the property of
being R-related to B. Furthermore, according to the Fine-Adams Proposal the values
of Prop are existentially dependent on the arguments to Prop with that value. So, if
for example B or the R-relation were to not exist, neither would Prop(R,xBy). The
dependence does not, of course, run the other way; both B and R could exist without
the property of being R-related to B. Indeed, this would happen were R to exist in
a world without B or vice versa (if one countenances such a possibility). What is
important here is that B itself is crucially involved in the property of being R-related
to B. That property is something like “built from” the two relevant arguments to
Prop. B is existentially prior to that property, and others like it.29 If the Fine-
Adams Proposal is correct, monadic relational properties are no help salvaging The
Principle. This is because there is an important sense in which the existence of
B is presupposed by the property of being R-related to B, just as the existence of
the R relation is presupposed by that property. As such, Castor and Pollux (if
you will allow me to use these names) must already exist and be distinct logically
prior to their coming to have, respectively, the property of being d spatial units from
Pollux and the property of being d spatial units from Castor. The distinctness of
28I don’t mean to suggest that Fine or Adams has endorsed or would endorse this proposal.
29I should note that I don’t quite understand the Fine-Adams Proposal because I cannot make
sense of existential dependence of properties on particulars. And insofar as I understand it, I think
it is probably not right. A better proposal is the Plantinga Proposal, which I will consider presently.
At any rate, to the degree that you share my incredulity, you should find the Plantinga Proposal
all the more attractive. And that is fine by me.
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Castor and Pollux cannot be a function of their having their respective monadic
relational properties. They must have what Adams calls “primitive thisness.”30
Now I find the following principle highly intuitive: No natural property presupposes
the existence of a contingent particular with primitive thisness. This principle is
intuitive, I think, because natural properties are supposed to be fundamentally
qualitative, and properties that presuppose the existence of contingent particulars
with primitive thisness seem not to be fundamentally qualitative. (Suppose the
bundle theory of particulars were true, that is, that particulars are just bundles of
universals. Then monadic relational properties may very well be natural, for they
would be properties like that of being d spatial units from the particular constituted
by the property of being F, and the property of being G, and... That property’s
naturalness does not founder on my principle about naturalness, even if one might
think it non-natural for other reasons.) If that principle is right, then on the Fine-
Adams Proposal, monadic relational properties are no help salvaging The Principle
because they are not natural and, therefore, are not among the properties relevant
to The Principle.
The second way to think about monadic relational properties, I call the
‘Plantinga Proposal’, which takes its cue from Plantinga (1974), (1978), and (1985).31
According to the Plantinga Proposal, the logical form of propositions denoted by sen-
tences like ‘A has the property of being R-related to B’ is this: Exmp(A,Prop(R,xHBy)).
Exmp remains as above, but Prop now takes as a second argument ordered n-tuples
of haecceities (in this case, the 1-tuple of the haecceity of B). A better description
for the monadic relational property, then, is this: the property of being R-related to
the thing with HB, or the property of being R-related to the thing with the property of
being identical to B. There is still existential dependence. According to Plantinga
Proposal, however, the dependence obtains between or among properties, rather
than between or among properties and particulars. In the present case, the prop-
erty of being R-related to B is existentially dependent on HB, that is, on the property
of being identical to B. It is in this sense that monadic relational properties involve
30In case this seems to fast, remember that we are here considering monadic relational properties
as the only way other than properties of identity to salvage The Principle vis-a`-vis particulars. If
monadic relational properties are not doing work with respect to the distinctness of particulars,
then nothing is.
31I don’t mean to suggest that Plantinga has endorsed or would endorse this proposal. In fact, I
suspect that Plantinga would be more inclined to endorse the Simple Proposal (below), if he would
endorse any proposal at all.
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properties of identity. Here, there is no logical priority of Castor over the property
of being d spatial units from Castor nor of Pollux over the property of being d spatial
units from Pollux. As such, there is so far no bar to these properties playing a role
with respect to salvaging The Principle.
The third way to think about monadic relational properties, I call the ‘Simple
Proposal’. According to the Simple Proposal, there is no existential dependence of
monadic relational properties on the relations and particulars/properties of identity
to which they are so intimately related. On this view, the logical form of proposi-
tions denoted by sentences like ‘A has the property of being R-related to B is this:
Exmp(A,F), where F is a property like any other, though one that is exemplified by
an object o just in case it stands as the first term of the R-relation to B. I contend
that the sparse theorist ought to be unhappy with this proposal. As we have seen,
there are three ways a property might qualify as natural, as a property the sparse
theorist ought to countenance: it must contribute to resemblance, causal powers, or
the ontological base. I claim that monadic relational properties do not qualify on
any of these fronts; I take them in reverse order. First, monadic relational proper-
ties are no addition to the descriptive resources of the language, and are thus not
involved in the ontological base. Everything one needs to adequately characterize a
world is supplied by a class of properties not including monadic relational proper-
ties. Once one can describe the fact that R(A,B), there is nothing left to say with
monadic relational properties that hasn’t already been said. On the other hand,
one might insist that once one has described the distribution of monadic relational
properties, there is nothing left to say with the relations. But in the context of
external relations, there seems to be an ontological priority of the relation over the
monadic relational property: an object stands in external relations logically prior to
exemplifying the relevant monadic relational properties. Unlike internal relations,
external relations do not supervene on the nature of their relata. One can fully
describe objects without recourse to either external relations or the monadic rela-
tional properties corresponding to those external relations. It therefore seems more
natural to claim that the relations are pulling the ontological weight, and that the
monadic relational properties are just along for the ride. It is the objects’ standing
in relations that makes the difference to the character of the world. This view is
further buttressed by considerations of resemblance and causal powers, to which
I turn presently. Second, then, monadic relational properties appear impotent to
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contribute to a particular’s causal profile. One issue is that A’s standing in R to B
would seem to have no impact on A’s causal profile that A’s standing in R to C would
not also have, where B and C are qualitative duplicates (or, lest I beg any questions:
where B and C are qualitative duplicates with respect to everything except monadic
relational properties). This suggests that it is really R that is responsible for any
variation in causal powers here, not R in combination with the thing to which A is R-
related. As such, A’s having the property of being R-related to B would not seem to
have any impact on A’s causal profile that its having the property of being R-related
to C would not also have, nor would A’s having the property of being R-related to
B have any impact on the causal powers of A that is not already guaranteed by
A’s standing in R (to something). This suggests that monadic relational properties
simply aren’t making any causal contribution whatever. Third, monadic relational
properties do not contribute to resemblance. Again, it is strained at best to claim
that A resembles B because they both have the property of being R-related to C.
A and B would resemble no less if B went from being R-related to C to not being
R-related to C, a fortiori if B ceased having the property of being R-related to C.
In general, external relations do not contribute to resemblance, but can qualify as
natural on the other two criteria. So there is reason to reject the view that monadic
relational properties are natural.32
Another reason the sparse theorist ought to be unhappy with this proposal,
unrelated to the first two, is that it introduces a new sort of primitive, necessary
connection among universals. F, R and B (or even B’s haecceity) are not related
by determinable-determinate relations. Nor are they related by supervenience rela-
tions. In cases of supervenience, something is added to a descriptive resources of
the language when one adds the supervenient properties. Even though the prop-
erties supervene on other properties, they may still be included in the ontological
base. (Supervenient properties are not, pace Armstrong (1997), an “ontological free
lunch.”) Because the connection between monadic relational properties and the re-
lations to which they are connected is a new, primitive necessary categorial relation,
32Indeed, the sparse theorist ought to be unhappy with any of the three proposals, since sparse
theorists are wont to cash monadic relational predications in terms of relations, not in terms of
monadic relational properties. Cf. Frank Ramsey’s (1925) about what is expressed by Rab on the
view he calls the ‘complex universal view.’ I have tried, in the forgoing and a bit in what is to
follow, to rely on the assumption of the sparse theory as little as possible, so I have saved my appeal
to the sparse theory for a time when I can think of no other reasons to object.
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an addition to one’s ideology is required. But the cost of this addition to ideol-
ogy is not outweighed by its usefulness: we can get on without monadic relational
properties at all, much less with this understanding of them. Therefore, together
with the first consideration having to do with the descriptive resources of the sparse
theorist’s language, the Simple Proposal ought to be rejected.
The first step to the claim that monadic relational properties are non-natural
has been achieved. To repeat, that step was to show that if monadic relational
properties are to be any help salvaging The Principle, then they have to involve
properties of identity. On the Fine-Adams Proposal, monadic relational properties
are not any help salvaging The Principle. Likewise on the Simple Proposal. On
the Plantinga Proposal, they may be a help, and they also involve properties of
identity.33 What remains to be shown then, is that on the Plantinga Proposal,
monadic relational properties are not natural because the properties of identity
they involve are not natural.
So I turn to a defense of the second step, the claim that if monadic relational
properties are natural, then properties of identity must be natural as well. I here
focus on the Plantinga Proposal, since that it the only of the three views of monadic
relational properties on which they might be help salvaging The Principle. Another
principle about naturalness that I find highly intuitive is this: No natural property
involves a non-natural property, where involving is understood, as before, in terms
of existential dependence. Call this principle ‘The Victory of Non-Naturalness’.34
Consider, for example, conjunctive properties where one conjunct is clearly non-
natural. The property of being round and grue seems highly non-natural because
the property of being grue, which we can assume the property of being round and
grue involves, is highly non-natural. Now, on the Plantinga Proposal, the property
of being R-related to B involves the property of being identical to B (or HB). By The
Victory of Non-Naturalness, then, the property of being R-related to B is no more
natural than the property of being identical to B. We have made the second step.
Given our two steps, we may conclude that monadic relational properties
33One may wonder why it is that I do not attack the Plantinga Proposal with the same weapons
with which I attacked the Simple Proposal. The criticisms of the naturalness of monadic relational
properties are not, after all, specific to the Simple Proposal. This is right, and I invite the reader
to consider the following line of argument as a piling on to an already defeated foe.
34A better statement might be this: A property is no more natural than the least natural property
it includes. This formulation is a bit stronger than the one in the main text, and is stronger than
what I need here. Thus the weaker formulation.
88
whose canonical description involves the name of a particular are not natural, and
that monadic relational properties cannot salvage The Principle vis-a`-vis particulars.
If monadic relational properties are going to help salvage The Principle, then the
Plantinga Proposal must be right. On the Plantinga Proposal, monadic relational
properties involve properties of identity. But properties of identity are not natural.
So by The Victory of Non-Naturalness, monadic relational properties cannot be
natural either. Thus they are not to be included in the domain of the property
quantifier of The Principle. Therefore, the route to salvaging The Principle from
Black Worlds via an appeal to monadic relational properties fails.
Adams (1979) calls Black’s (1952) argument an argument from “spatial dis-
persal,” and goes on to articulate a different argument from “temporal dispersal.”
Black’s is an argument from spatial dispersal because it describes a world with two
qualitatively identical objects at a spatial distance from one another and attempts
to use that world to falsify The Principle. An argument from temporal dispersal,
then, is one that begins with a description of a world in which two qualitatively
identical objects stand at a temporal distance from one another and attempts to
use that world as an argument to falsify The Principle. The set-up of the argument
from temporal dispersal is straightforward:
For it seems that there could be a perfectly cyclical universe in which
each event was preceded and followed by infinitely many other events
qualitatively indiscernible from itself. Thus there would be distinct but
indiscernible events, separated by temporal rather than spatial distances.
(Adams (1979) p. 14)
The idea, of course, is the same. Construct a world that is symmetrical about some
axis. In the case of ordinary Black Worlds, that axis is spatial. In the sorts of
Black Worlds Adams has in mind, that axis is temporal. The argument against
The Principle then proceeds in the same way. I find Adams’s argument prima facie
compelling, and for the same reasons. I will not pause to examine it thoroughly,
given the presence of the argument from ordinary Black Worlds already in hand. I
mention it only to point out other ways to construct Black Worlds. Indeed, Black
(1952), Adams (1979), and Zimmerman (1997) each discuss various other iterations
and complications on the basic Black Worlds scheme. A thorough discussion of these
variations is not necessary here.
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Hacking (1975) has challenged the need to describe Black Worlds as worlds
containing two objects. Rather, Hacking suggests that Black Worlds may be worlds
with one object and non-Euclidean geometries. If space-time is curved, then a
Black World could be one in which an individual is at a spatiotemporal distance
from itself.35 That is, if space-time is curved, then it is possible to travel along a
straight path between a sphere and itself; in that sense, the sphere can be said to be
at a spatiotemporal distance from itself. Hacking concludes his paper in this way:
Whatever God might create, we are clever enough to describe it in such
a way that the identity of indiscernibles is preserved. This is a fact not
about God but about description, space, time, and the laws we ascribe
to nature. ((1975) pp. 255-6)
Hacking believes this is congruent with Leibniz’s original construal of the The Princi-
ple; he argues that Leibniz’s took the principle to be a “metaprinciple about possible
descriptions,” that while it was needn’t be true in every world, it was true about all
possible worlds (taken as a whole?). Now I do not think I understand what Hacking
means regarding Leibniz’s position regarding The Principle, but his basic thought
about whether The Principle is true is more or less clear. Whether The Principle is
true or not is a matter of how we choose to describe possible worlds, so no argument
against it could be compelling.
Adams (1979) responds adequately to Hacking’s challenge, in a way that
falls nicely in line with the view of metaphysics taken here. Adams’s considers two
responses. First, if the curvature of space-time is taken to be an irreducible property
of the space-time itself, then one can stipulate that the relevant world is one where
one must travel along a Euclidean straight line from one sphere to a sphere exactly
similar to it. This stipulation (which certainly seems reasonable) ensures that the
spheres are in fact two. Clearly, this requires that one insist that a difference in the
geometry of a world is not reducible to anything else, including the laws of nature,
other facts about objects, etc. That is, one must insist that it is not possible for
one world to be accurately described in both Euclidean and non-Euclidean terms.
Adams rejects this view, and so rejects this first response. I don’t have a view about
this, but it is clearly a contentious assumption, so it best not to rest too much on
it. The second response, the one that Adams endorses, is better. I cannot put the
35Cf. Black (1952) p. 161.
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point any better than Adams has:
The most obvious and fundamental difference between Black’s imagi-
nary Euclidean (or gently Riemannian) two-globe universe and its tightly
curved one-globe counterpart seems to be that in one of them there are
to iron globes, and in the other only one. Why can’t that be a difference
between possible realities in its own right? ((1979) p. 16)
To put the point in terms of conception or intuition, there is simply a difference be-
tween conceiving of a world with one sphere in a tightly curved space and conceiving
of two spheres separated in Euclidean space; there is a difference between the intu-
ition that these two situations are possible. Hacking would insist that this is simply
a matter of our chosen description of the scenario, which I suppose he would say
includes no fact of the matter as to whether there is one globe or two. I simply find
this position incredible. There is a fact of the matter as to how many spheres are in
each possible world (likewise for the number of humans). I agree with Adams: there
simply is a difference between a one sphere world and a two sphere Black World.
But I also agree with Adams that this point is only plausible to the degree that
one thinks of particulars as primitive features of reality. The next challenge to the
argument from Black Worlds against The Principle, from Hawthorne (1995), rejects
the primitiveness of particulars by embracing the bundle theory. If, then, we can
show that Hawthorne’s attempt to mitigate the problem posed by Black Worlds can
be shown to fail, that the bundle theory cannot survive in the face of Black Worlds,
then we can put Hacking’s criticisms to rest as well.
So then, Hawthorne (1995) also has challenged the need to describe Black
Worlds as worlds containing two objects. Hawthorne suggests that Black Worlds
may instead by described as worlds containing one object that is bi-located.36
Hawthorne’s stated objective is to show that Black Worlds pose no threat to the
bundle theory. In particular, he takes himself to show the following:
That [Black World] thought experiment does little more than remind us
of a consequence of the bundle theory that should have already have [sic]
36Adams (1979), to his credit, anticipates something like Hawthorne’s response when he claims
that the force of Black Worlds against The Principle relies on an “axiom of identity” that “the
same thing cannot be in two places at once.” (p. 14) As we will see shortly, things aren’t so
simple. For now, suffice it to note that Hawthorne’s reply is distinct from Hacking’s in not relying
on non-Euclidean geometries.
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noticed and embraced: that just a single universal can be at a distance
from itself, one and the same bundle can be at a distance from itself.
((1995) p. 196)
Because immanent universals can be in more than one place at the same time,
and because the bundle theorists ought to be committed to immanent universals
anyway, one and the same bundle can be located in more than one place. Immanent
universals just are universals that can be wholly located in more than one place.
There is, therefore, no bar to bundles of such universals being located in more than
one place. So given the identity conditions of particulars according to the bundle
theory, that a particular just is a bundle of universals, one and the same particular
can be located in more than one place. Indeed, the stipulations we are asked to
entertain in the case of a Black World, together with the supposition of the bundle
theory, entails that Black’s original Black World contains only one sphere—one
bundle of universals—in two places. (Here, we can see the dialectical dependence
of Adams’s second reply to Hacking on the falsity of the bundle theory. To insist
at this stage that there are two spheres would simply be to beg the question.)
Hawthorne, therefore, believes he can salvage the ordinary claim that there could
be two indiscernible things; this is simply an unperspicuous description of a genuine
possibility, viz. that of a world with one bundle of universals located in two places
at the same time.
Zimmerman (1997) responds adequately to Hawthorne’s challenge. He sup-
plies further moves that make an insistence on a two sphere Black World dialectically
appropriate.37 Zimmerman asks to consider a world with “two” indiscernible elec-
trons; “they” are synchonized throughout the history of this world. He claims,
plausibly I think, in light of the fact that electrons obey indeterministic laws, that
at some point in the history of this world it was possible for one electron, but not
the other, to have had a different future than the one it has in this world. The
bundle theorist cannot allow this, however, because there is really only one bundle
of universals here, so there can only be one modal profile. A world where this one
bundle has different properties (futures) violates the truism that one thing cannot
37Again, Adams (1979) (p. 17f.) makes similar moves to those of Zimmerman. I have followed
Zimmerman here because he tries to rid himself of the need to appeal to primitive transworld
identity, which Adams explicitly relies upon. That is, Zimmerman tries to make the objections
stick even in light of a counterpart theoretic conception of de re modality.
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have different properties at the same time. Notice that counterpart theory cannot
help here. Counterpart theory cannot guarantee that this bundle have a different
possible future than that one, it can only guarantee that there is a world with two
electrons having different futures. That latter world represents a different future
for “both” electrons equally. In this way, the “two” electrons in the original world
are “modally linked.”38 The bundle theorist may reply by giving up the claim that
the bundle theory is necessarily true, and restrict her view only to actual objects.
By way of reply, and in order to draw the implausibility of such an ad hoc restric-
tion, Zimmerman further asks us to pick two actual electrons and imagine a world
containing only those two, and where they are guaranteed to be distinct in virtue
of some minor difference in their respective histories. This world is but a small
step from another world, in which the two electrons have identical histories. The
contingentist bundle theorist would be forced to say that in such a world, there is
some sort of substrata, that the bundle theory does not hold. Zimmerman then says
this: “Surely it is implausible to suppose that a tiny change in the global distribu-
tion of intrinsic properties would require a radical change in ontology!”39 I agree.
The bundle theorist has been forced to embrace something that I am not willing
to embrace, or she is strapped with insufficient modal space. I conclude that the
bundle theory is no help salvaging The Principle in the face of Black Worlds, and
that, therefore, Adams’s criticisms of Hacking stand up as well.
Before continuing, I want to emphasize something about Zimmerman’s fi-
nal maneuver. What he noticed is that these issues bear on actual-world objects,
that The Principle is false of actual world objects even if there are no actually in-
discernible things. This is because one can always pick an actual object and then
construct a world in which the only things that exist are that object and an in-
discernible twin of it. Using this strategy, Zimmerman has shown that the bundle
theory is false for the actual world, and therefore that The Principle is false of all
actual objects. We have not just learned something about Black worlds, but about
the actual world.
38Zimmerman (1997) p. 308.
39(1997) p. 308.
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4.3 Hawthorne and Sider on the Bundle Theory
The bundle theory is the only (or at least the most popular) realist alternative to an
ontology that admits primitive particulars, and it cannot account for the possibilities
that I claim require primitive partiuculars. John Hawthorne and Ted Sider (2002),
however, have defended the bundle theory against the claim that it conflates those
possibilities by exploiting a notion they call ‘linkage.’ Though Hawthorne and Sider
go on to articulate an implausible consequence of exploiting linkage, I believe the
notion cannot meet a different challenge related to that put to the bundle theorist
by the argument in §4.2 above. We need primitive particulars.
To defend these claims, I need to be more clear about the bundle theorist’s
ontology.40 First, it will be convenient to speak as if the bundle theorist denies
the existence of particulars. What is meant by that in this context is that they do
not believe in primitive particulars, and thus that the bundle theorist’s ontology
consists of just universals. Universals make up the fabric of the world, according
to the bundle theory.41 Second, the expressive resources of the bundle theorist’s
fundamental language are relatively paltry. They have names for universals and
a bundling relation, which I call ‘compresence.’42 There are no (primitive) names
for particulars. Compresence of universals takes the place of exemplification of
universals by particulars. So instead of saying that o exemplifies F and G, the bundle
theorist says that F and G are compresent (with one another). In the limiting case,
in which we would ordinarily say that a particular exemplifies only one universal,
F, the bundle theorist says that F is compresent.
Third, two notes about the compresence relation. Compresence is irreducibly
plural. The compresence of many unviersals cannot be reduced to many compresence
relations obtaining among those many in some combination or another. For example,
the compresence of F, G, and H cannot be reduced to the pairwise compresnece of
40I follow Hawthorne’s and Sider’s (2002) exposition here.
41Hawthorne and Sider (2002) may seem to go further. They say, “The theory...[admits] nothing
whatsoever that would play the role of locations in quality space. Thus in addition to lacking
particulars, its ontology contains no property instances, tropes, particular events, or any such
things.” (p. 32) These qualification would be redundant, however. Property instances, if they
are to be distinguished from tropes, must be complexes of a universal and a particular. Likewise
particular events. And tropes are not admitted by the realist, much less a realist whose ontology
consists of just universals.
42This follows Hawthorne and Sider (2002), who borrow the language from Russell (1940), but
modify his notion slightly. This terminology is popular.
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F and G, G and H, and F and H. Compresence is also multigrade. For any number
of universals, F1, ...,Fn, it is meaningful to say that F1, ...,Fn are compresent.
In the case of relations, things get a bit more complicated. Here’s a schematic
example. Where we would ordinarily say that a particular that is F and G stands
in R to a particular that is G and H, the bundle theorist says that R is compresent
with (F,G; G,H). In general, then, for n-place R, the bundle theorist says that R is
compresent with (...F1i ...; ...F
2
i ...; ...; ...F
n
i ...). This corresponds to the ordinary claim
that particulars x1, x2, ..., xn stand in R, where each x j exemplifies the F
j
i .
So far, the bundle theory only has resources that are too limited to respond
to the argument of the previous section, and it is for this reason that Hawthorne
and Sider introduce the notion of “linkage.” Consider the following two worlds:
w1: F R G RH
w2: F R G G RH
w1 is a world we would ordinarily describe as containing an F-thing that is R-related
to a G-thing, which is in turn R-related to an H-thing. w2, on the other hand,
contains an F-thing R-related to a G-thing, and a distinct G-thing R-related to an
H-thing. Since particulars are nothing more than bundles of unviersals, however,
these two worlds cannot be distinguished: there is no way to distinguish the first
and second G-things in w2.43 Now, here is Hawthorne and Sider’s suggestion:
The bundle theorist might further complicate the notion of copresence.
In describing [w1], rather than making two separate statements:
R is compresent with (F; G). R is compresent with (G; H).
she might substitute a single statement:
* R is compresent with (F; G), the latter of which is such that R is
compresent with (it; H).
43Hawthorne and Sider give other examples. For instance, consider two worlds we would ordi-
narily describe in the following way: both worlds contain only two F-things; in one world, the two
F-things are related in the same direction by the binary relations R and S, but in the other they
are related by R and S in different directions. The ordinary bundle theory cannot distinguish these
possibilities.
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(*) is not a mere abbreviation for the first statement, which is true in
both [w1] and [w2]; (*) is to be true only in [w1].
In (*), the phrase ‘the latter of which’ does not merely refer to G; its
function is to associate two positions within a single complex sentence
form, namely the position occupied by ‘G’ and the position occupied by
‘it’. ((2002) p. 36)
There is, according to Hawthorne and Sider, “linkage” between the position occupied
by ‘G’ and the position occupied by ‘it’. They continue in this way:
And though it may appear that (*) speaks of cases of G, which could
only be particulars (or tropes, or property-instances, or something else
playing the role of locations in quality space), in fact (*) is a complex
statement about only R, F, G, and H... ((2002) p. 36)
I will return to this claim—“The Claim”—shortly. Presently, we must turn to the
manner in which Hawthorne and Sider generalize the move made in (*) so as to
cover more complex cases.
Consider a range of cases we would ordinarily describe using the following
schema:
There are particulars x1, ..., xn such that Rpx1, ..., xnq, and such that x1 exem-
plifies the F1i , x2 exemplifies the F
2
i , ..., and xn exemplifies the F
n
i , and there
are particulars y1, ..., ym such that R1py1, ..., ymq, and such that y1 exemplifies
the G1i , y2 exemplifies the G
2
i , ..., and yn exemplifies the G
m
i .
What makes this a schema is that we have not specified whether any of the xi are
identical to any of the y j. The original bundle theory, of course, cannot distinguish
any of the relevant possibilities. They are strapped with describing them each in
this way:
R is compresent with p...F1i ...; ...F
2
i ...; ...; ...F
n
i ...q &
R1 is compresent with p...G1i ...; ...G
2
i ...; ...; ...G
m
i ...q
Using linkage, however, the bundle theorist can do better. Suppose we wanted to
represent the possibility that x1  y1. Then, we write:
R is compresent with p...F1i ...|α; ...F
2
i ...; ...; ...F
n
i ...q &
R1 is compresent with pα; ...G2i ...; ...; ...G
m
i ...q
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The idea behind the symbolism is this: “The presence of the symbol |α after the
F1i s, and the presence of α in place of the G
1
i s, indicates that those positions are to
be linked.”44 So, it is supposed to be a more abstract way of representing the move
made above with ‘G’ and ‘it’. We can generalize. Suppose we want to represent the
possibility that x1  y1, x2  y2, and x3  y3. Then we write:
R is compresent with p...F1i ...|α; ...F
2
i ...|β; ...F
3
i ...|γ; ...; ...F
n
i ...q & R
1 is compresent
with pα; β;γ; ...; ...Gmi ...q
One can modify this process in any way necessary. And one can link more than two
attributions of compresence, as in for example:
R is compresent with p...F1i ...|α; ...F
2
i ...|βq & R
1 is compresent with pα; ...F3i ...|γq
& R2 is compresent with pβ;γ;αq
This is the situation we would ordinary describe as one in which there are three
particulars x1, x2, and x3, exemplifying respectively the F1i , F
2
i , and F
3
i , and in which
Rpx1, x2q, R1px1, x3q, and R2px2, x3, x1q.
While it is true that, if one helps oneself to linkage, one can expand modal
space to cover (almost) every possibility that is intuitively possible, Hawthorne and
Sider argue that one thereby walks oneself into an unacceptable form of holism.
That is, if one embraces the bundle theory with linkage, Hawthorne and Sider argue
that one commits to the claim that complex truths do not supervene on simpler
ones. More explicitly, they claim:
The objectionable holism implied by the modified bundle theory is that
no matter what the basic properties and relations are, truths about what
intuitively count as complex systems involving just those properties and
relations do not supervene on simple statements about those properties
and relations. ((2002) p. 41, emphasis in the original)
That this is true is easy to see. Simply consider the pairs of worlds discussed above
that the ordinary bundle theory cannot distinguish but that the bundle theory with
linkage can. The simple statements that describe these worlds are the same, but the
complex statements are different. The simple statements simply will not capture
the relevant linkages. For example, in w1 and w2 above, the simple(r) statements
44Hawthorne and Sider (2002) p. 38.
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are just these two: R is compresent with (F; G), and R is compresent with (G; H).
But the two worlds make true different complex statements (involving linkages), so
there is a failure of supervenience. I do not want to belabor this point, and refer the
reader to Hawthorne and Sider (2002) for a full explanation; needless to say, I am
convinced by them on this point (both that the bundle theory with linkage implies
such a holism and that that holism should be rejected).
But I have a different worry. Recall The Claim, that sentences which deploy
a link are only about the properties and relations they mention. Hawthorne and
Sider claim to have enriched the capacity of the bundle theorist’s ontology to dis-
tinguish possibilities by introducing a device meant only to “associate two positions
within...complex sentence form[s].”45 Importantly, each sort of statement involving
linkage expresses a different irreducible form of compresence relation, in the sense
that each sort of statement involving linkage cannot be reduced to other statements
involving linkage or to statements that do not involve linkage. This is worth paus-
ing over. First, we should ask what, exactly, is being linked? The answer is simple:
(syntactic?) positions in complex sentence forms. What, though, takes (syntactic?)
positions in sentences about compresence relations? That answer is simple as well:
names for universals. Linkage is, then, performing quite a trick. While Hawthorne
and Sider insist that linkage is no addition to ontology (though they admit a great
addition to ideology), this can be right insofar as linkage is only linking names in the
language used to describe the worlds of the bundle theory. But then it is difficult
to see how linkage can help the bundle theorist to build, if you will, the worlds they
must be able to build. No universals have been added to the ontology, but the bun-
dle theorist—who only believes in universals!—is somehow able to distinguish more
possibilities. It would seem that linkage would need to link universals themselves,
not just their names, which occupy positions in true-blue compresence relations, not
just (syntactic?) positions in sentences about compresence relations.46 We need an
45(2002) p. 36.
46Hawthorne and Sider may deny that these sentences are about compresence relations, since
the concept of compresence is part of the primitive ideology of the bundle theory, and that it does
not correspond to any commitments of the ontology of the bundle theory. So there may be, in
an important sense, no compresence relation for these sentences to be about. (In some ways, the
denial that the bundle theory is ontologically committed to a compresence relation is similar to
the strategy of the so-called “ostrich” nominalist for denying that there are properties, a` la` Devitt
(1980). Cf. Lewis (1983).) While a thorough discussion of this issue would take us too far afield to
be profitable, I want to note that I am skeptical of the power of one’s ideology to do ontological work
if the relevant ideology is unaccompanied by some ontology. Thus in the text I assume that if the
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understanding of what is going on in the ontology when there is linkage, not just
in the language used by the ontologist. I don’t see that Hawthorne and Sider have
provided us with that sort of understanding.
We can make some headway on their behalf, however. There is another,
non-linguistic construal of the linkage trick. One could construe the symbols ‘α’,
‘β’, etc. as somehow repeating a list of universals that appears as a relatum in
one compresence bundle in such a way that distinguishes it from an exactly similar
list of universals that appears as a relatum in a different compresence bundle. Since
universals are all there is in the bundle theorist’s ontology, the only way to make this
distinction (without introducing particulars) is via the implicit addition of another
universal. That is, we must reject The Claim: statements invoking linkage are
not just about the properties and relations they mention because they must, if
they are to do their work in an ontologically adequate way, implicitly invoke other
universals.47 We can, at any rate, use the additions linkage introduces to the bundle
theorist’s language, together with the task they must accomplish, to decide what
these universals must be like. In particular, they must have the ability to mark
concept of compresence is part of one’s ideology then a primitive compresence relation is part of one’s
ontology. More importantly in this context, to be part of the ideology of a theory is to be a primitive
concept. So, if ‘compresence’ is part of the ideology of the bundle theory, then ‘compresence’ is a
primitive concept. And if there are many similar(!) notions, each of them is primitive. But then
I cannot understand the claim that different sorts of ‘compresence’ apply to different systems of
universals bundled in different ways, because I was supposed to understand the ways these different
systems of universals get bundled in different ways on the basis of various notions of ‘compresence’
I was already meant to have. This sort of conceptual circularity is unacceptable, and so I insist on
there being a compresence relation in the ontology. To put the point differently, once one introduces
myriad notions of ‘compresence’, one loses the ability to straightforwardly invoke ‘exemplification’
as something to use as an analogue by which one can appreciate the import of the new technical
notion (‘compresence’). Exemplification doesn’t provide links; providing links is, as Hawthorne
and Sider put it, the raison d’eˆtre of particulars ((2002) p. 41). (Lest there be any confusion, no
doubt I can understand the claim that particulars such and so exemplify universals this and that
according to distribution what have you. But the question is whether, using only the conceptual
and ontological resources of the bundle theory, I can still understand it. This is the claim at which
I balk.)
47Hawthorne and Sider seem to suggest that it is actually the compresence relation doing the
work (cf. p. 41f). But what they give with one hand, they take back with the other. For they also
admit that the repeated use of ‘compresence’ in each of the irreducible sentence forms discussed
above is “a bit of a cheat” (p. 41) because the bundle theorist’s ideology contains infinitely many
“compresence” predicates rather than just one. I cry foul, for this amendment fundamentally upsets
my grip on the notion of “compresence”. I have thus looked elsewhere for an adequate understanding
of what the linkage maneuver amounts to. At the very least, we can say that Hawthorne’s and
Sider’s admission here suggests that we don’t have a firm grip on what these irreducible statements
are about.
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off one F thing from another F thing, which things (we can suppose) stand in the
relations R and S to one another in the same direction. Suppose that we allow
ourselves to name these two F things; call the first one ‘a’ and the second one
‘b’. (Forget, for the moment, the problems this introduces. I will return to them.)
Consider now the property of being R-related to b and the property of being S-related
to b. Call the first of these ‘G’ and the second ‘H’. If we allow the bundle theorist
to exploit such properties when constructing her bundles, our two F things will be
easily distinguishable. The relevant world is one we could describe in the following
way:
R is compresent with (F, G and H; F); S is compresent with (F, G, and H; F)
Clearly, this is distinct from another possibility in which R and S hold in different
directions. Let ‘J’ be the name of the property of being S-related to a. Then we
write:
R is compresent with (F and G; F and J); S is compresent with (F and J; F and
G)
We have now enriched the ontology of the bundle theory to accommodate all sorts
of possibilities. And we have done so without any ideological trickery; all we have
done is expand the range of universals the bundle theorist is allowed to include in
her bundles. Note, however, that if one drops the names for the monadic relational
properties, these two world-descriptions are identical. This is precisely what one
has when one exploits linkage: without the syntactic markers ‘α’, ‘β’, etc. the
world-descriptions are identical.48,49
48The new theory may also be anti-haecceitistic, if we do not allow the “names” we have chosen
for our F things to be carried across worlds. Developing this point would not be fruitful in this
context.
49For what it’s worth, Hawthorne and Sider contemplate a construal of linkage according to
which the ontology of the bundle theory is burdened, rather than its ideology. On this construal,
one introduces a new relation that is compresent with the relevant universals only when the relevant
irreducible sentence involving linkage is true. For example, suppose one wanted to represent a world
that we would ordinarily claim contained three particulars, x, y, and z, and in which Rpx, yq, Spy, zq,
Fx, Gy, and Hz. To do so in this new way, one introduces a relation T and say that
T is compresent with (F, G, H)
rather than that
R is compresent with (F; G|α); S is compresent with (α; H).
(Again, each irreducible sentence form involving linkage gets is own ‘T’, if you will.) They then say
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We have seen that the exploitation of monadic relational properties is suffi-
cient to allow the bundle theorist to expand modal space in the way that they must,
but we have not paused to ask whether this exploitation introduces new problems for
the bundle theorist. It is not difficult to see that it does. First, the bundle theorist’s
ontology ought to only include sparse universals, that is, universals corresponding
to only the natural properties. But we have seen that monadic relational properties
(whose canonical descriptions involve a name of a particular) are not natural. The
bundle theorist, then, has a prior commitment to the claim that universals corre-
sponding to monadic relational properties are not part of their ontology. Second,
consider the question, what is the difference between the property of being S-related
to a and the property of being S-related to b? In order to add them into the bun-
dles for b and a, respectively, we must be able to distinguish a and b prior to that
addition. For it seems to be the difference between a and b that is distinguishing
these two properties if one does not want to introduce an unacceptable new sort of
primitive.50 But this is not possible in many cases. For example, it is precisely the
addition of H (the property of being S-related to b) and J (the property of beings
S-related to a) in a world where
S is compresent with (F and H; F and J); S is compresent with (F and J; F and
H)
that allows us to distinguish the two “particulars” there. (And thus, that addition
is what allows us to distinguish this possibility from one in which there is but
one “particular” S-related to itself.) Therefore, I am dubious toward the claim that
monadic relational properties are not an implicit invocation of primitive particulars.
If there were primitive particulars, one could distinguish a and b without using
this:
[O]ne should not be too quick to trust these new relations, for they are not the
ordinary ‘complex relations’ we all know and love. The instantiation of what one
normally thinks of as a complex relations is just a matter of the instantiation of its
‘constituents’, whereas these new relations do not supervene on their constituents.
((2002) p. 42)
Indeed. But, claim: they would so supervene if one (implicitly) introduced monadic relational
properties into the items with which these new complex relations are compresent. Since I am
skeptical of the ontological power of pure ideology, I have concentrated on a version of linkage that
burdens ontology. To alleviate the skepticism about relations like Hawthorne’s and Sider’s T, I
introduce monadic relational properties.
50Cf. the discussion of the Simple Proposal above.
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monadic relational properties and then go on to distinguish the properties of being
S-related to a and being S-related to b in the obvious, derivative manner. I conclude,
once again, that monadic relational properties are no help to the bundle theorist,
and that this construal of linkage is therefore not sufficient to salvage the bundle
theory.
4.4 A Quick Recap
So we have two convergent and interrelated lines of argument. The first argues di-
rectly that particulars are not identical if indiscernible, that is, that we need prim-
itive particulars. The second argues against the last line of defense for the bundle
theory, the only alternative to an ontology with primitive particulars. Particulars,
we may conclude, do not satisfy The Principle.
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Chapter 5
Why I’m a (Modest) Causal
Structuralist
[W]e can express my view by saying that properties are clusters of
conditional powers.
—Sydney Shoemaker, “Causality and Properties”
5.1 Humeanism, the Double-Aspect Theory, and Causal
Structuralism
Natural properties are intimately related to the causal profile of particulars.1 Partic-
ulars have the causal powers that they do because they exemplify the natural prop-
erties that they do. Electrons repel electrons because they are negatively charged.
Baseballs break windows because they are hard and have significant mass. Exam-
ples can be multiplied. So this much is uncontroversial: natural properties confer
causal powers on the particulars that exemplify them.
Much more controversial, however, is how intimate is the relationship be-
tween natural properties and the causal powers they confer. In particular, philoso-
phers dispute whether the relationship between each natural property and the causal
1In keeping with the tradition of the literature on this particular subject, I will speak in terms
of properties rather than universals throughout this chapter.
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powers it confers is necessary or contingent, and whether distinct natural proper-
ties can confer the same causal powers. Broadly speaking, there are three views to
take on these matters, and we can initially delineate these views in the following
way. “Causal structuralism” is the view that the relationship between each natu-
ral property and the causal powers it confers is necessary and that no two natural
properties can confer the same causal powers. The “double-aspect theory” is the
view that the relationship between each natural property and the causal powers
it confers is necessary but that two natural properties can confer the same causal
powers. “Humeanism”, as I use the term here, is the view that the relationship be-
tween each natural property and the causal powers it confers is contingent and that
two natural properties can confer the same causal powers. These characterizations
require supplementation.
Causal structuralism is the view that, for any natural property F, there is
some set of causal powers C such that, necessarily, an object o exemplifies F if and
only if o has all the powers in C. In other words, causal structuralism is the view that
every natural property has a unique causal essence, that having some set of causal
powers is necessary and sufficient for having a given property. This view stands in
sharp contrast to the Humean picture of the relationship between properties and
causal powers. The Humean picture has it that the causal powers conferred by
a property are utterly contingent. If the properties were distributed according to
a different pattern, then the respective causal powers conferred by the properties
would be different. The causal powers conferred by properties are a function of
the distribution, not of the properties distributed. So properties are not necessarily
related to any particular set of causal powers, and different properties can confer
the same set of causal powers, both in a world and across worlds. The double-aspect
theory is the view that for each natural property F, there is a set of causal powers
C such that, necessarily, an object o exemplifies F only if o has all the powers in
C. The difference between this theory and causal structuralism is, as noted above,
that the double aspect theory denies that o’s having the powers in C is sufficient for
o’s exemplifying F.2 If one finds oneself disinclined to the Humean view, then one
2One could be a different sort of Humean if one denied the possibility of two properties having
the same causal profile in the same world. I don’t know what would motivate one to such a view,
and I ignore it in the sequel. Further, I will by and large ignore the double aspect theory in what
follows, and will focus on the contrast between Humeanism and causal structuralism. The drama
created is admittedly somewhat artificial, but is useful nonetheless.
104
ought to consider the causal structuralist option.
We can be more precise about causal structuralism if we use the Ramsey-
Lewis technique for identifying functional roles, since the causal powers conferred
by a property can be viewed as the property’s functional role in the world’s causal
economy, as given by the laws of nature. Here’s the set-up. Let ‘Fi  F j’ be a
schematic representation of a law of nature, which law means that instances of Fi
cause instances of F j.3 Call the list of natural laws true at a world the ‘law book’
for that world. To find the causal role for a given target property: conjoin the
entries in the law book; for each property name, replace individual occurrences of
that name with occurrences of a single variable; take the existential closure of the
resultant open sentence (this generates the “Ramsified” law book); and then drop
the quantifier corresponding to the variable with occurrences of which one replaced
the occurrences of names of the target property. The “robust” causal structuralist
claims that this open sentence gives the causal role of the target property, and that
the satisfaction of this open sentence is necessary and sufficient for being the target
property. An example. Suppose the world had three properties and three laws:
F1F2,F1F3,F2F3. The conjoined law book is, then, (F1F2^F1F3^F2F3).
To generate the Ramsified law book, replace occurrences of Fi with occurrences of Xi
and existentially close to get: DX1DX2DX3pX1X2^X1X3^X2X3q.4 The causal
role of F1, then, is given by the open sentence DX2DX3pX1X2^X1X3^X2X3q.
Satisfaction of this open sentence is necessary and sufficient for being F1, according
to the causal structuralist.
One final note before I continue. I do not claim, with Shoemaker, that “prop-
erties are clusters of...[causal] powers.” It may be that the identity of properties is
overdetermined. For example, one might be able to find some unique cluster of
natural properties that each property exemplifies, which properties are independent
of it causal properties. Or it may be that, on top of having a unique causal essence,
each property has some quiddity, a property’s analogue of a particular’s haecceity.
I claim only that each property has a unique causal essence. So the causal struc-
3Here and throughout I omit the obvious qualification, “in conditions S” or some such.
4As Hawthorne (2001) notes, the law book is meant to be exhaustive. To secure that feature, we
need either to add clauses like @X4ppX4X2^X4X3q Ñ X4  X1q to the law books (as Hawthorne
suggests) or simply use the unique existential quantifier (‘D!’) in each case (as Jonathan Schaffer
(2005) suggests). These changes, of course, come to the same. I omit these modifications in the
body text; they will not be relevant to what I am about.
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turalism I want to defend is “modest.” Its modesty can be made precise by again
exploiting the Ramsey-Lewis technique. Instead of replacing all property names
with variables in the conjoined law book, the modest causal structuralist only need
replace occurrences of the name of the target property with a single variable in order
to identify the causal role of a target property. Satisfaction of this open sentence,
which includes names of other properties, is necessary and sufficient for being the
target property. This will become important in the sequel.
5.2 Properties Have Causal Essences
I have a newish argument for half of causal structuralism. The argument concludes
to the claim that natural properties have causal essences; this is half of causal
structuralism. (The other half is the claim that those causal essences are unique.)
The sense in which the argument is newish will emerge below.
The argument goes like this:
1. If something x does not have F but could have had F, where F is a natural
property, then there is a world w and two times t1 and t2 such that x has F at
t1 in w and does not have F at t2 in w. (I call this the ‘Change Principle.’)
2. There is no world w, times t1 and t2, natural property F, and distinct sets of
causal powers Ci and C j such that F confers Ci on its bearers at t1 in w and
confers C j on its bearers at t2 in w. (I call this the ‘No-Change Principle.’)
3. The property of conferring Ci (for any i such that the corresponding property
is exemplified by a natural property) is natural.
4. Therefore, natural properties (that confer causal powers) have causal essences.
So much for the argument.
The argument is valid. Suppose F1 and F2 are (distinct) natural properties
and exemplify respectively the property of conferring C1 and the property of confer-
ring C2 (where these are distinct as well). By (3), then, the property of conferring
C1 and the property of conferring C2 are natural. The following is an instance of
the Change Principle: If F1 does not have the property of conferring C2 but could
have had the property of conferring C2, then there is a world w and two times t1 and
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t2 such that F1 has the property of conferring C2 at t1 in w and does not have the
property of conferring C2 at t2 in w. Suppose for indirect proof that the antecedent
of this conditional is true. We can then affirm the consequent: there is a world
w and two times t1 and t2 such that F1 has the property of conferring C2 at t1 in
w and does not have the property of conferring C2 at t2 in w. But the following
is an instance of the No-Change Principle: there is no world w and two times t1
and t2 such that F1 has the property of conferring C2 at t1 in w and does not have
the property of conferring C2 at t2 in w. This is, of course, the negation of the
consequent of the instance of the Change Principle. So we get a contradiction from
the assumption that F1 could have had F2’s causal powers. Since the initial choices
were arbitrary, it follows that natural properties could not confer different causal
powers than they do in fact. That is, (4) is true: natural properties (that confer
causal powers) have causal essences. And (4) is half of causal structuralism.5
Why believe the premises? The Change Principle is just a version of a
modest combinatorial principle, one to which Humeans qua Humeans ought to be
committed. For example, David Lewis (1986) says this:
I require a principle of recombination according to which patching to-
gether parts of different possible worlds yields another possible world.
Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything can coexist with any-
thing else. (pp. 87-8)
So if F1 confers C1 in one world and confers C2 in another, there should be a third
world where F1 goes from conferring C1 to conferring C2. Admittedly, Lewis for-
mulates his principle of recombination in terms of the individuals of his ontology,
and properties are not individuals. Individuals are spatiotemporal points and sums
of spatiotemporal points. Properties, on the other hand, are classes of individuals,
classes of classes of individuals, and etc. However, assuming that there are univer-
sals, and that the natural properties correspond one-to-one with the universals, and
5Well, almost half. If one thinks of causal structuralism as a claim about all natural properties,
then the argument could not establish even half of causal structuralism. For the argument does not
assume that all natural properties confer causal powers, and only if all natural properties confer
causal powers would the argument establish that all natural properties have causal essences. (On
the other hand, if one thinks of causal structuralism as a claim about only some properties, then
the argument could establish half of causal structuralism.) I don’t take up the question which
natural properties confer causal powers, but I suspect that the best place to look would be to those
properties which could only be instantiated by particulars.
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that universals are individuals in whatever sense makes plausible such principles
of recombination, the implication goes through. I assume that there are universals
(since I think, though will not defend, that causal structuralism is most plausible for
the realist) and stipulate with Lewis (1983) that universals correspond one-to-one
with natural properties. Furthermore, since universals are not constructs of other
individuals (as is the case with properties conceived of as classes of individuals, as in
Lewis’s system), they should recombine in the requisite manner, barring necessary
connections. The antecedent of the Change Principle, instantiated in the case of a
natural property (universal) and properties of conferring such-and-such powers, is
the conditional supposition of the lack of a necessary connection between a natural
property and the powers it confers. Further, to grant that natural properties and
their causal profile are necessarily connected is just to give up the Humean view of
the relationship between natural properties and their causal powers and embrace
causal essences. At any rate, the Change Principle, as a modest combinatorial prin-
ciple, carries a high degree of intuitive plausibility. Even if one is not a Humean, and
whether or not one is attracted to combinatorial theories of modality, such modest
combinatorial principles are difficult to deny.
I don’t have an argument for the No-Change Principle, but I think it is
intuitively plausible. Not undeniable, but certainly more plausible than its negation.
It simply says that the laws do not change within a world. For the Humean, the No-
Change Principle is mandatory. The laws are just the best generalizations over the
total distribution of properties in a world. Since the total distribution of properties
in a world does not change from time to time in that world, neither can the best
generalizations over that distribution, and so neither can the laws. On an Dretske-
Armstrong-Tooley style view, things aren’t so clear.6 On this view, laws are second-
order relations between universals. Could these relations change within a world?
The view does not seem to bar such a change, but it would be quite puzzling.
What could explain the change? Though the initial setting of the relations which
constitute the laws “at the beginning” of a world is a reasonable place to claim that
no explanation is needed, a change in these relations “in the middle” of a world
cries out for explanation. But no such explanation could be forthcoming.7 Thus I
6Cf. Dretske (1977), Armstrong (1983), and Tooley (1987).
7Maybe God could change the laws. Doing so would be a dirty trick, however, so his nature
would preclude his doing so.
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find it more plausible to think that, even on the Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley view,
the changing of laws in a world is not possible.8
Alan Sidelle (2002) denies the No-Change Principle. He asks us to consider
a world that is like ours up to a certain time but that, after that time, is very much
unlike ours: “aspirins cease to relieve headaches, instead causing rashes; straight
contact causes angular motion; shadows don’t have the shapes of their objects—and
none of this is due to different forces.”9 Sidelle considers a number of ways one could
describe such a world. He thinks the most natural and plausible description is that
there has been a change in the laws of nature. There is as much law-likeness after
the change as before, the same properties seem to be instantiated, and the scientists
can find new equations to describe the post-change world.
Two other descriptions of Sidelle’s world are available. First, one could allow
the laws to mention times. If the laws mention times, then the No-Change Principle
is not violated because the laws would not need to change to explain the different
causes and effects before and after the “change.” I am not inclined to this reply,
but given the initial plausibility of the No-Change Principle and my inability to
see an advantage that Sidelle’s changing-laws description has to a laws-mentioning-
times description, I think the latter is on-balance more plausible.10 The second
alternative description is actually an implicit denial of the possibility of the world
Sidelle describes. One could deny that the same properties are exemplified, or one
could insist that something about the context has changed. I confess difficulty in
conceiving Sidelle’s world without introducing one of those two sorts of variation.
In particular, I cannot conceive straight contact causing angular motion without
an additional force; nor can I conceive shadows shaped unlike their objects with-
out something more than the laws changing. These difficulties cause me to doubt
whether I really can conceive of aspirin causing rashes instead of relieving headaches
without implicitly introducing a change in human body chemistry or in the chemi-
cal makeup of aspirin (since I don’t know what that is, nor how it affects aspirin’s
capabilities, anyway). The upshot of all this is that Sidelle has not given reason
8For the causal structuralist, the No-Change Principle is mandatory as well. The laws are a
function of the powers conferred by properties, and those powers can’t change even across worlds,
much less within them.
9Sidelle (2002), p. 315.
10Note that, insofar as laws can mention times, it seems right to think that causal conferring
properties “involve” times. Such a view is, then, no threat to the anti-Humean argument.
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enough to upset the plausibility of the No-Change Principle.
I gave a quick argument above that the No-Change Principle is mandatory
for the Humean, but a Humean might think that argument went too quickly. She
might resist by appealing to the so-called “best system” account of laws. Lewis
(1994) describes his take on the best system account thus:
Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler,
better systematized than others. Some are stronger, more informative,
than others. ... The best system is the one that strikes as good a balance
as truth will allow between simplicity and strength. How good a balance
that is will depend on how kind nature is. A regularity is a law iff it is
a theorem of the best system. (pp. 231-2)
Lewis goes on to add “fit” to simplicity and strength as virtues that the best system
must balance. Roughly, a system fits the course of history better than its rivals iff
the chance of that course of history is higher on that system than it is on its rivals.
Fit is required, he thinks, if the best system account is to accommodate chance. The
best system, then, balances best the virtues of simplicity, strength, and fit. These
ideas are familiar, so I will not pause over them. This account may be thought to
help resist the No-Change Principle because it may provide a way to get changing
laws. One might think that the best system for certain worlds could bifurcate (or
trifucate, or...) into two (or three, or...) subsystems, and that these subsystems
deliver the laws. So, for instance, in a world where there are putatively law-like
patters of quality distributions, which patters differ in the first and second halves of
the world, the best system may be one with two subsystems, each of which applies
to only half of the world. Such a view is still broadly Humean in spirit because the
laws supervene on the global distribution of properties; no two worlds with identical
distributions of properties could differ with respect to the laws. But the view allows
that the laws differ from time to time in some worlds.
I find the best system account of laws dissatisfying, so I don’t think it ought
to be used to resist the No-Change Principle. What follows presently is an attempt
to say why that is so. The troubles I raise will no doubt fail to convince the devoted
Humean; my audience is better taken to be the fence-sitters. I assume that the laws
of our world are probabilistic.11
11All I need is that probabilistic laws are possible. The stronger claim I make only for ease of
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A thought experiment: Consider a world, w, almost exactly like our world,
α. The only difference between w and α occurs in the last temporal moment of the
two; the distribution of properties in that last moment of w, tw, is different than
the distribution of properties in the last temporal moment of α, tα.12 What ought
we think about the laws of w? The natural thing, it seems to me, is that the laws
of α and w are the same, but the distribution of properties in tw is less likely on
those laws than is the distribution of properties in tα (or vice versa; I drop this
clause hereafter). Indeed, such a change in the distribution of properties in the final
moment need not be a violation of the laws. Now consider world w1, whose last
temporal instant, tw1 , is just like tw, but whose next to last temporal instant t1w1
differs from the second to last temporal instants of w and α, t1w and t1α, respectively.
Here again, it seems that the right thing to say is that the laws of w1 are the same as
those of w and α, but that the final two moments of the world are less likely given
the laws than are the final two moments of either w or α.
The reader can no doubt sense where this is going. Iterating this process
generates a sorites sequence of worlds if one does the alterations in an appropriate
way. In particular, the alterations must be such that there is apparent law-likeness in
the later stages of the worlds which differ quality-distribution-wise from α. This sort
of alteration is no doubt possible given modest combinatorial contraints on modal
space. The conditional premise of the standard sorites sequences is present here: for
any pair of “adjacent” worlds, it is implausible to think that the laws are different
for one member of the pair than they are for the other member.13 Furthermore,
given that the laws are probabilistic, it seems possible that each successive world
has the same laws as before. No violation of laws is required as one moves along the
sequence. But according to the best system account, some world in the sequence
has a distribution of qualities such that the system that best balances simplicity,
strength, and fit will be one that bifurcates. The best system account, then, says
that at some point in the sequence one gets to a world with changing laws. This, I
contend, is a problem.
Everyone must crack the vagueness nut, of course, and my difficulty is not
presentation and because it is, after all, probably true.
12If one is uncomfortable with talk of “temporal instants”, substitute instead some arbitrarily
small temporal duration.
13Cf. Lewis’s (1994) claim that rounding off probabilities is a warranted sacrifice of fit for
simplicity.
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that the best system account appears to be committed to the vagueness of the
predicate ‘x is a law’ or of at least one of the constraints of strength, simplicity,
fit, and balance. You give me your favored theory of vagueness, the best system
proponent insists, and I’ll give you the right thing to say about this sequence of
worlds. Fair enough, I say.
My worry: This sequence of worlds brings out the fact that probabilistic laws
just don’t supervene on the distribution of qualities at a world in the way that the
best system account contends. The sequence of worlds is designed to attune you to
the fact that a series of improbable events does not constitute even a violation of
probabilistic laws, much less a change in the laws. The question the best system
account faces is this: given that the probabilistic laws of α are not incompatible
with a world where things go much differently than they in fact go, why does the
best system account insist that such a world is not possible, that such a world must
have different laws? Certainly some such worlds are exceedingly unlikely given our
laws, but they are not impossible given our laws. To insist that they are impossible
given our laws is to make our laws stronger than they actually are.14 The flip-side is
that, if the properties instantiated in our world could be instantiated in worlds with
different laws, then there ought to be a world exactly like ours with respect to the
distribution of qualities but that differs with respect to the laws. Such a world may
be exceedingly unlikely given those laws, but that does not mitigate its possibility.
Thus, probabilistic laws do not supervene on the global distribution of properties at
a world in the way the best system account contends.
The Humean might be tempted to think that this worry simply begs the
question against them. I seem to simply insist that the distribution of qualities at
a world fails to settle what the probabilities given by the laws are. That is just
to reject the Humean view. I would construct the dialectic differently. I meant to
garner evidence that the distribution of qualities doesn’t settle the probabilities on
the basis of modal intuitions about what is nomically possible and impossible, given
that the laws are actually probabilistic. I think, then, that the improbable worlds
are nomically possible independently of my commitments for or against Humeanism.
This is not to beg the question, but to test to see whether the Humean hypothesis
about the laws is correct. Here again, I don’t doubt that the Humean will remain
14An imperfect illustration: Even if flipped fair coins came up nothing but heads from here to
eternity, the probability that a flipped fair coin will come up heads is 0.5.
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unconvinced; my hope is to entice the fence-sitters to step down from the fence to
join me.
Proponents of the best system account may modify their view by eliminating
the possibility that the system bifurcates (or...), and there may be a reason to opt
for this restriction. When bifurcation is allowed, the best system account introduces
a novel way for laws to fail to be counterfactual supporting. Consider a world w in
which, according to the best system, it is a law that Fs are Gs in the first temporal
half but it is a law that Fs are not Gs in the second temporal half.15 Suppose further
that something o is not F in the first half of w. Normally, the following counterfactual
is taken to be true in w: if o had been F, it would have been G. So far so good. But
suppose that, in the second half of w, o is (becomes) F. This undermines the truth
of the counterfactual, since one of the nearest Fo worlds, namely w, is a  Go world.
This is, at minimum, a cost of the best system account that allows bifurcation.
Whether it is more than that is hard to say, since there are other ways that laws
might fail to be counterfactual supporting.
One might try to elude this worry by rejecting weak centering.16 Such a
move is motivated, the thought goes, because similarity of laws goes with similarity
of worlds, so there is a sense in which the second temporal half of w is far away,
similarity-wise, from the first temporal half of w. This runs counter, however, to the
Humean picture of laws. That picture has it that the laws supervene on the global
distribution of qualities. So the fundamental arbiter of similarity is the distribution
of qualities. And, on that score, w can’t help but be closest to itself. To use the
laws to settle matters of similarity is to elevate the laws above the distribution. The
Humean simply cannot allow this.
Opting for a best system account that denies the possibility of bifurcation also
mitigates somewhat against the considerations regarding improbable worlds raised
above but is no help insofar as the goal is to escape my argument. The restriction
helps with improbable worlds because one can get worlds where large chunks of
worlds contain nothing but improbable events, chunks as large as the balance of
strength, simplicity, and fit will allow. One can, then, get much more improbable
15Whether these sorts of “negative” laws are possible is no matter. All I need is that it is a law
that Fs cause G1s, where G and G1 are incompatible.
16A model is strongly centered iff for all worlds w, the innermost sphere of worlds at w is twu.
A model is weakly centered iff for all worlds w, the innermost sphere of worlds at w has w as an
element.
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worlds on the restricted best system account than one can on the unrestricted best
system account. So the worry noted above isn’t quite so troubling. However, this
restricted best system account cannot reject the No-Change Principle. In that way,
it is worse off with respect to the general argument I am defending here.
The upshot of all this is that I think the best system account is either im-
plausible or no help to the Humean who wants to deny the No-Change Principle. It
is implausible because it inappropriately limits the extent of modal space by ruling
out improbable worlds. If one restricts bifurcation (or...) to expand modal space,
then the best system account does not entail that the No-Change Principle is false.
We are stuck with the No-Change Principle.
(3) will be contested, and is the most likely locus of resistance, but I find
it plausible. Natural properties make for resemblance. And natural properties
resemble with respect to the causal powers they confer on objects that exemplify
them. For example, the properties of being red and being blue both confer on
their bearers the power to reflect light. These properties resemble in that respect.
The properties of being spherical and being cylindrical both confer on their bearers
the power to roll downhill.17 These properties resemble in that respect. These
resemblances are also fundamental. It is not like the way that two things resemble
by both being grue or by both being two feet from an object (even the same object).
Rather it is like the way two things resemble by both being colored or by both
being positively charged. I do not have an argument for this claim. But it seems
to me that there are objective resemblances here, and where there are objective
resemblances, there are natural properties.
“Objection! Natural properties may not exactly resemble with respect to the
total set of powers they confer on their bearers. So, the property of conferring Ci
(for particular i) is probably not natural.”18 This may be right. We needn’t settle
the question here, however, for the argument—or at least something near enough—
17Where ‘downhill’ is understood as something like: toward the center of an object that is exerting
significant gravitational force on the rolling object, which object is in contact with a more or less
flat solid oriented to the gravity-exerting body in the required way. In other words, while I recognize
that the power to roll downhill isn’t a plausible candidate for a fundamental power, at least not
under that description, I still think it can serve as a useful example to fix the idea at which I am
driving.
18At least, it is probably not perfectly natural, in Lewis’s (1983) sense. Another way of putting
the same point is this: the Change and No-Change Principles and (3) should be formulated in
terms of perfectly natural properties. I do not think the distinction between the natural and the
perfectly natural is particularly relevant here, so I will not discuss it.
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can be rescued. Natural properties do resemble with respect to simple powers they
confer on their bearers. (The examples discussed in the preceding paragraph are
simple powers; I did not articulate all the powers of the properties of being red and
being blue, for instance.) So, one can run similar arguments using the properties of
conferring ci (for particular i), where ci is some simple causal power. Each argument
will conclude to the inclusion of individual simple powers in a given property’s causal
essence. Once one runs the argument for each of a natural property’s causal powers,
one will have a series of arguments that generates the desired conclusion. There is,
then, no deep problem here.
“Objection! You’ve just begged the question against Humeanism with (3).
No Humean in her right mind would admit that the property of conferring such
and such powers is natural, since (perfectly) natural properties must be intrinsic,
and since the Humean is ex hypothesi committed to the claim that causal conferring
properties are extrinsic.” The short answer to this objection is that I nowhere
assumed that causal conferring properties are intrinsic. The question whether all
natural properties of properties are intrinsic seems independent of whether the causal
laws supervene on the global distribution of properties. So far, then, there is no bar
to the Humean embracing (3).
Further, I find it implausible that all natural properties of properties are
intrinsic. There are two notions of intrinsicality relevant here. On the first notion,
a property F is intrinsic to something o just in case a duplicate of o must exemplify
F. (I want to leave aside challenges to our ability to understand what a “duplicate”
of a property is, though I confess I have trouble on this score. I assume that we
understand it well enough to get on.) There are two ways to go at this point. First,
one might think that if (property) F is a duplicate of (property) G, then F  G.
Given a tie between duplication and identity, one forces a tie between intrinsicality
and necessity. If one thinks along these lines, then all sides can agree that whether
causal conferring properties are intrinsic in this sense is just the question at issue: if
a property is intrinsic (to a property), then it is had necessarily. But I don’t see that
(3) alone entails that causal conferring properties are intrinsic in this sense. So far,
there is no tie between naturalness and intrinsicality, which is the intermediate step
needed to make the tie between naturalness and necessity. One gets the intermediate
tie if one is already assuming that all natural properties of properties are intrinsic.
However, that assumption is one only the Humean will embrace, and so to make it
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here is to beg the question in favor of Humeanism. We want to avoid begging the
question either way. The second way to go is to deny that if F and G are duplicates,
then F  G. If one goes that way, then I don’t see why the Humean has to deny that
causal conferring properties are intrinsic in this first sense. The issue that divides
the Humean from the anti-Humean is whether these causal conferring properties are
had necessarily. Without the tie between duplication and identity, one loses the tie
between intrinsicality and necessity. This is so even if one grants that there is a
tie between naturalness and intriniscality. Each option, then, poses no challenge to
accepting (3), given the right dialectical context.19
On the second notion of intrinsicality, a property F is intrinsic to something
o just in case o’s exemplifying F does not include the existence of something distinct
from o.20 For instance, consider the property of being lighter than blue. This prop-
erty is extrinsic in the sense that, if it is exemplified, then something other than
the thing that has the property must exist, viz. the property of being blue. If the
Humean wants to insist that I have begged the question by assuming that causal
conferring properties are natural, then they must deny either that the property of
being lighter than blue is extrinsic or that it is natural. Neither tack is plausible.
The property of being yellow and the property of being orange resemble in that they
both exemplify the property of being lighter than blue. So the property of being
lighter than blue is natural.21 And we have already noted that if something exem-
19I should note that I think the second option—denying the tie between duplication and identity—
is the right one for the Humean. According to the inchoate notion of duplication (again, insofar as
I grip the notion of duplication of properties), Humeanism is the view that duplication of property
does not guarantee identity. Since the Humean thinks that properties have quiddities, Humeanism
denies the tie between duplication and identity in the property case. This is just the analogue of a
haecceitistic view of particulars: duplication of particulars does not guarantee identity. (Here, both
quiddities and haecceities are to be construed as non-qualitative.) Quiddities, just like haecceities,
are not relevant to duplication. If that is right, then there is no bar to the Humean’s acceptance of
(3), even if one grants the tie between naturalness and intrinsicality.
20State of affairs s includes state of affairs s1 just in case, necessarily, if s obtains then s1 obtains.
21One might think that relational properties are not natural because they supervene on the
relations to which they correspond. First, the presence of such supervenience is not obviously
enough to overcome the considerations of resemblance that point to naturalness. Further, in the
case of categorial monadic relational properties, like that of being lighter than blue, I do not share
the inclination to think that there is any asymmetry between the monadic relational property and
the corresponding relation. Take, for instance, the property of being blue and that of being yellow.
The property of being yellow must exist to stand in the relation of being lighter than to the property
of being blue. But the property of being yellow necessarily exemplifies the property of being lighter
than blue, so the property of being yellow must exemplify the property of being lighter than blue in
order to exist. Of course, the same could be said for the relation as well. The point is, though, that
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plifies the property of being lighter than blue, then the property of being blue must
exist. So the property of being lighter than blue is extrinsic in the relevant sense.
So I don’t think the Humean can plausibly claim that the only natural properties
of properties are intrinsic in this second sense. So I have not begged any questions
by claiming that (3) is true.
Further still, it is true that the Humean is committed to claims that entail
that (3) is false. But the argument, insofar as it is construed as an argument
against Humeanism, is a reductio, so no one should be surprised that the Humean is
committed to things that entail that one of my premises is false. The idea, though,
is that the Humean is also committed, or ought to be committed, to each of the
premises or to things that entail each of the premises. The truth of premise (3),
in this dialectical context, is meant to be decided independently of considerations
about Humeanism and anti-Humeanism. The way to do this is to use the standard
tests for naturalness. One such tests is that of resemblance. If a property makes for
resemblance, then it is natural. Causal conferring properties, it seems to me, make
for resemblance. So they are natural.
The Humean may dig in her heels at this point, and insist that causal confer-
ring properties are natural because they make for resemblance, but are not natural
enough to be relevant to the Change Principle. I face a limitation here. I cannot
think of any other properties that plausibly qualify as natural by the resemblance
test but that aren’t relevant to the Change Principle. The burden, I think, is on the
Humean at this point. Whatever degree of naturalness is relevant to the Change
Principle, it seems to me that causal conferring properties have it. And this because
they make for resemblance. If the objection is just that causal conferring properties
don’t really make for resemblance, then we are truly at an impasse. I can only
note that the claim that causal conferring properties make for resemblance is much
more plausible than its negation (again, independent of my general views about
there seems to be no priority here at all. At best, the supervenience in question goes both ways, and
there is no obvious way to argue for supervenience with dependence. But dependence is crucial to
the objection. To claim that the supervenience of causal conferring properties on the distribution
of properties in a world (that is, on some complex set of relations that obtain among universals)
is a case of dependent superveience is just to beg the question in favor of Humeanism. For the
anti-Humean, causal conferring properties are very much like categorial relations among universals.
Again, begging the question in favor of Humeanism is no better than begging the question against
it. On the other hand, the question whether causal conferring properties are natural can be raised
independently of whether Humeanism is true. That is precisely what I have tried to do through
considerations of resemblance.
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Humeanism). Once again, I merely beckon the fence-sitters.
I claim the argument is but newish because something close to it has been
advocated by Sydney Shoemaker.22 Here is a characteristic statement of his argu-
ment:
It seems to me a general feature of our thought about possibility that
how we think that something could have differed from how it in fact is
[is] closely related to how we think that the way something is at one
time could differ from the way that some thing is at a different time. In
possible worlds jargon, the ways one and the same thing of a given sort
can differ across worlds correspond to the ways one and the same thing
of that sort can differ at different times in the same world. Could I have
been a plumber or an accountant instead of a philosopher? The answer
seems to be yes—and this goes with the fact that we acknowledge the
possibility of a scenario in which something who was exactly as I was
at some point in my life undergoes a series of changes resulting in his
eventually being a plumber or accountant. Could I have been a poached
egg? Pace Lewis, the answer seems to be no—and this goes with the fact
that our principles of trans-temporal identity rule out the possibility of
a scenario in which something starts off as a human being of a certain
description and ends up a poached egg. ((1998) in (2003) p. 419; cf. p.
217ff.)
Prominent interpreters of Shoemaker on this issue think the argument goes differ-
ently than the one I have offered. For example, here is John Hawthorne’s reading:
[Shoemaker’s] line of thought...takes off from the idea that in the case of
particulars, the possibility of something’s being F is of a piece with the
possibility of a world which branches from the actual world where that
thing is F. It then generalizes that thought to all things. Combine this
generalization with the thesis that a property cannot change its causal
powers over the course of time and then it follows that there is no world
where some property enjoys some power that it actually lacks—since
there is no world branching from the actual world where that property
enjoys that power.
22Cf. (1980), (1998).
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Here’s the motivating principle—call it the ‘Branch Principle’:
For every possible world w, there is some time t such that at all
times up to and including t, w is exactly like the actual world.
Given that properties can’t change there causal powers over the course
of time, and assuming that every property has always been around, we
can use the Branch Principle to secure at least on of the two key causal
structuralist theses (that the cause powers of a property are essential to
it). ((2001) in (2006) pp. 214-5)23
While I don’t care to fuss protractedly with details about how to interpret
Shoemaker, I can’t help but mettle a little.24 Shoemaker (1980) makes pretty clear
that he wants the Branch Principle for particulars because of his view that certain
historical properties are part of a thing’s individual essence: “the reason why the
possible history in which the thing has different properties must be a branching-off
from the history of the actual world is that the individual essence of a particular
thing must include historical properties” ((1980) in (2003) pp. 218-9). But he
transitions from a branching-off view for the case of properties. Just after the initial
statement of his branching-off view for particulars in (1980), Shoemaker says this:
“But now let us move from the case of particulars to that of properties. There
is no such thing as tracing a property through a series of changes in its causal
potentialities—not if it is a genuine property... And there is no such thing as a
possible history in which a property starts with the set of causal potentialities it
has in the actual world and ends with a different set” ((1980) in (2003), p. 218).
The last sentence is the crucial one: the only relevant possibility is one where a
property starts with a set of causal powers and changes, nevermind what the rest of
the world is like. In particular, nevermind whether the possible history in question
starts like actual history does. (It is true that Shoemaker thinks that all properties
are interconnected in a certain way, so the rest of the relevant possible world must
have only the same properties around. But it doesn’t follow from that that the
world has to be exactly like the actual world in the distribution of the properties
23Jonathan Schaffer (2005) interprets Shoemaker similarly (see esp. his n. 16). Dean Zimmerman
(2000) comes closer to my own reading.
24My desire to not engage in detailed interpretation of Shoemaker stems primarily from the
fact that I do not believe Shoemaker would endorse my argument. Anyway, he certainly hasn’t
committed to it. My argument is, however, inspired by the Shoemaker passages discussed here.
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up to a certain time, or in the objects that are around, or whatnot.) Moreover,
Shoemaker is much more explicit about the branching-off view for particulars in
(1980) than he is in (1998) (from which Hawthorne (2001) quotes), so the transition
to the case of properties in (1980), made explicit in the quoted material above (“But
now let us move from the case of particulars to that of properties”), is especially
telling. Therefore, it seems to me that, as far as properties go, Shoemaker only wants
the Change Principle, not something so strong as the Branch Principle. However,
Shoemaker certainly does not put the argument the way that I have. So I cannot
claim that Shoemaker would endorse the argument as I give it, though I do think I
am closer to the spirit of Shoemaker’s argument than Hawthorne is.
At any rate, Hawthorne goes on to argue against the Branch Principle:
Should we agree with Shoemaker that, at least in the case of particulars,
the Branch Principle is right? If determinism is true, there is no branch
world where I am a plumber. So, according to Shoemaker, if determinism
is true, things could not have been such that I was a plumber. Even if
one thinks that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, it does
not seem that one wants to say that it is impossible that I be a plumber:
for why not admit a world which is a bit different to ours all along where
I am a plumber? To focus our intuitions, we might do well to consider a
simple world, one where two particles have always existed (either since
the beginning of time or for an eternity). Call them A and B. Intuitively,
it seems that A could have existed alone. But there is no branch world
where A exists alone. At the very best, such modal commitments are
extremely tendentious. It thus does not seem that a promising way
to motivate causal essences for properties is by the Branch Principle.
((2001) in (2006) p. 215)
Hawthorne’s reasoning is valid; the Branch Principle has untoward consequences;
Hawthorne could have been a plumber, and A could have existed alone. Both of
these possibilities are precluded by the Branch Principle; it should be rejected. This
reading of Shoemaker supplies a bad argument.
Despite that the Change and Branch Principles are not the same, I do
want to consider whether my argument has the same implausible consequences that
Hawthorne draws from his reading of Shoemaker. The two principles, though dif-
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ferent, are clearly similar. I grant the assumption that determinism is true.
Given the Change Principle, is it possible that Hawthorne be a plumber? I
don’t see that the Change Principle entails that it is not possible. On the supposition
of determinism, it is clear that the world serving as a witness for this possibility will
have to be one that is different from the actual world from the beginning. The
Change Principle is compatible with Hawthorne’s existing in such a world.25 The
Branch Principle, of course, is not. This goes to show that the work being done in
this example is being done by determinism coupled with the claim that historical
properties are essential to objects, that is, the claim that the world had to be the
same as the actual world up to a point in order that Hawthorne come to be in that
world.26
The case of particles A and B requires more care. What is needed is a possible
world where A and another object go on existing for a while, and then the other
object goes out of existence. That is, we need a world where A goes from being
accompanied to being lonely. Without such a world, the Change Principle rules out
the putative possibility that A be lonely throughout the duration of some world.
This problem is not obviously to the point because it is unclear whether lone-
liness and accompaniment are natural properties (rather than being mere-Cambridge
properties). In fact, it seems they are paradigm mere-Cambridge properties. I can-
not see how the addition or subtraction of something to an object’s environment
could influence that object’s causal potentialities, what the object (objectively) re-
sembles, or whatnot. Such an addition could, of course, affect which of the object’s
causal potentialities are actualized, but that doesn’t constitute a genuine change in
the object. Since causal structuralism is a view about natural properties and not
about mere-Cambridge properties, if loneliness and accompaniment are not natural
properties, then we should not expect causal structuralist intuitions to apply in their
case. Though I’m inclined to think that these are not natural properties, I propose
to consider whether the problem can be eluded even on the supposition that they
are.
Is it possible, then, that there be a world where A goes from being ac-
25This is exactly the kind of possible world towards which Hawthorne gestures with the rhetorical
question, “why not admit a world which is a bit different to ours all along where I am a plumber?”
((2006) p. 215)
26Since historical properties are not plausibly essential to properties, this highlights the need to
look elsewhere to capture Shoemaker’s intuition.
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companied to being lonely, given the suppositions of determinism and the Change
Principle? In short: Yes. First off, it seems possible that A exists for a while with
just one other object, C, which ceases to be at some time in that world. If this
world is possible, then we have a world where A goes from being accompanied to
being lonely. The strictures of the Change Principle do not then prevent us from
saying that there is a possible world where A is lonely throughout the duration of
the world.
It may be tempting to object that we need it to be possible that A and B go
on existing for a while, ending with a moment in which B goes out of existence, and
followed by a period where A exists alone. Only then we will be able to say that A
be lonely throughout the duration of some world. A possible world involving A and
some object other than B in which A goes from being accompanied to being lonely
is not enough. One reason for objecting thus would be the view that properties
like being R related to B are natural. I myself don’t feel the temptation to object
in this way. I also don’t share the view that being R related to B (and its ilk)
are natural. But if you do, then I think one still cannot argue to the conclusion
that A couldn’t have been lonely. A world with only A and B and in which A
goes from being accompanied to being lonely is possible. A and B will, of course,
have to be arranged differently to begin with in this world where B ceases to exist
somewhere along the line, but there is no reason to think this impossible. The
explanation for B’s ceasing to exist in the differently arranged world can be what
you like. I conclude, then, that the Change and No-Change Principles do not lead
to the untoward consequences to which the Branch Principle leads.
So, we have three plausible claims—the Change and No-Change Principles,
and the claim that the properties of conferring such-and-such powers are natural—
that are independently plausible, do not have the negative consequences of the
Branch Principle, and jointly entail that natural properties (that confer causal pow-
ers) have causal essences. We have a newish argument for half of causal structural-
ism.27 Just this anti-Humean result, at any rate, will be enough for some.28
27But cf. fn. 5.
28Even given the caveat of fn. 5, we have an argument that mitigates against the Humean view
of the relationship between properties (universals) and causal powers. The lesson may just be that
the Humean ought not believe in universals (cf. the discussion of the Change Principle above), but
that is in itself a substantial result.
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5.3 From Causal Essences to Causal Structuralism
But it is not enough for me. I want to get all the way to causal structuralism
(about properties that confer causal powers). In order to do so, I need an argument
that the causal essences of properties are unique. The argument will take the form
of a cumulative case, based on both epistemological and theoretical grounds. To
hasten the discussion, call ‘quidditism’ the view that “quiddities,” the analogue for
properties of identity in the case of particulars, are needed to individuate all natural
properties in isolation from all others. And call ‘anti-quidditism’ the view that
denies that quiddities must do that work. Causal structuralism is an anti-quidditist
view, and an argument that having a given causal profile is sufficient for having a
particular property is an argument against quidditism.
First, I want to argue that the best initial theory of actual-world properties
is anti-quidditistic. We could have no a posteriori reason to think that there are two
properties that both are exemplified in our world and have the same causal profile.
To think we could have such reason would be to violate the theoretical constraints
with which we begin our theorizing about properties. The metaphysician postulates
a property where there is an objective qualitative or causal similarity. One type of
similarity, one property. Moreover, it seems that we could have no a priori reason
to think that there are two properties that both are exemplified in our world and
have the same causal profile. How could such an a priori argument go? Any such
argument is likely to start with a possibility claim, or a principle of recombination,
or some such. But possibility claims and principles of recombination cannot tell us
anything about the contingent features of the actual world, only that there must be
some world that is such and such a way.
The best initial theory of the actual world, then, will not include properties
with the same causal profile. The theoretical constraints on universals simply pre-
clude such a claim, given that there are no a priori reasons to think that our world
contains such unviersals, and since there simply couldn’t be any a posteriori reason
to think that our world contains such universals. Therefore, prior to considering
modal claims about what kinds of property combinations there could be, we have
no reason to postulate quiddities, because we have no reason to believe that the
possession of a given causal profile is insufficient for having a particular property.
In light of this, the burden of proof rests with the quidditist. We need a reason
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to complicate our ontology of properties via the postulation of quiddities that do
quidditistic work.29 The quidditist will think she can discharge that burden. I will
consider two ways she might attempt to do so. In the remainder of this section, I will
consider whether distinct properties with identical or symmetrical causal roles are
possible. If they are, we will have a direct argument for quidditism: the resources
of causal structuralism are insufficient to generate all of modal space. In the next
section, I will consider an argument against causal structuralism. This can be seen
as an indirect argument for quidditism, which seems to be the only viable alternative
to causal structuralism.
Many will claim that they can conceive of a world containing two properties
with identical or symmetrical causal profiles, or that they have an intuition that
a world containing two properties with identical or symmetrical causal profiles is
possible. So, for example, they will claim that worlds with the following sorts of
law-books can be conceived, or that they have an intuition that they are possible:
(i) F1F2,F2F1, (ii) F1F2,F1F3, (iii) F1F3,F2F3,F4F1,F4F2, etc. The
laws are symmetrical in the sense that ex hypostesi two distinct properties have the
same causes and effects. In worlds whose law books are (i) or (iii), F1 and F2 have
symmetrical roles; in worlds whose law books are (ii), F2 and F3 have symmetrical
roles.
Robust causal structuralism cannot distinguish the properties with identical
or symmetrical causal roles. Consider a world with (i) as its law book. The Ramsey
sentence for F1 is identical to the Ramsey sentence for F2. For F1, the Ramsey-
sentence is DX2pX1X2^X2X1q, while for F2 it is DX1pX1X2^X2X1q. Since
there is nothing to distinguish the variables X1 and X2, and since conjunction is
commutative, these two open sentences are (semantically) identical. F1 and F2 are
indistinguishable in this world. Similarly for a world having (ii) as its law book. The
Ramsified law book for such a world is this: DX1DX2DX3pX1X2^X1X3q. In this
case, the two open sentences DX1DX3pX1X2^X1X3q and DX1DX2pX1X2^X1X3q
are identical, so the causal roles of F2 and F3 cannot be distinguished. So F2 and F3
themselves are indistinguishable for the causal structuralist in such a world.
Hawthorne (2001) provides another example, one that prompts him to con-
sider an interesting strategy with respect to the present problem. In the cases involv-
ing symmetrical laws considered so far, the causal structuralist might claim that the
29Cf. Hawthorne (2001) in (2006) p. 216.
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two properties with symmetrical causal profiles are, contrary to initial appearances,
identical.30 Put worries about the plausibility of that strategy aside for the moment
and consider the following law-book: F1  F3,F2  F3,F1&F2  F4. This law-book is
especially troubling for the causal structuralist because, he claims, there is no room
at all for the claim that F1 and F2 are identical. F1 and F2, when co-exemplified,
have an effect that they do not have in isolation. There is a structural parallel here
to Max Black worlds. An anti-haecceitist bundle theory has difficulty with intra-
world duplication of qualitative profile in the same way that anti-quidditist causal
structuralism (a sort of “bundle theory” for properties, if you will) has difficulty
with intra-world duplication of causal profile.
There is another way to think about anti-haecceitism, however, articulated
and defended by David Lewis (1986):
If two worlds differ in what the represent de re concerning some indi-
vidual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way, I shall call that a
haecceitistic difference. Haecceitism, as I propose to use the word, is
the doctrine that there are at least some cases of haecceitistic difference
between worlds. ((1986) p. 221)
Lewis’s conception of haecceitism concerns de re representation rather than quali-
tative duplication and so does allow intra-world qualitative duplication. However,
one might think that once a Max Black world is admitted, one must embrace haec-
ceitism. There will be one world containing only one of the objects in the Black
world, and another world containing the other. These worlds differ concerning what
they represent de re, but are qualitatively identical. Lewis demurs. He sees the
need for only one world to represent these two possibilities, and appeals to coun-
terpart theory to underwrite his contention. That is, one will only have one world
with (say) a single sphere. This world represents both spheres of the Black world,
under different counterpart relations. So it is sufficient to underwrite the truth of
the claim that the one sphere in the Black world could have existed alone and the
truth of the claim that the other sphere in the Black world could have existed alone.
Haecceitism is not violated, since there are not qualitatively identical worlds that
differ in what they represent de re.
30Cf. Hawthorne’s (1995) claim on behalf of the bundle theory that a world with “two” indis-
cernible spheres is actually a world with only one sphere.
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Hawthorne suggests an analogy of Lewis-style anti-haecceitism for proper-
ties. Call a description of the world which uses only “structural” primitives like
part/whole and causal necessitation, logical vocabulary, and individual constants
for particulars (if one is an haecceitist in the non-Lewisian sense about particulars),
a ‘structural description’. There is a “quidditistic difference” between two worlds if
those worlds have the same structural description but differ with respect to what
they represent de re concerning properties. Anti-sturcturalism is the view that
there are quidditistic differences between worlds. Structuralism is the view that
there are no quidditistic differences between worlds. By insisting on this notion
of anti-quidditism, the structuralist can allow for intra-world duplication of causal
profile. In the same way that Lewis uses counterpart theory to escape the above
argument for haecceitism that starts from a Max Black world, so the structuralist
can use counterpart theory for properties to escape a similar argument for quid-
ditism that starts from a world with symmetrical laws. One might think that one
can generate a quidditistic difference between worlds from a world with symmetrical
laws. There will be one world with one property and another world with the other,
which worlds will have the same structural description and yet represent different
properties. By utilizing counterpart theory, however, the anti-quidditist can say
that there is one world representing two possibilities, just as with the spheres.
I have two problems with this strategy. First, Lewis-style anti-haecceitism
is compatible with the bundle theory but does not, in itself, supply a way for the
bundle theorist to elude worries about intra-world duplication. For Lewis’s part,
anti-haecceitism can work as he wants it to because he rejects the bundle theory.
Particulars are sums of space-time points, not bundles of universals. Space-time
points are primitively distinct or individuated by their location (which they have
necessarily) in the spatiotemporal manifold, so there is no question about absolute
intra-world duplication, that is duplication that includes sameness of parts: nothing
is duplicated in that sense for Lewis! Combine anti-haecceitism with the traditional
bundle theory, however, and there is still a problem of intra-world duplication. The
traditional bundle theory only has universals, and so cannot use spatiotemporal
points to prevent absolute intra-world duplication. Insisting that there is no problem
for the bundle theory here is just to stick one’s head in the sand. This compatibility
with the bundle theory is instructive because causal structuralism on one construal is
analogous to a bundle theory for properties. So even if Hawthorne’s anti-haecceitist
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suggestion is taken on board, it seems that the causal structuralist may no less face
a problem about symmetrical laws.
The second problem with the strategy is that, because Lewis-style anti-
haecceitism requires counterpart theory if it is to be plausible, the analogy in the
case of properties has some awkward consequences. Lewis’s counterpart theory is
made plausible in part by his insistence that particulars cannot change properties,
even accidental ones, and remain the self-same thing.31 For example, were I to
stand up in ten minutes, strictly speaking something other than me (or a different
temporal part of me than the one sitting right now) would be standing. In the
property case, however, such a view loses some of its plausibility. For instance, the
property of having such-and-such an extension is a property exemplified, albeit ac-
cidentally, by universal so-and-so. However, on a counterpart theoretic conception
of properties, if property A’s extension in one world is different from property B’s
extension in a different world, then property A could not be identical to property B.
On a classical conception of properties as realist universals, this is quite a surprise:
the property of being tall could have had a different extension than it does in fact.
(This is true in part because I might not have been tall, despite the fact that I am
tall.) Furthermore, counterpart theory for properties makes trouble for the standard
motivation for counterpart theory in the case of particulars. Consider a trans-world
case involving two worlds. (An intra-world case involving two times would work as
well, but is just harder to describe.) In the first world, a blue ball and a red ball
are all that exists. In the second, two red balls are all that exists. Focus now on
the property of being red. On the counterpart-theoretic understanding of properties,
the property of being red of the first world is not strictly identical to the property
of being red of the second world. The two properties, after all, have different ex-
tensions. Rather, they are simply counterparts. Call these two properties Red1 and
Red2, respectively. According to the traditional counterpart theorist, the blue ball
from the first world cannot be identical one of the red balls of the second world
because the two exemplify different properties. However, the counterpart theoretic
conception of properties makes this inference so far invalid. Because Red1 is merely
a counterpart of Red2, we have no reason to think that the latter precludes Blue1.
So the blue ball of the first world may well exemplify Blue1 in the second world.
31Lewis makes such an argument in, for example, his (1986) pp. 198-202. Cf. the Leibniz’s Law
argument for perdurantism from the problem of temporary intrinsics in his (1986) pp. 203f.
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The way it would do so is by existing in the first world and being blue there. In
other words, counterpart theory for properties suggests a very natural world index
for the identity of the properties themselves. Thereby, the need for counterpart
theory for particulars is mitigated. (For further emphasis of this point, note that
the second world may well represent both balls as blue under a different counterpart
relation.) So I am not high on the prospects of counterpart theoretic structuralism
as a solution to the problem of symmetrical laws.
On the other hand, most of the problem of symmetrical laws does not stick to
modest causal structuralism. Modest causal structuralism can distinguish properties
that other versions of causal structuralism cannot, and so has no trouble distinguish-
ing putatively distinct properties with symmetrical roles within a world. Consider
a world with (i) as its law book. Modest causal structuralism only quantifies over a
single property in the law-book to identify the causal profile of a particular property.
So, for F1, that causal profile would be: the property such that instances of it cause
instances of F2 and instances of it are caused by instances of F2. That is, F1 satisfies
the open sentence: pX1F2^F2X1q. For F2, that causal profile would be: the prop-
erty such that instances of it are caused by instances of F1 and instances of it cause
instances of F1. That is, F2 satisfies the open sentence: pF1  X2 ^ X2  F1q. These
two roles, and the two open sentences that specify them, are clearly not the same.
This is a distinct advantage of modest causal structuralism’s failure to identify each
property with a cluster of powers identified without reference to other properties, an
advantage that extends even to the sort of world which led Hawthorne to consider
the anti-quidditist-couterpart-thoery combination.32
However, Hawthorne (2001) does point out that there are pairs of law-books
that modest causal structuralism cannot distinguish. For example, modest causal
structuralism cannot distinguish F1  F3,F2  F3 from F1  F3,F4  F3. The causal
roles of F2 and F4 are identical, so modest causal structuralism can make room for
only one possibility here, though there seem to be two. In light of the anti-Humean
argument given above, it strikes me that the modest structuralist has a motivated
reason to reject this pair of possibilities. They can allow that one of the worlds is
possible. However, once the causal profiles of F1 and F3 are settled, they cannot
vary from world to world. This kind of inter-world symmetry ought to be rejected
32One might worry that modest structuralism requires quiddities (as Hawthorne suggests it does).
I invite the reader to hold that thought until they have read §6.2.1.
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by the causal structuralist, but it’s rejection is not ad hoc.
What should we make of the problem of symmetrical laws, of the putative
intuition that there are worlds with symmetrical laws? Maybe we would do well to
consider a concrete case, and to consider whether it strikes us as intuitively possible.
Suppose (per impossibile, given the anti-Humean argument above) that the property
of being spherical could have conferred powers actually conferred by the property
of being cubical. Now, try to conceive a world where the property of being cubical
confers the powers it actually does, where the property of being spherical confers
those powers as well, and in which both properties are exemplified. I confess that
I have extraordinary difficulty conceiving such a world. Spherical things, in such
a world, would not roll smoothly; they would look and feel as though they had
six square sides and eight verticies, etc. To insist that objects with such features
are spherical strains the intellect. I am inclined to think I’m confusing a property
with its name. Further, I am meant to be conceiving a world where it is not only
spherical things that behave in this way, but cubical things as well. Conceiving that
cubical things behave in the relevant way is, of course, no trouble. But there is
nothing to distinguish, save stipulation, the spheres from the cubes. I do not mean
to be manifesting a tacit verificationism. The point is, rather, that there are certain
things that mark off the spheres from the cubes, and that among those things are
behaviors they exhibit under normal conditions.
One might object that we need not give up the anti-Humean argument above
in constructing a world containing two properties with identical causal profiles.
Rather, we need a world with two alien properties that have the same causal profile.
In a moment, I want to question whether we can conceive such a world. But for
now, note that this really just makes things worse for the objector. In not giving
up the anti-Humean argument, the objector commits to the possibility of two prop-
erties that necessarily have the same causal profile. This claim strikes me as rather
implausible, though I have no argument against it. That implausibility suggests,
however, that one ought to accept both halves of the causal structuralist view or
neither, that accepting quidditism but embracing the anti-Humean argument given
above is somehow unstable. Recall the symmetrical law-books that are the only
trouble for modest structuralism. This is another case where one must reject the
anti-Humean argument in order to deny the uniqueness of of a properties causal
essence. In the symmetrical law-books, F1 and F3 must vary their causal profile.
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If it is unstable to accept one half of causal structuralism without accepting the
other, then the anti-Humean argument above is enough to generate the uniqueness
of causal essences as well.
I want to cast doubt on the intuitions supporting symmetrical laws by consid-
ering God’s creative capacities. Consider again an intuition that an alien-property
world might involve two properties with the same causal profile. Now imagine God
trying to create such a world. Because the two properties have precisely the same
causes, if God intended to instantiate one of the properties, he would thereby intend
to instantiate the other as well. But suppose God only intends to instantiate one
instance of either of the properties, and suppose he is successful, that only one prop-
erty instance is created. It seems he would have no way to know which property he
would thereby have instantiated. He could not wait to see what effects the property
instance had, for the effects would be the same regardless of which property has been
instantiated. Nor could he consult modal space to see how the property instance
would behave were it in other worlds, for the causal profiles of the two properties
are necessarily the same. While it may be acceptable for humans to be embroiled in
skeptical scenarios, God certainly could not be. I, therefore, am led to doubt that
such a world is possible. And I believe this doubt ought to stick even if one denies
that God exists, or even that he could.
The point is that it is difficult to know what it is one is meant to conceive
or intuit when one conceives a symmetrical law world or intuits that such a world
is possible. It cannot be that we are able to write down a law-book that would
hold only in such a world; such a writing down is no doubt possible to do. I cannot
move beyond that depth, however. One way to emphasize this issue, and hopefully
to tap the reader’s intuition that I am right about this, is to consider the question:
why is it that, when one goes to conceive a symmetrical law world or intuits that
such a world is possible, one thinks one is conceiving of a world that must be
described as a symmetrical law world or intuiting the possibility of a symmetrical
law world, rather than conceiving of a world with a redundant law-book or intuiting
the possibility of a redundant law-book? By a redundant law-book, I mean a law-
book that gives multiple names to the same property. So, for example, consider the
law-book F1 F2,F1 F3. What reason is there to think that F2 and F3 are distinct
properties? This question is the one that I have trouble answering. Nothing about
my intuitions or conceivings dictates, when I conceive the truth of this law-book or
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intuit that it could have been true, that these two properties are distinct. Only if
they are distinct, however, is there a problem of symmetrical laws.
Even if one shares my trouble with law-books like the one mentioned in the
previous paragraph, one might have an easier time with law-books like this one:
F1  F3,F2  F3,F1&F2  F4. As Hawthorne (2001) notes, it seems to be “crucial to
this structure” that F1 and F2 are distinct.33 But this is not obvious to me. It is
not obvious in large part because I cannot think of any set of properties that have
unique causal powers when co-instantiated. The causal powers of different sorts of
properties simply do not seem to interact in the relevant ways. For example, mass,
color, and shape properties do not have the sorts of causal powers that combine in
the way required by Hawthorne’s problematic law-books. Co-instantiation of these
properties does not produce unique causal powers in the right sort of way. Now,
I can think of properties that, when co-instantiated with themselves or with other
determinates of the same determinable, have causal powers that they do not have
when they are instantiated alone. Consider mass properties. Suppose two objects,
both with a mass of one kilogram, are placed side by side. Together, these objects
have a total mass of two kilograms. And together, the masses of the two objects exert
a greater gravitational force than they do individually. So, let the property of being
one kilogram be both F1 and F2 in Hawthorne’s law-book. When co-instantiated
with itself, the property of being one kilogram has a causal power different from when
it is not co-instantiated with itself.34 Therefore, it is not crucial to Hawthorne’s law-
book that F1 and F2 are distinct. This sort of causal law, however, is simply not
problematic for causal structuralism.35 If all the law-books like the one Hawthorne
supplies involve these kinds of “additive” properties, then these kinds of symmetrical
33p. 224.
34I do not want to assume unrestricted composition here, in large part because I find it implausi-
ble. So there is nothing in this situation that exemplifies the property of being two kilograms. It is
the collective causal powers of two instances of the property of being one kilogram that is relevant
in this situation.
35Indeed, this sort of law is just a special case of the sorts of laws one might expect to govern what
we might call “plural” causation. I have in mind here, for example, the power of a group of people
to lift a piano, the power of a group of musical instruments and musicians to produce a particular
harmony or a very loud volume of sound, etc. Hawthorne’s law-book (where F1  F2) is just a special
case because there are two instances of the same property, which needn’t always occur in cases of
plural causation/laws. For example, imagine two trumpets producing precisely the same volume
and pitch of sound that together produce a volume that neither trumpet could achieve individually.
This would obey the strictures placed by Hawthorne’s law-book without making trouble for causal
structuralism.
131
law-books are not a problem for causal structuralism. (To be clear, this is not the
sense of ‘co-instantiation’ that Hawthorne has in mind.) At the very least, until
someone supplies an example of two distinct properties that show up in a law-book
like Hawthorne’s, we have no counter-example to causal structuralism. We can, to
repeat an earlier point, write down law-books with symmetries. But in order to
make trouble for causal structuralism, one must argue that we ought to think that
two property names occupying symmetrical positions in a particular law-book have
distinct referents. This latter constraint has not been achieved.
Here is one last example to try to hammer home the point that symmetrical
law worlds are problematic. If symmetrical law worlds are possible, then there ought
to be a world like the following, which I will call a ‘nominal-realist world’. Each
property instance in a nominal-realist world is an instance of a distinct property.
For example, every instance of red is an instance of a different red universal, each
of which confers the same causal powers. This situation is realistic because prop-
erty instances are complexes, and in principle, each universal could have multiple
instances; in this world, multiple instances of the same universal simply never occur.
This situation is nominalistic because two “red” things do not share (in one’s fa-
vored sense) a universal in virtue of their both being red. Let us impose the further
stipulation that in a nominal-realist world, the sense in which the situation is nom-
inalistic does not extend beyond the first level of universals. That is, all the reds
share a single universal (the property of being a red?) in virtue of which they are
reds. To deny this would be to continue the nominalism infinitely up the hierarchy.
That is, all the reds would exemplify a different property of being a red, and so on.
Now, let a “quasi-duplicate of world w” be a world w1 that is exactly like w except
for being nominal-realist. For example, let w1 be a world in which the only two
particulars are two white dots, a1 and b1. In w1, a exemplifies the property of being
white and the property of being a dot, as does b. Let w2 be a quasi-duplicate of w1.
In w2, then, two white dots exist as well, a2 and b2. In w2, however, a2 exemplifies
the property of being whitea and the property of being a dota, whereas b2 exemplifies
the property of being whiteb and the property of being a dotb. The respective prop-
erties confer the same causal powers, as per nominalistic realism. If symmetrical
law worlds are possible, then there are quasi-duplicates of every “normal” world.36
36We can also construct other non-normal duplicates where arbitrarily many things of a given
type share a single universal, and all the others of that type have nothing in common. Or where
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So what? I maintain that an ontological theory that leaves room for nominal-
realist worlds—like w2 or a quasi-duplicate of the actual world—is inadequate be-
cause such worlds are not possible.37 What is unsettling about a nominal-realist
world is that it appears to have a layer of ontology that is only imposed by theoriz-
ing about the ontology of that world. That is, a description of a world does not tend
to require talk about the world’s universals. What is required is a description of the
particulars, their distribution, and their qualities. The ontology of the world is then
constructed using one’s favored theory. As such, I find myself unable to distinguish
a conceiving of of a nominal-realist world (say, of a quasi-duplicate of the actual
world) from my conceiving of a normal world (the actual world) while imposing
a bizarre ontological theory on it. Likewise for the intuition that such a world is
possible.38 More importantly, a world should not be described using nominalistic
realism because nominalistic realism is false. Not only does this dissertation assume
that ordinary realism about universals is true, but nominalistic realism is inferior
to both ordinary realism and ordinary nominalism precisely because it is needlessly
complicated.
Because the possibility of nominal-realist worlds is entailed by the possibility
of symmetrical laws, one must either restrict the sorts of symmetrical law worlds
one is willing to countenance or deny altogether that symmetrical law worlds are
possible. I can see no principled way to do the restriction, so it seems to me the only
viable route is to deny the possibility of symmetrical law worlds altogether. But
no matter, because I believe that every symmetrical law world is a nominal-realist
world, or something near enough. Every world with symmetrical laws will have two
versions of the “same” property, in the sense that the property of being whitea and
the property of being whiteb are the same in w2. This should not be hard to see:
all it took to generate the claim that there are two versions of the property of being
each pair or triple and so on of a given type share a single universal, but where the pair or triples
and so on have nothing in common. And so on. Then one can construct analogues of quasi-
duplicates of normal worlds. One could further iterate this process. All because there could have
been symmetrical laws.
37One may be inclined to object: “But you just described, in a perfectly consistent manner, what
the world would be like. How, then, can you deny that such a world is possible.” I believe I can
describe nominalist worlds as well, but I deny their possibility. I do not deny nominalism because
I think it internally incoherent, but because I think, on balance, it is not as good of a theory as
realism. Likewise in this case.
38This situation is exactly like the one I find myself in when I try to conceive of a purely nomi-
nalistic world.
133
white was the claim that there are two distinct properties that confer all the causal
powers that the property of being white confers.
I therefore have a very general worry about the conceivings of or putative
intuitions about these worlds with symmetrical laws. I have pointed out some un-
palatable consequences of accepting such intuitions if they involve properties that
are exemplified in the actual world. I have also argued for causal essences on the
basis of modal intuition, and we have seen that this argument mitigates against the
standard intuitions about worlds with symmetrical laws, namely, worlds in which
an actually exemplified property has a different causal profile than the one it in fact
does, and where that causal profile matches the causal profile of a different actually
exemplified property. For my part, I find the modal principles needed to generate
the argument for causal essences more plausible than the intuitions about worlds
with symmetrical laws. Alternatively, one can keep the argument for causal essences
and claim simply that it is possible for two alien properties to have the same causal
profile. I have given reasons to doubt the viability of this strategy as well.
Maybe, however, one thinks there are worlds with symmetrical laws on the
basis of an argument that begins with certain modal principles and concludes to the
claim that a symmetrical law world is possible. Presumably such an argument must
begin with a principle of recombination. One such principle is Lewis’s “patchwork”
principle mentioned above in connection with the Change Principle. Again, the
patchwork principle says, roughly, that anything can coexist with anything else.39
In this context, unlike in the earlier context involving this principle, I assume that
the patchwork principle is meant only to cover particulars and the distribution of
qualities over the particulars, and need not extend to the distribution of qualities
over the qualities themselves. The question here is how one could derive from the
patchwork principle the conclusion that the laws could have been symmetrical. I
contend that one cannot do this without assuming the truth of Humeanism. Only
if one thinks that the laws supervene on the distribution of particulars and the
distribution of qualities over the particulars would anything about the laws follow
from the patchwork principle. The patchwork principle simply does not constrain
the laws. Assuming the truth of Humeanism in this context is dialectically suspect,
39Incidentally, in Lewis’s considered system, the principle should really read that counterparts of
anything do coexist (quantifiers wide open) with counterparts of anything else (where coexistence
and counterparthood are reflexive).
134
however, because one of the points at issue here is whether the laws supervene on
the distribution of properties at a given world. Thus, an argument that begins with
the patchwork principle and concludes to the possibility of symmetrical laws would
beg the question.
Another principle of recombination, one that does make trouble for the causal
structuralist, is a principle of recombination for laws (or law-books). One plausible
principle—probably the only principled one available—states that any consistent
law-book is the law-book of a possible world. One might think that it follows
immediately from this that worlds with symmetrical laws are possible, for there
clearly are some consistent law-books that supply symmetrical laws. This is a little
too fast, however. First, note that the property names involved in the law-book
cannot have rigid reference because of the anti-Humean result established above.
For suppose the law-book of the actual world includes the conjunct F1  F2, and
that F1 does not appear in any other conjunct. It follows from these facts and the
anti-Humean argument that, if ‘F1’ has rigid reference, that law-books including
a conjunct like F1  F3 could not be true (supposing that F2 , F3, which we can
stipulate for our purposes). It would be better, when stating the relevant principle
of recombination, to use “open” law-books—law-books that deploy variables rather
than names—and to leave open the assignment of variables to properties.40 Once
one makes this adjustment, however, nothing about the possibility of symmetrical
laws follows from the adjusted principle of recombination for open law-books. So, for
instance, the open law-book X1 X3,X2 X3 must be the law-book of some world,
it is an open question whether X1  X2. The causal structuralist can simply insist
that such identities hold wherever there is a symmetrical open law-book. Given
the forgoing discussion, such a move is not out of line. As such, this principle of
recombination is not a problem for the causal structuralist. I can think of no other
recombination principles that might entail that symmetrical laws are possible, so I
conclude that no argument that symmetrical laws are possible is likely to succeed.
The upshot of the forgoing is that there is much trouble with the postulation
of worlds with symmetrical laws. As such, the burden on the anti-structuralist noted
at the beginning of this section cannot be discharged. The simpler, structuralist
40Of course, one could just leave open the assignment of names to properties, but it is somewhat
more intuitive to have rigid names and variable variables. If one would rather allow the reference
of names to vary, one can adjust the rest of what I say in the obvious ways. The points still go
through.
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theory of the actual-world properties should not be revised because of the putative
modal intuitions about symmetrical laws, and should therefore be extended to alien
properties as well. The resources of anti-quidditist causal structuralism are sufficient
to generate all the modal space one must generate. So we have an argument for the
second half of causal structuralism, namely, that the causal essence of properties are
unique.
5.4 The Problem of Necessary Laws
We have seen an argument that causal structuralism is true, an argument that I
believe relies only on very plausible premises. However, some believe that causal
structuralism has a rather implausible consequence. The problem is that causal
structuralism (putatively) entails that the laws of nature are necessary—that is,
that causal structuralism entails law necessitarianism. The entailment is meant to
be straightforward. The causal essences of properties are given by their role in the
causal economy of the world, as specified by open sentences generated from the law
book in the way outlined above. Thus, if the law book changes, then the properties
change, since the causal structuralist says that the causal role of a property is an
essence of that property. Different role, different essence, so different property.
This straightforward argument is too fast: causal structuralism does not
entail that the laws of nature are necessary; it is compatible with the claim that the
laws of nature are contingent. However, this compatibility is only available if one
accepts the Principle of Instantiation—the claim that the only properties that exist
are those that are exemplified. For then, there simply are no alien properties. Non-
existents, alien properties or no, cannot have a causal profile. Thus, there aren’t any
laws involving alien properties, since the laws ride piggyback on the causal profiles
of properties. Even given the Principle of Instantiation, causal structuralism does
constrain the possibility space in this sense: where the laws of nature are different,
the properties that exist (are exemplified) must be different. That is, in a world
where the laws of nature differ from the actual laws, the intersection of the set of
properties that exist (are exemplified) in the actual world and the set of properties
that exist (are exemplified) in the alternative world is the null set.41
41This is quick and dirty and, as such, inaccurate. The inaccuracies will be corrected below. The
important upshot for my purposes here will nonetheless stand: causal structrualism constrains the
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For those, like me, who deny the Principle of Instantiation and think that
properties are necessary existents, things are not so simple. While the laws governing
alien properties are never actualized in the actual world, they nonetheless hold
true in the actual world. Alien properties have their causal profiles in the actual
world, though their causal powers are never actualized. A similar line to the one
considered in the preceding paragraph is available, however. Say that a world is
“governed” by a law just in case, at some time or other in the world, a cause-effect
sequence occurs, which sequence involves instances of properties related by the law
in question. Worlds that are governed by the same laws as those that govern the
actual world are “nomologically possible” worlds. Worlds governed by different
laws are “nomologically impossible” worlds. These stipulations are, I believe, quite
close to the inchoate notions regarding the nomologically possible and impossible.
Nomologically impossible worlds are worlds where the actual laws do not govern,
despite that the actual laws are true there. So, while this line does not, strictly
speaking, avoid law necessitarianism, it does allow a division of modal space into
the worlds that are governed by our laws and worlds that are not, and that is enough
to maintain the intuitive distinction between the nomologically impossible and the
metaphysically impossible.42
This response can be extended to mitigate some unease in a way similar
to the way which Kripke (1980) (et al.) attempts to do for unease created by a
posteriori identities.43 The Kripkean strategy in the case of, for example, water’s
being H2O is to say that the intuition that water could have been something other
than H2O is really an intuition that something other than H2O (water) could be
qualitatively indistinguishable from water. In the case of law necessitarianism, the
strategy is to say that an intuition that some given property could have conferred
different causal powers is really an intuition that some other property could have
conferred different causal powers while being an epistemic duplicate of the given
property. For example, suppose one had an intuition that one would describe as
the intuition that there is a possible world where negatively charged objects attract
one another, that the property of being negatively charged confers on its bearers
the power to attract negatively charged objects. The Kripkean response is that one
possibility space in a way that anti-structuralist views need not.
42Cf. Fine (2002). In his terminology, I have provided here a way for the causal structuralist to
maintain the distinction between “metaphysical” and “natural” necessity.
43Cf. Shoemaker (1998).
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is misdescribing the intuition that some property not identical to but an epistemic
duplicate of from the property of being negatively charged confers on its bearers the
power to attract other objects that exemplify that property.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005) helpfully criticizes this strategy; it will not do as
it stands. Schaffer pushes two reasons to think that the extension of the Krip-
kean strategy to this case is unwarranted. First, Schaffer points out that claims
about identity are involved with the scientific essentialist claims regarding which
the Kripkean misdescription strategy is deployed, whereas there is no identity in-
volved with the causal structuralist claims. Since identities are necessary, there must
be something wrong with the intuition that water could have been XYZ, since water
just is H2O. But the law necessitarian claim does not involve identity; rather, the
law necessitarian claims that necessarily, certain properties are governed by certain
laws. Independent motivation is needed for thinking that these governance claims
are necessary, and unless that motivation is found, the Kripkean strategy will stand
unmotivated. Schaffer offers a parody:
Imagine a crazy theorist who insists that it is metaphysically impossible
for there to be a talking donkey. When faced with the objection that
one can perfectly well conceive of a talking donkey, he replies: “Well,
that is just a misdescription of a different scenario, in which some merely
donkey-like beast is doing the talking.” It seems to me that the proper
reply here is: what (independent) reason do you have for thinking that
this is a misdescription? I offer the analogous reply to the necessitarian.
((2005) p. 11, emphasis in the original)
But I have supplied the independent motivation in the form of an argument for
causal structuralism, which entails law necessitarianism.44 So this reason for un-
dercutting the misdescription strategy is ineffective. The causal structuralist is not
like Schaffer’s “crazy” theorist, the extension of the Kripkean strategy not entirely
unmotivated.
Second, and better, Schaffer argues that epistemic duplication is not straight-
forwardly available in the causal structuralist case. Here is Schaffer:
44Schaffer is aware that Shoemaker (1998) recognizes this issue, and he briefly considers the
Shoemaker argument for causal structuralism discussed above (as Hawthorne (2001) reads him).
Cf. Schaffer’s (2005) fn. 16. The trouble Schaffer finds with Shoemaker’s argument is addressed in
my new(ish) argument for causal structuralism.
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The Kripkean maneuver presupposes that water and thwater are super-
ficially similar in the sense of being epistemic duplicates. But charge
and schmarge cannot be epistemic duplicates, by the necessitarian’s own
lights. For the...necessitarian, properties are holistically interdefined in
terms of their web of (nomic or causal) interrelations. For instance,
charge is defined in terms of a disposition to exert force, force is defined
in terms of a its connection to charge and its disposition to accelerate
mass, etc. Consequence: a world without charge cannot have any other
actual properties like force or mass (it may at best have “quorce” and
“schmass”). In general, in a world with schmarge, all properties must
be alien properties. But what remains of epistemic duplication? These
worlds have no common content. Indeed, given that epistemic proper-
ties like believing and perceiving are in the causal web, a world without
charge cannot have belief or perception or any other property that might
serve as a basis for epistemic duplication. ((2005) pp. 11-2, emphasis in
the original)
This problem is real; no obvious reply is available. However, I think the causal
structuralist has some resources at her disposal to fight back.
To start, the law necessitarian can question whether holistic interdefinability
entails that necessarily, each exemplified property is defined in terms of every other
exemplified property.45 Consider a world with four properties and the following
law book: F1  F2,F2  F1,F3  F4,F4  F3. It seems to me that, while F1 and F2
are holistically interdefined and F3 and F4 are holistically interdefined, neither F1
nor F2 are interdefined with F3 or F4, and neither F3 nor F4 are interdefined with
F1 or F2. As such, while F1 and F2 could not exist without the other, nonetheless
they could exist in a world where they are the only two properties or where other
properties than F3 and F4 exist so long, of course, as it is stipulated that F1 and F2 do
not causally interact with the other properties. Therefore, properties that could be
exemplified (at the same time) in the same world need not be interdefined. Thus,
from the fact that properties are holistically interdefined it does not follow that
necessarily, each exemplified property is defined in terms of every other exemplified
45I have put what follows in terms that assume the Principle of Instantiation. I hope the dis-
cussion regarding that principle above will make clear how to translate these claims without that
assumption.
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property. There may be utterly distinct webs of properties coexisting in a single
world.
This victory, however, may be pyrrhic. In Schaffer’s terms, the real question
is whether holistic interdefinability entails that “in a world with schmarge, all prop-
erties must be alien properties.” That is, we must wonder whether all the actual
properties are interdefined. For the only way the straightforward possibility outlined
above is relevant to epistemic duplication is if mental properties are in a different
causal web than physical properties. Placing the mental and physical in different
causal webs is problematic for obvious reasons having to do with mental causation,
and surely no defense of law necessitarianism wisely rests on epiphenomenalism.
I am not confident about how much to make of this issue, whether it is a
particularly deep problem for the strategy I am here considering. To see why, con-
sider the following analogy. There might have schmatter, nomologically impossible
(in the sense outlined above) stuff that plays something like the role matter does in
our world. Schmatter is stuff the fundamental quantities/atoms of which exemplify
only alien properties but that out of which things could be composed. Could one
make a mountain out of schmatter? I don’t see any reason to think that one could
not. Likewise, one could have genuine clouds made out of twater, so it seems to
me.46 But mountains and clouds causally interact with matter and water, and so
must be capable of causally interacting with schmatter and twater. Mountains and
clouds are on a different “level” of reality than more “fundamental” physical things.
I do not have a good story to tell about the way in which the causal powers of
mountains aren’t excluded by the causal powers of the stuff of which mountains are
made. But in a probabilistic setting (like our actual setting), a story about how
higher level property instances (an instance of the property of being a mountain)
cause lower level effects (this atom’s behaving just so when acted on by that atom)
by increasing the probability that the latter occur relative to a scenario where the
higher level property instances are not present or are not causally relevant (where
this and that atom are isolated from the mountain) does not seem implausible.
If this is right, then the causal webs of mountains and clouds can be isolated
from that of the fundamental physical things in a certain sense, despite that these
46Compare Putnam’s (1975) (and others’) contention that twater flows from the taps, runs in
the rivers, and fills the lakes of Twin Earth. These claims about mountains and clouds should not
be confused with the different and much more controversial claim that this mountain or this cloud
could have been made out of schmatter.
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two levels causally interact. One way to accomplish this is to construe the stuff
out of which things are composed as a background condition such that inter-level
interactions are in general conditioned by the natures of the stuff at the respective
interacting levels. For example, a mountain’s being made of matter rather than
schmatter can be construed as a background condition that constrains the sorts of
causes and effects that the mountain can have. A mountain made of schmatter
cannot have mattery effects, and vice versa. A law, then, might be something like
this: (in the relevant conditions) mountains, if made of schmatter, probabilistically
cause schmatter particles to behave in such and such a manner and, if made of
matter, probabilistically cause matter particles to behave in this and that man-
ner.47 Similarly, floors made of matter support chairs made of matter, and floors
made of schmatter support chairs made of schmatter. As a result, floors made of
matter (schmatter) have certain effects on more fundamental things made of mat-
ter (schmatter). In particular, a particular floor made of matter (schmatter), on a
which a chair is sitting, causes carbon atoms (scharbon atoms) that are part of the
chair to maintain a certain position by exerting a force that counteracts the force
of gravity (schmavity?). While the floors to chairs laws can be stated in the usual
way, the floors to atoms laws must be relativized to accommodate the makeup of
the floor and of the atoms. The makeup of the floor and the atoms is a background
condition relevant to determining whether or which part of the law is relevant to
the given situation. If mental properties stand to fundamental physical properties
in something like the way the property of being a mountain stands to the property
of being an atom—that is, if mental states are on a different level than physical
states—then one can claim that mental properties could be exemplified in a physi-
cally alien world without sacrificing their causal influence on the physical realm in
the actual world. Whether matter or schmatter is present is a background condi-
tion relevant to determining whether mental states will have mattery or schmattery
effects. It seems to me that this way of thinking of mental properties is plausible.
47The probabilistic aspect of this story is, strictly speaking, not necessary to the point. This can
be seen simply by noting that one can remove the two occurrences of ‘probabilistically’ from the
example law given here without upsetting the point I am trying to make. However, the probabilistic
setting helps us avoid the pitfall of thinking of causation as occurring only when there is contact
between the thing doing the causing and the thing being affected. Thinking of causation in a
way that requires contact tends to supply red herrings to discussions about inter-level causation
(cf. a good chunk of the mental causation literature). It is for this reason that I have introduced
probabilistic laws.
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If all that can be made to work, then one can claim that while mental prop-
erties are interdefined with physical properties, it does not follow that mental prop-
erties cannot exist in physically alien worlds. One is forced to claim that mental
states are interdefined not only with physical properties but with those physically
alien properties as well. But there is no empirical reason to think this is false (un-
less one thinks that mental properties just are physical properties, a controversial(!)
claim I don’t intend to take up here). Even if the particular story I have suggested
turns out to be implausible, it still remains true that there is some sense in which
mental properties and physical properties occupy different levels of reality. I sus-
pect that an adequate understanding of this relationship will open the possibility
that mental properties be interdefined with both physical properties and physically
alien properties. Mutual interdefinition of that sort is all that is needed to salvage
the notion of epistemic duplication. Thus, the Kripkean redescription strategy has
not been ruled out; the matter of epistemic duplication is not so simple as Schaffer
makes it out to be.
At this stage, I want to make an important dialectical point. I gave an
argument for causal structuralism and noted that it entails, in a certain sense,
that the laws of nature are necessary. The objector claims that worlds with our
properties but without the actual laws are possible, and I have claimed that the
Kripkean redescription strategy can explain away the intuitions about these possible
worlds. In light of a problem with the redescription strategy, I have offered a way
to understand the causal influence of mental properties that allows for epistemic
duplication even in the face of Schaffer’s objections to the contrary. The dialectical
point is this: I do not need to give the One True Story about mental properties and
their causal influence in order to escape Schaffer’s worry in the way outlined above.
I simply need to provide a way to understand the claim that our mental states
are both causally efficacious and can be exemplified in worlds with alien physical
properties.48
Furthermore, suppose the Kripkean redescription strategy fails. So long as
one is a law necessitarian because one embraces the anti-Humean argument given
above, all that has been shown so far is that we have conflicting modal intuitions.
To this point, no reason has been given to think that the contingentist intuitions
48Borrowing a distinction from the literature on the problem of evil, I need only a “defense,” not
a “theodicy.” Cf. Tooley (2007).
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are more plausible than the intuitions I used to make the anti-Humean argument,
nor that one ought to keep the contingentist intuitions rather than those I used to
make the anti-Humean argument. In a moment, I will turn to considerations that
press on the contingentist, both directly, by challenging her position, and indirectly,
by challenging the basis for her contingentism. Through these challenges, I hope
to complete the case that we ought to keep the anti-Humean intuitions and throw
out the contingentist intuitions. As such, the Kripkean redescription strategy is not
necessary to complete a defense of causal structuralism; it would simply be an added
bonus if it can be pulled off. I have done my best to make the case than it can be.
The objector can push further against the law necessitarian. The preceding
response to the problem of necessary laws (whether or not that response involves the
Kripkean redescription strategy) secures nomologically impossible but metaphysi-
cally possible worlds via an appeal to alien properties. But alien properties are
not needed to characterize the world completely. A theory without alien properties
is simpler and, thus, to be desired. I reply that this objection misses its target.
Causal structuralism is neutral with respect to the possibility of alien properties,
and I believe a theory must accommodate modal truths if it is to characterize the
world completely. Therefore, alien properties are needed to characterize the world
completely. Since alien properties are compatible with causal structuralism, there is
no conflict. The objector will continue that I have already sacrificed modal intuition
by restricting the kinds of combinations of actual properties that are allowed and
by restricting the possibility of actual properties being governed by different laws.
My appeal to modal intuition, the objector continues, is therefore unjustified. I
reply that I have not given up the epistemological view that modal intuition counts
as evidence. In fact, I have argued for causal structuralism on the basis of modal
intuitions. What I have claimed is that we have unstable modal intuitions in this
particular case, and I have begun to make a case that the intuitions supporting
causal structuralism ought to be kept, while the ones supporting Humeanism ought
to be rejected. All this is compatible with the claim that we ought to keep what-
ever modal intuitions that we have so long as they don’t conflict with other, more
justified views of ours.49 The intuitions about alien properties and nomologically
49This is precisely the line of one of, if not the most outspoken and successful contemporary
defender of (modal) intuition—George Bealer. For example, in his (2002), Bealer claims,
The set-theoretic paradoxes establish an important moral: namely, that intuition can
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impossible worlds can be kept by the causal structuralist, and so ought to be kept
(barring other, unrelated reasons to reject them).50
The causal structuralist and law necessitarian may also push back on the
contingentist. It is wildly implausible to think that any property could confer any
power, that the link between properties and laws is utterly unconstrained. The
property of being red could not confer the power to repel negatively charged objects,
or the power to roll smoothly downhill. (This is true despite that it is certainly
possible that only red objects repel negatively charged objects, or that only red
objects roll smoothly downhill. There is a strong intuition that such worlds would
be one in which there are merely accidentally true generalizations that red objects
repel negatively charged ones, or that red objects roll smoothly downhill.) This
intuition against bizarre laws is much stronger, moreover, than the intuition that
the property of being red could confer the power to reflect wavelengths of light other
than those red objects reflect in fact. Similarly, it is implausible to say that the
property of being square could have conferred the powers that the property of being
red in fact confers. For, if it had, it would seem that the property of being square
would have been a color. The property of being square could not have been a color.
This strategy can be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be deployed as
a way to undermine the credibility of the intuitions that properties could confer
different powers than the ones they do in fact. This is the weaker interpretation
of the strategy. According to this weaker strategy, what we really have here are
be fallible, and that a priori belief is not unrevisable. Infallibilism and unrevisability
have often been red herrings in modal epistemology. An alternative tradition—from
Plato to Go¨del—recognizes that a priori justification is fallible and holistic, relying
respectively on dialectic and theory construction.
I am invoking dialectic and theory construction here to defend the keeping of the causal stucturalist
and anti-Humean intuitions as opposed to their contingentist, Humean cousins.
This point is relevant as well to the discussion of the problem of symmetrical laws in the previous
section. While I grant the initial plausibility of the intuitions about worlds with symmetrical laws,
I deployed both a critical examination of them and other intuitions in an attempt to undercut their
force.
50Thus the fundamental flaw in Korman (2005) is uncovered. I make no claims about whether
Korman is right about the extant discussions and defenses of law necessitarianism, only that he
missed the possibility that law necessitarians respect the evidential weight of modal intuition while
nonetheless accepting that they must deny, at the end of the day, some of the claims to which
those intuitions point. I have tried to make a case for accepting the intuitions that converge
on necessitarianism (via causal structuralism) and for denying the intuitions that point to the
contingency of laws. Sidelle (2002) (cf. p. 311) recognizes this issue, though we disagree about
which intuitions to keep.
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unstable intuitions. One is then forced to choose which ones we ought to keep. Given
that, to my mind, the intuitions regarding radical law-change are stronger than the
intuitions about the possibility of law-change, I choose to keep the intuitions against
radical law-change. Second, this strategy may be deployed as a direct problem for
contingentists. Since we have intuitions to the effect that properties cannot confer
just any power, the contingentist owes not only an account of where the limits on
variation lie, but also an explanation of why they lie where they do. This is the
stronger interpretation of the strategy. No such account is forthcoming, nor is it
easy to see how such an account could be forthcoming, given Humeanism. But this
simply leaves us with an incredible theory of the relationship between properties
and powers, given the strength of the intuitions against radical law-change.
I want to close this discussion by pointing out two potential avenues of reply
to the problem of necessary laws (if one accepts it as a problem) that I am not
sure how to evaluate. The first is only a partial reply, for reasons that will emerge.
The second is more thoroughgoing. The first potential avenue of reply exploits the
presence of constants in the laws of nature and suggests that the values of these
constants could change without a change in the laws. This would allow a sort
of “variation” in the laws that would capture what are, to my mind, the clearest
intuitions about the possibility of “different” laws. To make the idea clear, consider
the law of gravity: F  Gm1m2r2 , where F is the magnitude of the gravitational force
between two objects o1 and o2, m1 the mass of o1, m2 the mass of o2, r the distance
between o1 and o2, and G the “gravitational constant.” The causal structuralist
could claim that the property of having mass n (for particular n) confers on its
bearers the power to gravitationally attract objects of mass m with a force equal
to Gmnmmr2 , where G is construed as a variable rather than a constant. The value of
G, on this view, is part of the background conditions relevant to the actualization
of the power conferred on an object by its mass property, much like the way the
presence of light in a world is part of the background conditions relevant to the
actualization of a red object’s power to reflect light of a particular wavelength. The
causal structuralist that takes this line is allowed to say that the force of gravitational
attraction can vary between worlds even when objects of the same mass at the same
distance are involved.
Interestingly, Sidelle (2002) goes the other way with this: he takes the puta-
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tive variability of the constants to deliver the contingency of the laws.51 I certainly
don’t want to reduce this discussion to a quibble about proper way to understand
‘law,’ but I do want to note that the issue at stake here is the extent to which
causal structuralism, a claim about properties and the causal powers they confer,
entails that the laws cannot change. The point I made in the previous paragraph
questions whether causal structuralism entails that the causal powers conferred by
properties must be specified so as to include values for the constants one finds in
the “laws.” I see no reason to think causal structuralism entails that much. In-
sofar as that is right, causal structuralism does not entail the laws, but only some
other things—“law-schemas,” if you will—where the values for the constants are left
open, that is, are construed as variables. If we take law-schemas to be laws, causal
structuralism would entail the necessity of the laws but will be compatible with the
denial of necessitarianism as it is usually construed. If we reserve the label ‘law’ for
law-schemas “completed” with constants in the place of the relevant variables, then
it remains to be shown that causal structuralism entails the laws (at least, so goes
the present reply). To settle this issue, one will have to consider whether the causal
powers conferred by properties must include values for the constants. Sidelle does
not address this question, nor does anyone else of whom I am aware. The causal
structuralist would do well to resist the claim that values for the constants must be
included.
The second, more thoroughgoing potential avenue of reply charges the ob-
jector with a kind of misdescription so far overlooked.52 I propose that we grant
the claim that the worlds that make trouble for law necessetarianism are ones the
objector describes as involving actual-world properties but different laws. Since
the actual-world laws are probabilistic, the actual-world properties are governed by
probabilistic laws. So it is compatible with law necessetarianism that actual-world
properties have causes and effects that are not “normal,” that are extraordinarily
unlikely. Here, then, is the reply: admit that there are worlds where all the causes
and effects are abnormal, but insist that is inappropriate to describe these worlds
as one where the laws are different. Such a world is compatible with the laws of
nature as they are, of course. And the laws, unless we are begging the question in
favor of Humeanism, cannot be assumed to be given by the intraworld distribution
51Cf. p. 313.
52Though similar issues arose in the discussion of the No-Change Principle, above.
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of properties. Considered in itself, then, such a world is apt to cause confusion: it
could lend itself to a description according to which the laws are other than they
actually are. Given what else we know, however, we ought to describe such a world
as one that is abnormal (and exceedingly far away). The objector has simply mis-
described her intuition. She had an intuition about a distribution of properties, and
chose to describe that intuition as one with non-actual laws. It is the move from the
distribution to the non-actual laws that is not warranted in a probabilistic setting.
In this chapter, I have mounted a defense of causal structuralism. First, I
gave an anti-Humean argument, one that, is sound, establishes that properties that
confer causal powers have causal essences. This is one half of causal structuralism.
I then mounted a defense of the other half of causal structuralism, namely the claim
that the causal essences of those properties are unique. This required a defense of
the claim that worlds with symmetrical laws are not possible. Lastly, I considered
the problem of necessary laws, and argued that it was not so big of a problem
as people have often claimed. In the next chapter, I turn to a consideration of
the way that causal structuralism relates to the universal-particular distinction; in
particular, I claim that causal structuralism goes part of the way toward establishing
that universals are identical if indiscernible.
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Chapter 6
Putting the Pieces Together
There is another way of distinguishing between universals and par-
ticulars. Among particulars exact likeness is not identity. ... Among
universals it is otherwise.
—John Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter
The time has come to argue directly for the central claim of this disserta-
tion: universals but not particulars are identical if indiscernible, and the universal-
particular distinction can be vindicated using this asymmetry. The resources to
purchase this conclusion have, for the most part, been mined in what has come
before.
6.1 Particulars and the Identity of Indiscernibles
It has already emerged in Chapter 4 that particulars are not identical if indiscernible;
that is, particulars do not satisfy The Principle. There, I argued first that properties
of identity—properties like that of being identical to Jamie—are not natural, and
therefore are not relevant to settling questions about indiscernibility and the truth
of The Principle, in the senses I am about. Second, I argued that the possibility
of Black Worlds—worlds symmetrical about some qualitative axis—showed that
indiscernible particulars are possible, and that these possibilities are indeed relevant
to actual world particulars. From the possibility of indiscernible particulars it follows
that actual-world particulars are not identical if indiscernible. And third, I argued
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against a way of construing the bundle theory, which construal appeals to “linkage”,
by arguing that such a construal implicitly introduces non-natural properties, in the
form of monadic relational properties whose canonical description involves the name
of a particular, into the bundles that such a bundle theory identifies with ordinary
particulars. As such, not only is such a bundle theory at odds with a basic bundle
theoretic commitment—namely, to a sparse theory of universals—but The Principle
is still false on such a theory. I concluded, then, that particulars do not satisfy The
Principle.
That conclusion, however, only achieves one third of the stated aim of this
dissertation. The other two thirds are made up by two other claims. First, there is
the claim that universals are identical if indiscernible, that they do satisfy The Prin-
ciple in the sense defended in Chapter 3. Second, there is the claim that this asym-
metry between universals and particulars supplies an Adequate universal-particular
distinction, in the sense defended in Chapter 2. I turn to these questions, respec-
tively, in the following two sections, §6.2 and §6.3.
6.2 Universals and the Identity of Indiscernibles
It is a short step from causal structuralism to the claim that certain universals are
identical if indiscernible, to the claim that universals (that confer causal powers)
satisfy The Principle. As we have seen, the causal essence of a given universal cor-
responds to a natural property (the property of conferring C17) or set of natural
properties (the property of conferring c2, the property of conferring c24, ...). Since
these causal essences are unique, each universal (that confers causal powers) ex-
emplifies a unique natural property or set of natural properties. So indiscernible
universals (that confer causal powers) are impossible. This is just to say that uni-
versals (that confer causal powers) satisfy The Principle.
Here, there is clearly work left to be done. I have not argued that all univer-
sals confer causal powers. If there are universals that do not confer causal powers,
I’ve given no reason to think that they satisfy The Principle as well. I turn presently
to this question.
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6.2.1 Four Ways for Universals to be Identical if Indiscernible
The most obvious lacuna in the general argument of this dissertation concerns uni-
versals that do not confer causal powers. Only if all universals conferred causal
powers could the argument for causal structuralism given in the previous chapter
deliver the conclusion that all universals are identical if indiscernible. I must find,
then, some way to fill this gap. I will consider four such ways, in no particular
order. Before considering those options, I want to remark that I find the claim that
universals are identical if indiscernible initially plausible. There seems to be a good
sense in which universals differ qualitatively. While the ontologist must vindicate
that claim, it is important to note it at the outset in order to set the dialectical sit-
uation. For this shifts the initial burden of proof to those who deny that universals
satisfy The Principle.
Furthermore, universals cannot do their work if they do not satisfy The
Principle. This is especially clear in the case of highly determinate universals like
the property of being yellow and the property of being an equilateral triangle.1 The
argument proceeds via reductio and bears an important resemblance to the argument
that properties with symmetrical causal powers are not possible. So suppose there
is a universal that is qualitatively indiscernible from a distinct, arbitrarily chosen,
highly determinate universal, say the property of being blue. Call this property
‘A’. It is plausible, I think, that determinable-determinate relations, and categorial
relations generally, are natural. Categorial relations seem to make for resemblance.
The property of being yellow and the property of being blue resemble in that they are
1The simplest and most effective way to clarify the determinable-determinate relationship is
by giving examples. The property of being a color and the property of being a shape are both
determinates of the determinable, the property of being a property. The property of being red and
the property of being blue are both determinates of the determinable, the property of being a color,
while the property of being triangular and the property of being rectangular are both determinates
of the determinable, the property of being a shape. And the property of being scarlet and the
property of being burgundy are both determinates of the determinable, the property of being red,
while the property of being equilateral and the property of being scalene are both determinables of
the determinate, the property of being triangular. So the determianble-determinate relationship is
relative in this sense: a property is only a determinable (determinate) with respect to some other
property. Nothing is simply a determinable or a determinate. The relations are also transitive: the
property of being a color is a determinable of the determinates, the property of being scarlet and
the property of being burgundy. They are also asymmetric and irreflexive.
It should be non-controversial that a vast many (natural) properties stand in determinable-
determinate relations that can be used to construct a sort of hierarchy. Besides colors and shapes,
various magnitudes (masses, extensions, etc.), biological and artifactual kinds, functional properties,
and mental properties also form determinable-determinate hierarchies.
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both colors. The property of being triangular and the property of being rectangular
resemble in that they are both shapes. I could go on, but I suspect the idea is more
or less clear. Thus, A must stand in all the same categorial relations as the property
of being blue. A is a determinate of the property of being a color ; it stands in the
darker than relation to the property of being yellow ; etc. Just this much should
cast doubt on whether there really is a distinct property here. Further, A would
confer all the same causal powers as the property of being blue. I argued above that
such a situation is problematic and should be rejected. At any rate, in light of the
qualitative indiscernibility between A and the property of being blue, it is plausible to
think that entities which exemplify A will exactly resemble entities which exemplify
the property of being blue and will resemble other entities which exemplify other
properties to whatever degree entities which exemplify the property of being blue
resemble those other entities exemplifying those other properties. I contend that
this situation upsets the ability of the property of being blue to do its work with
regard to making for resemblance. Two objects can exactly resemble despite having
no properties in common. This is precisely what a realist about universals goes to
great lengths to deny. Alternatively, given that A and the property of being blue are
distinct universals, objects which exemplify them should be qualitatively dissimilar.
But it is difficult to discern in what sense this would be so. An object which
exemplified A would have a color that is darker than an object which exemplified the
property of being yellow ; it would be colored; etc. Distinct (natural) properties ought
to make for qualitative dissimilarity, and this seems to be upset by the possibility
of qualitatively indiscernible universals.
What about more determinable universals like the property of being a color
and the property of being a shape, and what about causal conferring properties like
that of conferring the ci? The situation with these universals is more or less the
same, I think. Suppose there was a property that stood in all the same categorial
relations as the property of being a color ; call it ‘B’. B would be a determinable of
the property of being blue, and the property of being burgundy, etc. It would be a
determinate of the property of being a physical property, etc. And it would confer all
the same powers as the property of being a color. Objects which exemplify B would
exactly resemble objects which exemplify the property of being a color, and would
resemble other objects to whatever degree do objects which exemplify the property
of being a color. As with more determinate properties, I simply lose my grip on
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the claim that there really is a distinct property here. But more importantly, we
have a case in which exact resemblance is possible without sharing of unviersals and
in which possession of distinct (natural) properties does not make for qualitative
dissimilarity. These properties cannot do their work.2
The existence of two properties which exemplify all the same natural prop-
erties and which stand in all the same natural relations is not the same, however,
as having two independent sets of properties comprising symmetrical structures.
Maybe there might be two “color” hierarchies, or two “shape” hierarchies, and so
on. Each property in these hierarchies would need to be indiscernible with their
“twin” in the other hierarchy with respect to natural properties. Twins would need,
at minimum, to exemplify twin properties and stand in twin relations, but could
exemplify some identical properties and stand in some identical relations. This
may seem to be a problem because have here a scenario where there is a sense in
which two structures of properties are qualitative duplicates but are nonetheless
non-identical. But such a description is not available in this case. As described,
the symmetrical structure scenario requires that twin properties exemplify different
natural properties or stand in different natural relations. It is no matter that the
different properties exemplified or different relations stood in are themselves twin.
Twins are not identical, so exemplifying twin properties and standing in twin rela-
tions is not enough to constitute qualitative duplication. The Principle is therefore
not threatened by such a scenario.
Given the prima facie plausibility of the claim that universals satisfy The
Principle, that that claim simply needs vindication, and the plausibility of the case
that universals cannot do their work if they do not satisfy The Principle, the burden
is, I believe, on the detractor to argue us out of it. I do not believe that burden
can be convincingly met. It is this last claim that I hope to achieve. To do so, I
will consider four ways that one might fill out one’s theory of universals in order to
guarantee the claim that universals are identical if indiscernible. I hope the reader
will find at least one of the stories plausible.
The first way to fill the lacuna created by my not having argued that all
universals confer causal powers is just to defend the claim that all universals do
confer causal powers. If that is true, then the argument for causal structuralism
2Here again, it may help some to imagine God undertaking to instantiate one, rather than
another, of these indiscernible properties.
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given in the previous chapter delivers the conclusion that all universals have a unique
causal essence. And thus all universals would be identical if indiscernible. This
strategy does not strike me as particularly promising. It seems to me that some
universals do not confer causal powers. For example, it seems strained to me to
think that the property of conferring Ci (for some i such that the corresponding
property is exemplified by a natural property) itself confers causal powers; I can
think of no causal powers that it plausibly could confer on the natural property that
exemplifies it. In general, universals exemplified (only) by other universals seem like
plausible candidates for universals that do not confer causal powers on their bearers.
However, one might claim that the property of conferring Ci confers on the things
that exemplify it the power to confer Ci. That is, one might think the property of
conferring Ci exemplifies the property of conferring the property of conferring Ci.
This latter property might in turn exemplify the property of conferring the property
of conferring the property of conferring Ci. In order to execute this strategy, one
must commit to an infinite hierarchy of such iterated conferring properties, and one
must further commit to the claim that each property in the hierarchy is natural.
(This is required, recall, in order that the Change Principle be relevant to each
property in the hierarchy and, thus, in order that the things that exemplify each of
them have a (unique) causal essence.)
In short, there are three challenges for this strategy. First, one must defend
the claim that even properties like the property of conferring Ci, confer causal
powers. Second, one must defend the claim that iterated conferring properties, like
the property of conferring the property of conferring Ci, are natural. And third, one
must defend the claim that an infinite hierarchy of iterated conferring properties is
worth taking on board. While the first two of these claims do not seem plausible
to me, I have no argument against them. They are not incoherent, nor is there an
obvious contradiction between each and any other claim I have assumed or defended
here.
However, while the third claim—that an infinite hierarchy of iterated confer-
ring properties is worth taking on board—is not obviously incoherent or inconsistent
with other claim I have assumed or defended, one may think there is a good case to
be made against it. The objector proceeds by arguing that infinite hierarchies like
the one needed here are a form of problematic infinite regress. One way to argue
that the hierarchy involves a problematic infinite regress is to first claim that the
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identity of the properties at each level depends on the identity of properties at the
next level. Then one claims that this dependence is problematic because one can
never reach the “top” of the hierarchy and, thus, that one cannot “ground” the iden-
tities of properties at any lower level. This construal of the objection is, then, one
that betrays a general opposition to infinite hierarchies. These sorts of oppositions
inevitably rely on some intuition about orders of explanation, or some such. In this
case, the identity of properties higher up the hierarchy “explain” or “ground” or
“underlie” the identities of the properties below. I confess, however, that I don’t
understand these sorts of worries. My failure to understand is not general; there are
cases where I feel the need to “explain” or “ground” one thing by or on another. In
particular, I understand the need to explain the features of particulars by appeal-
ing to universals. Particulars (most of them, anyway) are contingent entities, and
their properties and relations are likewise contingently exemplified. In light of this
contingency, questions like these are intelligible and seem to admit of substantive
answers: Why is this thing here now red rather than green? A dog rather than a
person? Etc. However, when the entities in question are necessary existents and
the properties they have or the relations in which they stand are necessarily had or
stood in by them, I lose my grip on what’s being demanded when someone demands
an explanation. To say, for example, that the property of being blue is what it is
because it is a determinate of the property of being a color while denying that the
property of being a color is what it is because it is a determinable of the property of
being blue is incredible. I don’t see any order here at all. Likewise with these con-
ferring properties. Given that the relationships between all of them are necessary,
I don’t see how one can impose any sort of order on the relationships between their
identities. To say that one grounds or explains another is implausible.
This take on the situation is likely to give rise to cries of vicious circularity.
I am explaining the identity of one property on the basis of the identity of another
while also explaining the identity of the latter on the basis of the identity of the
former. I am doing no such thing. I deny that there is explaining to do here at all,
not that the explanation runs both ways. For similar reasons, I do not understand
charges of circularity when the entities in question are necessary existents and when
the properties and relations in question are necessarily had by or stood in by those
necessary existents. The need for explanation simply strikes me as a misguided one.
I will return to this issue in a bit.
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More generally, insofar as an infinite regress is composed by a hierarchy, it is
not for just that reason problematic. Certainly you get a proliferation of ontology,
but that is only a problem if one can do without it or if one has no reason to embrace
it, not in virtue of being infinite. Only when one must continually appeal to the
same entity along the regress is there immediate cause for worry.3 For then, one
is explaining a thing on the basis of itself. Hierarchies do not do this. One gets
different entities at every level. So one can mitigate any worry merely about the
proliferation of ontology if one has reason to believe that such a proliferation is
necessary. I have argued that universals must satisfy The Principle, and it may be
that the only ways to make good on this claim is to embrace at least one infinite
hierarchy. At least the ways I can think of do; this will emerge. Furthermore, it may
be that commitments one takes on just in virtue of being a realist about universals
commits one to an infinite hierarchy. If it is those commitments that allow us to
make good on the claim that universals satisfy The Principle, our footing will be
that much more sure. (Such will be the case for the third non-causal structuralist
option outlined below.)
At any rate, there are other ways to fill this lacuna than by arguing that
all universals confer causal powers. Universals may exemplify other sorts of natural
properties than properties like that of conferring such and such powers. As such, it
may be possible to be a double-aspect theorist, or even a Humean about universals
and causal powers and nonetheless embrace the present strategy for making the
universal-particular distinction. I turn presently to the first of three ways to argue
that universals are identical if indiscernible without embracing causal structuralism
about all universals, but will begin by considering a suggestion of Zimmerman’s
(2000).
With Zimmerman (2000), let a “‘non-circular definition’ of the individual
essence of a thing x be the specification of conditions logically necessary and sufficient
for being x, conditions which do not themselves mention entities having individual
essences which in any way involve x itself.” (p. 281) Zimmerman continues:
[I]t is a relatively easy matter to find necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for being this or that particular property without appeal to causal
powers. For it is plausible to suppose that every property stands in
3Cf. the “resemblance” regress cited as a problem for “Resemblance Nominalism” in, e.g.,
Moreland (2001).
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necessary relations to other properties (properties that are not in any
obvious way themselves causal powers), and that this network of nec-
essary relations is such that no two properties stand in precisely the
same necessary relations to other members of the network. I have in
mind relations among determinables and determinates: every determi-
nate necessarily falls under its determinable(s), and necessarily excludes
all other same-level determinates; and these two features can be used to
build non-causal, purely qualitative individual essences for determinates
and determinables—albeit ones that go round in a circle. (p. 282)
Zimmerman counsels us to forego the search for a non-circular definition of the
individual essences of properties, but offers a way to specify, in a circular way, the
individual essences of properties by exploiting determinable-determinate relations.
Zimmerman provides the following example of how to use determinable-
determinate relationships to specify the individual essence of a property:
[C]onsider the property of having mass n, where n is some value in a
standard unit of measure for mass. Necessarily, anything that has mass n
does not have mass n 1; more generally it is necessary that, for every real
number m such that m is not zero but is greater than n, something has
mass n only if it does not have mass n m. I submit that it is a necessary
truth that something has the property having mass n if and only if it
has some mass or other, but not mass n   m, for every m satisfying
the above recipe. This gives us an individual essence for having mass
n, a logically necessary and sufficient condition for being that particular
property. The determinable property having (some) mass (or other) will
in turn have as its essence being such that anything that exemplifies it has
either mass n or n  1 or.... The technique is obviously applicable to all
other properties that are either determinables or determinates. ((2000)
p. 282)
With respect to properties the units of measure of which fall on some sort of line (in
the case of mass, the natural numbers), we can agree that Zimmerman has given an
example that is easily generalizable.
It seems that Zimmerman’s idea is to use the determinable-determinate and,
more generally, categorial relations in which natural properties stand to specify their
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essences. Supposing that those relations are unique, that no two properties stand in
exactly the same or symmetrical categorial relations, and supposing that categorial
relations are natural, we can turn Zimmerman’s suggestion into an argument for
the claim that natural properties (universals) are identical if indisicernible. This
strategy is the first non-causal structuralist option.
However, it is not obvious that all properties can be ordered in the way Zim-
merman requires, that is, in a way that precludes symmetrical categorial relations.
Consider the colors. Standardly, the colors are placed on a “wheel,” not a line. As
such, it is not obvious, pace Zimmerman, that his strategy is applicable, for de-
terminates on such a wheel will give rise to symmetrical determinate-determinable
relationships that will therefore not be sufficient to force discernibility where there
is non-identity. Furthermore, consider the shapes. It strikes me as implausible to
think that these can be ordered in any meaningful way. Consider, for example,
different sorts of triangles. Which among equilateral, scalene, and isosceles ought
to be counted as least? I don’t even know how to begin to address a question like
this. But the Zimmerman strategy needs a “least” or “greatest” member in order
to be effective.
More importantly, it not clear that Zimmerman’s suggestion is easily trans-
lated into language that guarantees satisfaction of The Principle. Consider again
the property of having mass n. Zimmerman supplies this individual essence: being
some mass or other, but not mass n   m, for every m satisfying X, where X is
given by Zimmerman’s recipe. This essence is not a good candidate for a natural
property. We must find some set of natural properties the possession of which will
be necessary and sufficient for having that essence. We can distinguish two parts
to the essence: first, being some mass or other and second, not being mass n   m,
for every m satisfying X. With respect to the first part, the translation into the
language of natural properties is relatively straightforward. We can say that the
property of having mass n stands in the is a determinate of relation to the property
of being some mass or other, the name we can give to the determinable the de-
terminates of which are all the individual masses and nothing else (the property of
having a mass may be better, but what to call the relevant property needn’t concern
us). Determinable-determinate relations are plausibly natural, when the properties
standing in them are natural as well. Determinable-determinate relations are in the
ontological base of a realist ontology: one cannot describe the categorial structure of
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the ontology without mentioning them. The property of having mass n is plausibly
natural. Things can resemble in virtue of having it. And the property of being some
mass or other is plausibly natural. Things with mass should share at least one
causal power, a power that will not be possessed by things without mass. So the
first condition can be translated into the language of natural properties. What of
the second condition, that of not being mass n m for all m satisfying X? The most
obvious way to translate this into a view relevant to The Principle is via the claim
that the property of having mass n exemplifies the properties of not being mass
n m1, not being mass n m2, and so on. If that is right, then we are here invoking
properties of non-identity, or properties of distinctness, in order to guarantee that
universals satisfy The Principle.
This should be troubling. Properties of non-identity are negative properties,
so their naturalness is immediately called into question. Negative properties do not
seem fit to make for resemblance or causal powers, or to be part of the ontological
base. Intuitively, two things can be entirely dissimilar (or have no causal powers in
common) and yet “share” many negative properties. And there do not seem to be
any truths that cannot be accounted for by appealing only to non-negative prop-
erties; negative properties thus are not required in the ontological base. Simplicity
dictates, therefore, that we exclude them from it. I suggest, then, that Zimmer-
man’s way is not a plausible one for making the case that universals satisfy The
Principle. I will return to Zimmerman’s suggestion in a bit, and will argue that it
is instructive.
The first non-causal structuralist option, then, faces two challenges. First,
there is the possibility that categorial relations will be symmetrical in some cases.
Second, even leaving aside the first challenge, there is the fact that the Zimmerman
strategy apparently invokes properties of non-identity or distinctness to guarantee
that non-identical universals are discernible. There is, here again, an infinite hierar-
chy. In this case, it is either an infinite hierarchy of categorial relations or an infinite
hierarchy of properties of distinctness. If we avail ourselves only of unique categorial
relations, these categorial relations will need to stand in unique categorial relations
themselves. These latter will need to stand in unique categorial relations as well,
and so on. On the Zimmerman strategy, each property of distinctness, themselves
natural, must exemplify properties of distinctness in order to satisfy The Principle.
These properties of distinctness will themselves exemplify others, and so on. While
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I have argued that such infinite hierarchies are not intrinsically problematic, they
are a cost that must be taken into account.
On the other hand, nowhere have I addressed the question whether the prop-
erties of identity exemplified by natural properties are themselves natural. As I men-
tioned, the argument against the naturalness of properties of identity given above
only goes to show that properties of identity for particulars are not natural. The
claim that properties of identity for particulars are natural is initially troubling be-
cause naturalness is supposed to correspond roughly to qualitativeness, extended to
cover all causal powers and further to capture primacy. In the particular case, prop-
erties of identity appear to be a paradigm of non-qualitativeness; this is what led to
the mistake of ruling too quickly that they are irrelevant to indiscernibility. In the
case of universals, things are not so clear. For it is certainly prima facie plausible
that the property of being blue and the property of being yellow differ qualitiatively.
Likewise for any other pair of natural properties. It is, furthermore, hard to say in
what this qualitatively difference lies other than to reiterate that one is blue and
the other is yellow. If the difference is qualitative, though, and if qualitative dif-
ference, like qualitative similarity, is undergirded by natural properties, then it is
natural to say that the property of being (identical to) the property of being blue
and the property of being (identical to) the property of being yellow are playing a
qualitative and, therefore, natural role. This—the claim that properties of identity
for universals are natural—is the second non-causal structuralist option for arguing
that universals satisfy The Principle.
Care is needed, however. The suggestion that universals are qualitatively dif-
ferent could mean two things. On the one hand, it might mean that the universals
themselves differ qualitatively. This is the understanding assumed in the preceding
paragraph. On the other hand, it might mean that instances of the unviersals, or
objects that exemplify them differ qualitatively. In this case, the relevant qualita-
tive difference needn’t be explained in terms of a qualitative difference between the
property of being blue and the property of being yellow. Rather, one must simply
note that the property of being blue and the property of being yellow are differ-
ent qualities. But that last point is compatible with the claim that the universals
themselves do not differ qualitatively, in the sense of exemplifying different natural
properties.
This problem—that of defending the claim that universals themselves differ
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qualitatively—is the chief problem facing this second non-causal structuralist option.
I confess that I am of two minds about this issue. I am tempted by both ways of
understanding the claim that universals differ qualitatively. However, the argument
that universals cannot do their work unless they themselves differ qualitatively lends
some credibility to the understanding of the present issue which suggests natural
properties of identity for universals. Note as well that there would be an infinite
hierarchy of properties of identity in this case as well: each property of identity
for a universal would itself be natural and would thus correspond to a universal.
Thus it would exemplify a natural property of identity of its own, which would thus
correspond to a unviersal. And so on. Again, a cost.
Returning to Zimmerman’s suggestion, I think more can be made of it than I
made above by construing it as a third non-causal structuralist option. Underlying
the specific Zimmerman suggestions, which we say above was difficult to translate
into the language of natural properties, is the idea that it is the categorial rela-
tions in which properties stand which make possible a unique specification of each
properties essence. We have seen that the categorial relations themselves are prob-
ably not sufficient; some natural properties just do not stand in the right kind of
non-symmetrical categorial relations. However, what about monadic relational prop-
erties corresponding to these categorial relations? For example, what of properties
like the property of being lighter than yellow, the property of being a mass greater
than three kilograms, and the property of being a non-equilateral type of triangle?
I want to make clear what the issue here is. The issue is whether certain
monadic relational properties whose canonical descriptions involve one or more noun
phrases, are natural. This general class of monadic relational properties includes
the property of being smaller than Jamie, the property of being three feet from a
tree, and the property of being lighter than blue. Thus, the issue is not whether
certain relations—being smaller than, being three feet from, and being lighter than,
for example—are natural (though that is not something I deny). In particular, the
issue is whether monadic relational properties whose canonical descriptions involve
the name of a universal and that of a categorial relation are natural. This more
narrow class of monadic relational properties includes the property of being lighter
than yellow and the property of being a mass greater than three kilograms, not
categorial relations like that of being lighter than and being a mass greater than.
These monadic relational properties whose canonical descriptions involve
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names of categorial relations and universals correspond to “internal” relations in
which the things that exemplify them stand. Object o is internally related to ob-
ject o1 by R just in case necessarily, if o exists, then oRo1. Categorial relations are
internal to universals; universals must stand in the categorial relations that they
in fact stand in. The monadic relational properties corresponding to these internal
categorial relations are necessarily exemplified by the universals. Consider, then,
the pair of questions: Why must unviersals stand in the internal categorial relations
that they do? and Why must universals exemplify the monadic relational proper-
ties corresponding to categorial relations that they do? I claim that it is misguided
to answer these questions by appealing, respectively, to monadic relational prop-
erties corresponding to categorial relations or to internal categorial relations. In
the case of internal relations, the relations themselves and the monadic relational
properties simply come as a package. Categorial relations are internal because of
something about the entities standing in them, not something about the relation. If
one wants an explanation of this fact, it seems natural to say that the thing about
the universals that renders categorial relations internal to them is that the univer-
sals necessarily exemplify certain monadic relational properties corresponding to the
relevant categorial relations. Part of what makes the property of being yellow the
universal that it is is that it exemplifies the property of being lighter than blue, so
it must stand in the relation is lighter than to the property of being blue. To the
degree that I am inclined to explain the monadic relational properties in terms of
the relations (because of my views about external relations and monadic relational
properties corresponding to those), I am also inclined to explain the relations in
terms of the monadic relational properties (again, why are the relations internal?).
This prompts the promised return to the problem of circularity discussed
above. If there is circularity here, it is not just that there is a circle between the
exemplification of the relevant monadic relational properties and the standing in the
corresponding categorial relations. It is also between the identity conditions for the
property of being yellow and those for the property of being blue. Claiming that the
categorial relations “come before” their corresponding monadic relational properties
is simply no help in this context. For the categorial relations in question have to
be relations to the appropriate universals. If the exemplification of the monadic
relational properties “came before” the standing in the categorial relations, we would
have a tidy explanation of this fact. But here again, it seems to me that the desire
161
for explanation, and thus the cry of circularity, is simply misguided. Here’s a slogan:
the colors (and all other universals) rise and fall together. They rise and fall along
with the requisite categorial relations and monadic relational properties. If there is
circularity here, it is benign.
Returning to the development of this option, first note that monadic rela-
tional properties corresponding to categorial relations are plausibly natural. The
property of being yellow and that of being orange resemble in that they both ex-
emplify the property of being lighter than blue. The property of being a square and
the property of being a rectangle resemble in that they are both determinates of the
property of being a quadrilateral. Clearly, these examples can be multiplied. Impor-
tantly, it seems to me that one can not give a complete qualitative characterization
of, for example, the property of being yellow without mentioning the property of
being lighter than blue. So there is an important asymmetry between these monadic
relational properties and those corresponding to, for example, spatial relations. It
seems no part of a qualitative characterization of me that I exemplify the property
of being three miles from Jamie. This property is a paradigm “Cambridge” prop-
erty; monadic relational properties corresponding to categorial relations are no such
thing.4 These monadic relational properties make for resemblance. Therefore, they
are natural. Second, it is plausible that every universal will exemplify a unique set
of monadic relational properties, unlike when one limits oneself to categorial rela-
tions. The reason these monadic relational properties provide a more powerful basis
for supplying identity conditions for universals than do categorial relations alone, is
that these monadic relational properties have the other universals “built into” them.
Each universal can serve as the “least” or “greatest” member in the sense that was
lacking above.
Does this option require that universals have quiddities? Maybe. Some
may think that because the canonical descriptions of the relevant monadic rela-
tional properties exploit the names of universals, the identities of the universals
whose names they exploit must be secured without the monadic relational proper-
ties themselves. I certainly don’t share this suspicion. But it doesn’t matter. Even
if one thinks one needs quiddities to “ground” the identities of monadic relational
4Thus we find the holism implied by the bundle theory problematic, while we do not find a
holism for properties problematic. This is, I believe, a symptom of the our intuitions about the
relevant monadic relational properties. It is, furthermore, the reason why I allowed myself to exploit
modest causal structuralism.
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properties, it will still be the case that universals exemplify unique sets of these
monadic relational properties. As such, they will satisfy The Principle, whether or
not quiddities are needed for some other reason.
There is another infinite hierarchy in this case as well. The proponent of
the use of natural monadic relational properties to guarantee the claim that uni-
versals satisfy The Principle will be forced to claim that the monadic relational
properties themselves stand in categorial relations corresponding to unique sets of
monadic relational properties. This is required in order that the monadic relational
properties themselves satisfy The Principle. These will stand in categorial relations
corresponding to natural monadic relational properties, which in turn must stand
in categorial relations corresponding to natural monadic relational properties, and
so on. Yet again, a cost.
On the other hand, I do not believe there is anything like the challenges
I’ve outlined for the other three views which guarantee that universals satisfy The
Principle. As such, this fourth view seems initially more plausible. Indeed, whether
or not one aims to make the universal-particular distinction in this way, I think
one ought to end up committed to this hierarchy of monadic relational properties
corresponding to categorial relations. As I mentioned earlier, insofar as the realist
ought to be committed to the infinite hierarchy of monadic relational properties
required by this option, the universal-particular distinction that exploits it is better
poised to pay the costs imposed by the proliferation of ontology.
The upshot of the forgoing is that we have options for making good on
the claim that universals satisfy The Principle. I have supplied four. First, one
can claim that all natural properties confer causal powers and that, therefore, all
universals are identical if indiscernible because each exemplifies a unique set of causal
conferring properties. Second, one can claim that all natural properties are ordered
in such a way that they stand in unique, natural categorial relations and that,
therefore, they are identical if indiscernible. Third, one can claim that properties of
identity for natural properties are themselves natural and that, therefore, universals
are identical if indiscernible. And fourth, one can claim that monadic relational
properties whose canonical description involve the name of a natural property and
which are exemplified only by natural properties are natural, and that, therefore,
universals are identical if indiscernible.
I have offered some problems for each of these options, but I do not believe
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that any of them are decisive. Indeed, I have argued that many of the problems
rely on highly controversial general ontological principles. Given the prima facie
plausibility of the claim that every universal is qualitatively different, and the more
important argument that universals cannot do their work if they do not satisfy The
Principle, I believe these options are sufficient to vindicate the claim. Further, I
will say this: the disjunction of these four options is, in my mind, more plausible
than its negation. And, at any rate, my failure may simply be one of imagination.
There may be other ways of filling out the theory of universals in order to guarantee
the claim that they satisfy The Principle. If so, so much the better for my way of
making the universal-particular distinction.
I therefore conclude, with a degree of hesitance appropriate to these kinds of
metaphysical inquiries, that universals are identical if indiscernible, that they satisfy
The Principle. Two thirds of the stated aim of this dissertation have been achieved.
6.3 The Adequacy of This Completed Puzzle
Lastly, I must consider whether the puzzle assembled herein is adequate in the sense
of Ch. 2. I believe that it is.
First, the distinction for which I have argued is E-Adequate: it gets the pre-
theoretical extensions of the categories right. I hope this claim won’t meet much
resistance. Particulars are the sorts of things I argued are subject to inclusion in
Max Black worlds, whose properties of identity don’t make for causal powers, etc.
Universals, on the other hand, are those features of particulars that I argued satisfy
the strictures of causal structuralism, or whose properties of identity are natural, or
which stand in categorial relations corresponding to monadic relational properties,
etc. In other words, the sorts of things that I considered in developing the distinction
I have defended guarantees that I have not altered the inchoate extensions of the
categories in an unacceptable way.
Further, the distinction for which I have argued leaves a penumbral area
fuzzy. So, I have left open whether certain abstract objects like sets, numbers,
and propositions are universals or particulars. I believe this is as it should be. I
have no clear sense for whether these kinds of entities are universals or particulars.
If a careful examination of their respective natures returned the result that they
satisfied The Principle, then one could conclude that these entities are universals.
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If one concluded that they did not satisfy The Principle, then one could conclude
that they are particulars. Having a distinction that leaves open the status of these
kinds of entities is, I believe, a virtue of the view defended here.
Second, the distinction for which I have argued is I-Adequate. Again, a
distinction is I-Adequate just in case it is motivated by the broader theory of uni-
versals and particulars. One must find a feature X—in our case, satisfaction of
The Principle—that particulars have but universals lack, or vice versa. To ensure
that the distinction is I-Adequate, one must argue for the status of particulars with
respect to X on the basis of observation and modal intuition about the nature of
particulars. With respect to universals, in light of the fact that universals are theo-
retical posits, one must argue on the basis of what it takes for them to do their work.
This is precisely what I have done here. The Black World arguments proceed on the
basis of modal intuitions about what sorts of worlds of particulars are and are not
possible. And the arguments that universals satisfy The Principle proceeds on the
basis of what it takes for universals to do their work. Since these arguments return
an asymmetry with respect to The Principle, the distinction constructed thereon is
I-Adequate.
I conclude, then, that the following is an Adequate universal-particular dis-
tinction: Universals satisfy The Principle, and particulars do not.
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Appendix A
Moltmann and Ontology
A.1 The Issue
In a series of papers ((2003), (2004a), (2004b)), Friederike Moltmann has argued
that an adequate understanding of two classes of English phenomena requires a
four-fold ontological distinction among ordinary objects (you and I), universals or
properties (the property of being wise), tropes (Briggs’s wisdom), and kinds (the
class of wise tropes and the class of houses). The first class of phenomena concerns
the behavior of certain quantifiers typically consisting in combinations of a deter-
miner concatenated with the bound morphemes thing and way, as in something,
everything, and the same way. Moltmann calls these “nominalizing quantifiers”.
The second class of phenomena concerns the behavior of bare nominalizations such
as wisdom as compared to the behavior of explicit property referring terms such
as the property of wisdom/being wise. The two classes are related in that her view
about the second goes to further her view about the first.
Moltmann’s ontology is rather elaborate. While most realists side either
with Aristotle or with Plato about the nature of universals, Moltmann (2004b)
thinks we need both. While most who countenance universals reject the need for
tropes, Moltmann (2003), (2004a) thinks we need both. While most would equate
the realm of things and the realm of objects, Moltmann (2004a) thinks we need
“non-objects” as well. Once one takes stock of the complete picture Moltmann
supplies, the question whether English forces these view on us seems natural. I will,
with limited scope, ask it.
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After I lay out Moltmann’s case and some aspects of her ontology, I will argue
that we can make due with less. In particular, I will argue that there is some more
English data that is difficult for Moltmann to accommodate cleanly and, moreover,
that Moltmann has no need for the tropes of contemporary trope theorists once she
has admitted universals.
A.2 Moltmann’s Case
Here is Moltmann on what she hopes to establish:
Nominalizing quantifiers...do not range over possible meanings of occur-
rences of expressions they could replace (i.e. predicative, adverbial, or
clausal expressions), namely entities such as properties or propositions.
Rather nominalizing quantifiers induce reference to other kinds of ob-
jects, objects only related to the semantic contribution of expressions
such quantifiers could replace. Nominalizing quantifiers generally range
over what is now most often called ‘tropes’, that is, instantiations of
properties in obejcts, or else entities related to tropes, such as collec-
tions of tropes, kinds of tropes, or higher-order tropes. ((2003) p. 446.)
And later:
[S]omething ranges over the kinds of things that nominalizations derived
from adjectives and verbs refer to and these things are not...things of the
sort of properties or propositions. ((2003) p. 447)
Moltmann calls quantifiers like ‘something’ nominalizing quantifiers for that reason,
that is, because ‘something’ ranges over the nominalist’s tropes (Jamie’s cuteness
and Tim’s belief that Jamie is cute) rather than the realist’s properties/universals
(the property of being cute and the proposition that Jamie is cute). For ease of
discussion, I will by and large focus on the predicative case, where a nominalizing
quantifier replaces a predicative noun phrase, as in the move from (A.1) to (A.2):
(A.1) Jamie is cute.
(A.2) Jamie is something endearing.
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However, I believe what I have to say carries over to the clausal case as well.
Moltmann also believes that the “Relational Analysis” of predicative and
attitudinal statements is mistaken. The Relational Analysis is the view that pred-
icative and clausal complements have properties or propositions as their semantic
values, which values serve as argument to the relation expressed by the verb. It is
tempting for proponents of the Relational Analysis to take the behavior of nominal-
izing quantifiers like ‘something’, which can replace these complements, as evidence
for their view, and therefore to take such quantifiers to function as ordinary ob-
jectual quantifiers ranging over the semantic values of the predicative and clausal
complements. The Relational Analysis, then, analyzes (A.2) as in (A.3):
(A.3) Dx(is(Jamie, x) & endearing(x)).
Moltmann, on the other hand, will defend an analysis of (A.2) as in (A.4), where
‘W’ is a variable ranging over predicates of English, prop(W) the property expressed
by W, and f (prop(W)) the entity that the nominalization of the predicate W refers
to:
(A.4) DxDW(is W(Jamie) & x= f (prop(W)) & endearing(x)).
Given all this, it should be clear that Moltmann must defend, at bottom,
three claims. First, she must defend the claim that nominalizing quantifiers are not
ordinary objectual quantifiers which range over possible arguments to the predicate.1
This step would establish that (A.3) is inadequate. Second, Moltmann must defend
that something like (A.4) is correct, where what is still open is what to put on the
other side of the ‘’ from x in the second conjunct. Third, she must defend the
claims that bare nominalizations and ‘property of’ constructions refer to different
kinds of objects, and that nominalizing quantifiers range over the things that she
claims bare nominalizations refer to, rather than over the things that ‘property of’
constructions do. This step would establish that one ought to put ‘ f (prop(W))’ on
the other side of ‘’, rather than, for example, ‘prop(W)’. At the end of the day,
what I really want to challenge Moltmann’s case for the third claim, for reasons that
will emerge below.
1I ignore the possibility of construing nominalizing quantifiers as substitutional. Moltmann
(2003) defends as well the claim that this view is incorrect.
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A.2.1 The First Claim
It will be worthwhile to review the evidence Moltmann garners in favor of the first
claim, namely that nominalizing quantifiers are not ordinary objectual quantifiers.
If complements provide an argument for a relation expressed by the embedding
predicate, then in extensional contexts unlimited substitutions of co-referring ex-
pressions should be allowed salva veritate. For example, where Jamie is the wife of
Tim’s youth and the best AP English teacher at Akins HS, (A.6) and (A.7) must
be true if (A.5) is:
(A.5) Tim is married to Jamie.
(A.6) Tim is married to the wife of his youth.
(A.7) Tim is married to the best AP English teacher at Akins HS.
‘Married to’ is clearly expressing a relation, to which the referent of ‘Jamie’, ‘the
wife of his youth’, and ‘the best AP English teacher at Akins HS’ serve as argument.
If predicative complements denote a property which serves as an argument to the
relation expressed by the relevant predicate, as they do according to proponents
of the Relational Analysis, then unlimited substitutions of co-referring expressions
should be allowed there as well. However, some substitutions result in either unac-
ceptability or a change in meaning of the embedding predicate. Thus, predicative
complements cannot serve as arguments. For example, consider the following:
(A.8) Jamie remained cute.
(A.9) Jamie remained the property of being cute/some property/some entity.
In (A.8), ‘remained’ has a predicative reading, whereas in (A.9) it takes on an
identity reading, as in (A.10):
(A.10) Jamie remained Jamie.
Moltmann calls this the “Substitution Problem”, and it serves as her main argument
against the Relational Analysis.
Given the Substitution Problem, we have good reason to think that the Re-
lational Analysis is mistaken: predicative (and clausal) complements do not provide
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arguments for a relation expressed by the embedding predicate. Therefore, analy-
ses like that embodied in (A.3) must be rejected. One could challenge Moltmann’s
argument here, but I will grant that the Relational Analysis is mistaken for the
reasons she gives, for the purposes of this paper.
It does not yet follow that something like (A.4) must be correct. All that
follows is that ‘is’, ‘remained’, etc. do not express a relation when complemented
by a predicative complement. How to repair the analysis of sentences like (A.2) is
still an open question. However, I propose to grant that something like (A.4) is the
next most plausible proposal as an analysis of (A.2). If we do so, we must next look
to replace the ‘?’ in (A.11):
(A.11) DxDW(is W(Jamie) & x=? & endearing(x)).
I give Moltmann this much of her claim because I am not concerned about how to
move from (A.3) to (A.11). Moltmann provides no argument for this step. Rather,
I am concerned with the way Moltmann moves from (A.11) to (A.4), and she does
try to argue for that step.
A.2.2 The Third Claim
Motlmann, as I noted above, believes that the best candidate to replace the ‘?’ in
(A.11) is a trope or kind of trope—in the case of (A.2), cuteness, a kind of trope—
and it is to her arguments for this claim that we turn now. The fundamental
kind of evidence garnered to support this view comes from the behavior of certain
classes of predicates—evaluative, epistemic, instance-distribution, etc.—which act
as quantifier restrictions on nominalizing quantifiers. Consider (A.12) and (A.13)
for instance:
(A.12) Jamie is something endearing, namely cute.
(A.13) Jamie is something that is rare (namely intelligent).
‘Endearing’ is an evaluative predicate here serving to restrict the quantifier ‘some-
thing’. ‘Rare’ is an instance-distribution predicate and also restricts the quantifier
‘something’. These predicates, Moltmann argues, are not predicates that may be
rightly ascribed of properties. (A.12) does not entail that the property of being cute
(the property of cuteness) is endearing, nor does (A.13) entail that the property of
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being intelligent (the property of intelligence) is rare, Moltmann argues. She garners
evidence for this from (A.14) and (A.15), which she thinks are either unacceptable,
false, or true for the wrong reasons:
(A.14) The property of being cute is endearing.
(A.15) The property of being intelligent is rare.
According to Moltmann, in order for (A.14) to be true, the abstract object itself
must exemplify the property of being endearing. In order for (A.15) to be true, the
abstract object itself must exemplify the property of being rare. Even if those things
are true, they are not relevant to (A.12) and (A.13). (A.14) and (A.15), however,
are supposed to contrast with (A.16) and (A.17):
(A.16) Cuteness is endearing.
(A.17) Intelligence is rare.
Moltmann finds these acceptable, even true, and relevant to the truth of (A.12) and
(A.13).2 So bare nominalizations must have different denotations than ‘property of’
constructions, and she proposes that the denotations of bare nominalizations are
kinds of tropes.
I believe Moltmann’s case with respect to this third step, her argument that
tropes and kinds of tropes populate the domain of nominalizing quantifiers, is weak.
To see why, I turn first to some of the details of Moltmann’s ontology (§A.3), which
will provide clarity to the sketch of her argument. Then I will consider more data
(§A.4), which will lead to a defense of my claim that Moltamnn’s case for making
the third step in the way she does, is weak (§A.5).
A.3 Moltmann’s Ontology
Moltmann’s ontology is elaborate, and not all aspects of it are relevant for my
purposes. I will content myself to outline her notion of a trope, that of a kind (of
trope), and that of a property object, or universal. This will require a consideration
of Moltmann’s distinction between objects and so-called “non-objects”, as kinds of
tropes are supposed to be non-objects.
2Examples along these lines can be multiplied; however, these will suffice for our purposes.
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First, then, I turn to Moltmann’s notion of a trope. Moltmann (2003) gives
the following existence and identity conditions for tropes:
T. For n-place relation R, individuals d1, ..., dn, and a time t,
a. the trope that corresponds to d1, ..., dn and R at t, f pd1, ..., dn, xR, tyq, exists
iff R holds of d1, ..., dn at t,
b. the trope that corresponds to d1, ..., dn and R at t, f pd1, ..., dn, xR, tyq, is
identical to the trope that corresponds to d11 , ..., dn1 , R1 and t1, f pd11 , ..., dn1 , xR1, t1yq,
iff R  R1, d1  d11 , ..., dn  dn1 , and t  t1.
Importantly, these conditions are not sufficient to establish the existence or give the
identity conditions of the tropes of contemporary trope theory. To see why this is
so, it will be necessary to consider in a bit of detail what tropes are supposed to be,
and to what they are supposed to be an alternative.
What is a trope? As Moltmann recognizes, a trope is at bottom a “particu-
larized” property, a property instance. Everyone must, in some sense, countenance
tropes in their ontology; it is obvious that properties have instances. But Moltmann
also recognizes, and clearly intends to take up, a more contentious use of ‘trope’ that
gives specific, controversial content to that name, such that tropes stand in clear
contrast to the property instances of most theories of universals.
That content is this: tropes are properties that are also simple, abstract
particulars. Tropes are properties in that they are the ontological ground of the
attributes of ordinary objects. Some examples. Suppose we have before us three
objects o1, o2, and o3. Suppose that o1 is blue and spherical, that o2 is green and
cubical, and that o3 is blue and cubical.3 o1 and o2 do not resemble one another;
o1 and o3 resemble with respect to color but not shape; and o2 and o3 resemble
with respect to shape but not color. The trope theorist accounts for these facts
by claiming that these objects have tropes as “metaphysical” parts, which tropes
stand in relations of exact resemblance. o1 and o3 each have a distinct but exactly
resembling blue trope, that o2 and o3 each have a distinct but exactly resembling
cubical rope, and that o1 and o2 do not have any tropes that exactly resemble. What
of the claims that tropes are simple, abstract, and particular? Rightly understood,
3I will simplify the discussion by assuming that shape and color are fundamental attributes, at
the ontological ground floor, if you will. These particular choices are inessential to the discussion.
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the account of qualitative resemblance sketched in this paragraph will imply that
tropes have these features.4 First, consider the claim that tropes are simple. This
amounts to the claim that tropes are not constituted by two fundamentally different
kinds of entity, something particular and something “universal”. This marks tropes
off from realist property instances, which are constituted by a universal and a sub-
strate (or bundling relation). Rather, tropes are meant to be a single thing that
grounds both particularity and universality, but without two “parts” or “aspects”
to ground those features independently. Second, tropes are abstract. By this, the
trope theorist ought to mean that tropes are not ordinary, physical parts and that
they are qualitative. Our exactly resembling tropes must be abstract in order to
ground the qualitative natures of o1, o2, and o3. Their abstractness, in this sense,
also distinguishes tropes from bare particulars, which are non-qualitative. Lastly,
tropes are particulars. They share, therefore, an ontological category with ordi-
nary, concrete particulars like mountains, dogs, and people. To what particularity
amounts is difficult to say; it is tempting to take it as a primitive in one’s ontology.
The distinctness of our exactly resembling tropes is a consequence of the tropes’
particularity.
Now we can see that (T) does not establish the existence of the tropes of
contemporary trope theory. (T) is compatible with views according to which tropes
are complex entities and with a views according to which tropes are not particulars.
So for instance, if the name ‘trope’ is thus far floating free, waiting to be tied to
a kind of thing in the world, then the realist with complex property instances can
take (T) on board without hesitation. For they will believe that there is a trope—a
property-instance—that corresponds to an n-tuple of objects, some relation, and
a time that exists if and only if those objects stand in that relation at that time,
and that two tropes—two property-instances—are identical just in case the n-tuple
of objects, the relation, and the time related to the first trope are respectively
identical to the n-tuple of objects, the relation, and the time related to the second
trope. The second of these possibilities—that tropes are not particulars—is not
relevant, as no one holds such a view. But it is worth pointing out how drastically
(T) underdetermines standard trope theory. It is the decidedly metaphysical claims
4For the remainder of this paragraph, I draw heavily on the work of Anna-Sofia Maurin (2002).
Similar understandings of trope theory, both critical and defensive, and be found in Campbell
(1990), Daly (1997), Moreland (2001), and many others.
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about simplicity, particularity, and abstractness that mark the fundamental contrast
between the tropes of trope theory and the “tropes” of the realist.
Further, trope theory contrasts with a theory of universals in a number of
ways, making Moltmann’s acceptance of both putatively problematic. For example,
if one embraces trope theory, then there seems to be no further need for universals,
since those are postulated as well to account for qualitative resemblance. This
suggests that there are not separate ontological roles for kinds of tropes and property
objects to play. That is, if one is accounting for resemblance by using tropes and
classes of exactly resembling tropes (what Moltmann calls ‘kinds’), then that just
is one’s theory of properties, and so ‘property of’ constructions ought to refer to
kinds, not some other thing. Pace Moltmann, there just does not seem to be room
for both kinds and property objects in an ontological theory.
Here it will be useful to light on Moltmann’s distinction between “objects”
and “non-objects”, as this distinction is part of what Moltmann uses to establish the
existence of both universals and kinds of tropes. Objects, simply put, are elements
of an ontology that exemplify properties in the ordinary, “direct” way. Non-objects,
on the other hand, are elements of an ontology that do not exemplify properties in
the ordinary, direct way. Rather, non-objects exemplify properties in virtue of the
exemplification of properties other objects related to non-objects in a certain way.
Non-objects “inherit” their properties.5 Since kinds of tropes are the only type of
non-objects relevant to the present paper, we need only discuss more specifically
the sense in which kinds are non-objects. Kinds of tropes, Moltmann contends, only
exemplify properties derivatively, in virtue of the direct exemplification of properties
by tropes themselves. So, for example, wisdom exemplifies the property of being
valuable because instances of wisdom, namely wise tropes, are valuable to their
bearers.
Rather than the standard ontological way of marking the distinction between
kinds of tropes and property objects, Moltmann marks it using linguistic data that
she believes support the claim that the referents of bare nominalizations are non-
objects whereas the referents of ‘property of’ constructions are objects. Though she
does not say so, if she can make the distinction between kinds of tropes and property
objects in the way she thinks she can, then maybe she could sharply distinguish her
tropes from the property instances one might construct with property objects by
5Cf. (2004a) p. 2.
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defending the claim that property instances are not the right sort of thing to be
instances of kinds of tropes. This is yet another issue that I simply set aside here.
Instead, I want to take up Moltmann’s way of distinguishing kinds of tropes and
property objects. The crux of the matter is this claim:
Whereas predicates apply to what property-referring terms stand for
just as they do when they apply to ordinary individuals, they apply to
what bare nominalizations stand for only by, in some way, targeting the
instances first and only derivatively the kind. ((2004b) p. 746)
I disagree with both parts of this claim. First, predicates sometimes apply to what
property-referring terms stand for in a derivative way. Second, predicates sometimes
apply directly to kinds. I want to leave the first claim alone for now, and will return
to it in §A.4.
Turning, then, to the second claim. In her discussion of the the Substitution
Problem, Moltmann considers a Fregean solution, according to which the referents
of predicative and clausal complements—“concepts” and “contents” respectively—
cannot be the same as the referents of referential NPs. According to a Fregean, then,
the Substitution Problem can be solved if we recognize that concepts and contents
cannot be referred to by referential NPs. Thus Frege was infamously lead to deny
that the concept ‘horse’ is a concept and to ask for his granum salis. About such a
proposal, Moltmann says this:
The basic problem with a Fregean explanation, it seems, is this: what-
ever the things might be that predicative or clausal complements stand
for (‘concepts’ or ‘contents’), once they act as arguments of a relation
expressed by the predicate, they simply are accessible by description to
the philosopher and semanticist. ((2003) p. 451)
I don’t see the relevance of the fact that the relevant denotations act as arguments.
Rather, the issue is just this: once an entity is admitted into one’s ontology, one
makes the entity accessible by description to the philosopher and semanticist. Molt-
mann has done exactly this with kinds, and faces a similar problem as a result.
Recall that she denies that one can predicate properties directly to them. However,
consider the following:
(A.18) Intelligence is a kind.
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(A.19) The kind intelligence is a kind.
These seem to be clear cases of predication of the property of being a kind to the
kind intelligence. And if Moltmann is right, both must be true. But she also denies
the possibility of such predications, and suggests in places that ‘kind’ constructions
are like ‘property of’ constructions in that they force reference to reifications of
kinds, which are just abstract property objects that can exemplify properties in the
usual way.6 This problem, it seems to me, is just as bad as the one for which Frege
asked for his grain of salt, and which he got into by having a view on which it is
false that the concept horse is a concept. In other words, by admitting them as a
category of entities into her ontology, Moltmann makes kinds available for reference
via the exploitation of ‘kind’ constructions. By denying that kinds directly exemplify
properties, Moltmann commits to the following claim:
(A.20) The kind intelligence is not a kind
This is just like Frege’s denial that the concept horse is a concept, and just as
bad. Moltmann’s claim that ‘kind’ constructions force reference to so-called “reified
kinds” which can exemplify properties directly strikes me as unmotivated and simply
incredible. In the next section, I will hope to cast doubt on the need to make the
moves that got Moltmann to this place.
A.4 More Data?
I want to turn now to Moltmann’s claim that “predicates apply to what property-
referring terms stand for just as they do when they apply to ordinary individuals.”
It seems that there are acceptable sentences embodying explicit reference to prop-
erties but which attribute to the properties the kinds of predicates Moltmann’s
account predicts one cannot. In fact, these sentences look to be merely surface
transformations of sentences she gives to support her view. Consider the following:
(A.21) Jamie is something that is not often rewarding (namely generous).
(A.22) Jamie has a property that is not often rewarding (namely generosity/the
property of being generous).
6Cf. (2004a) p. 24.
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(A.23) Jamie is something that is rare (namely generous).
(A.24) Jamie has a property that is rare (namely generosity/the property of being
generous).
(A.25) Briggs is something that is very rare, very admirable, hard to find, and
often needed.
(A.26) Briggs has a property that is very rare, very admirable, hard to find, and
often needed.
I don’t see how to escape analyzing (A.22), (A.24), and (A.26) as in (A.27), (A.28),
and (A.29) respectively:
(A.27) Dx(has(Jamie, x) & prop(x) & not often rewarding(x))
(A.28) Dx(has(Jamie, x) & prop(x) & rare(x))
(A.29) Dx(has(Briggs, x) & prop(x) & very rare(x) & very admirable(x) & hard
to find(x) & often needed(x))
However, the attributions of properties to properties in (A.27), (A.28), and (A.29)
may need to be understood as derived property attributions, in a sense to be ex-
plained shortly. The important point, for now, is just that these seem to be clear
cases in which (i) the predicate ‘has’ takes a property as argument and (ii) instance-
distribution, evaluative, etc. predicates are acceptably applied to an argument to
the predicate ‘has’.
Moreover, suppose for the moment that bare nominalizations and ‘property
of’ constructions have the same denotations. It is not obvious that the Substitution
Problem arises here, as (A.31) and (A.34) are at least marginally, if not clearly,
acceptable restatements of (A.30) and (A.33), respectively, with (A.32) and (A.35)
the associated claims with nominalizing quantifiers:
(A.30) Jamie has the property of being generous.
(A.31) Jamie has generosity.
(A.32) Jamie has something that is rare (namely the property of being generous).
(A.33) Briggs has the property of being intelligent.
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(A.34) Briggs has intelligence.
(A.35) Briggs has something that is very rare, very admirable, hard to find, and
often needed.
It seems, then, that there is linguistic data which mitigates against Moltmann’s
contention that ‘honesty’ and ‘the property of honesty/being honest’ have different
denotations. I grant that (A.31) and (A.34) are awkward, but they strike me as no
less awkward than (A.30) and (A.33).7 Note, further, that replacing the verb ‘has’
with ‘exemplifies’ improves all six of (A.30-A.35), as in (A.36) and (A.37):
(A.36) Jamie exemplifies the property of being generous.
(A.37) Jamie exemplifies generosity.
I conjecture that the awkwardness is due to the fact that ‘has’ takes on slightly dif-
ferent meanings depending on what complements it, as suggested by the zeugmatic
effect produced by (A.38) and (A.39):
(A.38) Russell has a boat and the property of being tall.
(A.39) (My dachshund) Elsie has floppy ears and cuteness.
Since property attributions involving the verb ‘has’ complemented by a bare nom-
inalization or a ‘property of’ construction do not appear in everyday conversations
and are, relatedly, mildly technical, philosophical constructions, the awkwardness
should be none too surprising.8 They strike our ear strangely because they are
unfamiliar and unexpected. We use ‘is’ with the usual predicative complements in
ordinary speech. ‘Has’, on the other hand, has many ordinary uses, most of which
express a kind of possession very much unlike the way in which particulars “have”
properties. The use of ‘exemplifies’ is a likewise technical, philosophical locution,
that does not have more familiar usages as ‘has’ does. As such, (A.36) and (A.37)
do not have the awkwardness of (A.30) and (A.31), and the substitution of a bare
7To parody Moltmann’s claims about someone looking for a property object, we might say
that (A.30) could only be true in a metaphysical fantasy where Jamie holds the property of being
generous in her hand.
8Moltmann admits that ‘property of’ constructions are a technical part of English, but insists
that English speakers have systematic intuitions about their appropriate use. Cf. (2004b) p. 743.
I agree with the first half of that claim, but in conversations with non-philosophers have found the
second half to be overstated at best.
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nominalization for its corresponding ‘property of’ construction is simply unproblem-
atic. The upshot is this: when one reads (A.30) and (A.31) with the right notion of
‘has’ in mind (viz., exemplifies), they are acceptable, and no Substitution Problem
arises. Any awkwardness ought to be attributed to unfamiliarity and the presence
of more familiar uses of ‘has’.
As discussed above, Moltmann believes that predicates express derived prop-
erties when applied to kinds. Here is another passage reflecting this conviction:
Predicates, when applying to kinds, express derived properties, proper-
ties that hold of the kind on the basis of some or all instances fulfilling
the corresponding underived or basic property. ((2004b) p. 749)
Moltmann believes this is unique to kinds and thus distinguishes them from property
objects. However, the same phenomenon is plausibly going on with (A.22), (A.24),
and (A.26) and, therefore, is not sufficient to distinguish kinds from property ob-
jects. Though (A.22) attributes the property of being not often rewarding to the
property of being generous, that attribution is true because Jamie’s generosity—that
is, Jamie’s instance of generosity—is not often rewarding. The property of being
rare is attributed to the property of being generous by (A.24), but is true because
of the distribution of the instances of the property of being generous. Similarly for
(A.26). In other words, predicates sometimes express derived properties when ap-
plied to property objects, where the derived properties hold of the property objects
on the basis of facts about the instances of the property objects.
A.5 How to Make Due with Less
In light of the discussion in §§A.3-A.4, I believe we can replace the ‘?’ in (A.11)
with ‘prop(W)’ rather than with ‘ f (prop(W))’. That is, we can populate the do-
main of nominalizing quantifiers with universals—the denotations of ‘property of’
constructions—rather than with kinds of tropes. Moltmann’s data does not support
the need for the tropes of contemporary trope theory, so the property instances of the
realist will due, nor does it support the distinction between kinds of tropes and prop-
erty objects, so property objects alone will due. The ontology required by Moltmann
is elaborate and, I believe, redundant, and requires the dubious object/non-object
distinction. If we can make due with less, then we ought. We can, since the standard
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ontology of the realist has the resources to account for the data. So we ought.
The materials for this argument are present in what has come before, so I
will simply rehearse the adjustments one must make to Moltmann’s ontology. One
must identify the denotations of bare nominalizations with those of ‘property of’
constructions, and claim that those denotations are realist universals. Likewise,
‘kind (of)’, ‘quality (of)’, ‘attribute (of)’, etc. constructions denote universals. Uni-
versals can exemplify properties in the usual, direct way, but also in the derivative
way identified by Moltmann. Because the resulting ontology does not contain any
entities that exemplify properties only derivatively, one may dispense with the dubi-
ous object/non-object distinction. One may also borrow (T) and welcome into the
ontology tropes conceived of as complex objects (something like states of affairs)
consisting of a universal, a particular, and the exemplification relation. However,
one would want to make clear that these tropes are nothing like the tropes of trope
theorists; they are rather the property instances of standard realisms.9 With these
adjustments, much of what is wrong with Moltmann’s ontology can be corrected.10
However, there is at least one trouble for this proposal.11 Moltmann is right
that the following claims, outside any context, say different things:
(A.40) Honesty exists.
(A.41) The property of being honest exists.
(A.40) is true just in case some person or thing is honest, whereas (A.41) is true just
in case an certain abstract object exists. The present proposal, however, seems to
suggest that they say the same. The predicates are the same, as are the denotations
of the respective NPs.
The trouble is only apparent, however. We have already seen the need for
predicates that express derived properties and those that do not. In the case of
some predicates, for example ‘exists’, the meanings are ambiguous as between the
expression of a derived property and the expression of a underived property. Bor-
rowing an unseen insight from Moltmann, we can say that the default interpretation
9As such, ‘trope’ may be a misleading label. I use it simply because Moltmann does.
10Incidentally, if one is more a fan of trope theory than realism about universals, one can go a
slightly different route and use the standard ontology of trope theory to purge Moltmann’s ontology
of the object/non-object distinction and the proliferation of entities as well. As a committed realist,
I choose not to go this way, but the debate between realists and trope theorists is orthogonal to
the real issue here, viz. how not to end up with Moltmann’s ontology.
11Troubles about awkwardness in certain sentences are dealt with above.
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of the predicates is determined by the choice of subject. If one uses a bare nominal-
ization, the default interpretation of a predicate takes one to the derived property;
if one uses a ‘property of’ construction, the default interpretation takes one to the
underived property. (This goes to further mollify the worries about awkwardness
discussed above.12) Furthermore, note that the interpretations of the predicates can
be forced by context. Consider the following:
(A.42) Lots of properties exist in Plato’s heaven, whether they have instances
or not. Wisdom exists (there), Patience exists (there), along with many
others.
Given this slight contextual set-up, one very clearly gets ‘Wisdom exists’ to mean
that the abstract object exists, whether or not there are any instances. This use
is perfectly acceptable, and Moltmann cannot explain it without making similar
adjustments for context. But once one introduces such adjustments, what gain is
there to adding all the extras to one’s ontology? Better to stick with less.
12Cf. (2004a) p. 29, where Moltmann has to make a similar sort of move to avoid a problem for
her own proposal.
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